PFJO,

First, I notice that you haven’t answered my question. I mentioned one specific case in which people who advocate a “thick” conception of libertarianism (including Howley, myself, Roderick Long, Wendy McElroy, Hans Hoppe, Chris Sciabarra, Ayn Rand, Benjamin Tucker, Herbert Spencer, and a lot of other people from many different wings of the mvement) often stress the importance of non-coercive cultural phenomena to libertarian politics: cases in which there are important causal preconditions for a flourishing free society. Here it seems that libertarians have strategic reasons for favoring some non-coercive cultural arrangements over other non-coercive cultural arrangements, even though neither arrangement involves an initiation of force against identifiable victims. Do you disagree? If so, why? Or do you agree, but think that strategic commitments are somehow unimportant for libertarians to consider? If so, why?

Second, rather than responding to this question, at all, you have simply repeated a set of completely unsupported definitional claims. I don’t know what expertise or authority you think you have that would justify these from-the-mountaintop declarations. It certainly has nothing to do with the history of the word “libertarian” (or the French “libertaire,” from which “libertarian” was derived). The word has meant all kinds of different things throughout its history: it was originally coined by Joseph Dejacque as a euphemism for anarchistic socialism (which is still the primary use of the term in Europe); it has been used as a general contrast term for “authoritarianism”; American free marketeers and Constitutionalists started using it as a replacement term for “classical liberal” in the mid-20th century; about a decade later, a few (e.g. Murray Rothbard, later on Walter Block) started using it to specifically describe an axiomatic ethico-political system deriving from the non-aggression principle. The last of these definitions is the only one that systematically excludes consideration of any social question other than those having to do with the legitimate use of force. Some other meanings of the term (e.g. the understanding of “libertarianism” as more or less synonymous with “classical liberalism”) tend to minimize but not do away with other considerations; others (e.g. the identification of libertarianism with anti-authoritarianism or anarchism specifically) tend to put quite a bit of attention on broader questions about the desirability of different non-coercive social structures. You can find out some of the history behind these kinds of debates from books like Chris Sciabarra’s Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical and Total Freedom; I already linked an article of my own (from FEE’s The Freeman: Ideas on Liberty) which discusses some of the philosophical aspects of the debate and mentions some of the history of debates within the movement along the way. Of course you’re under no obligation to agree with me on the matter (lots of libertarians don’t–Walter Block, for example, has recently written against “thick” conceptions of libertarianism) but the position is certainly out there, and has been out there for a good century and a half or so, and it’s a bit much for you to simply hand down unsupported declarations about the “definition” of libertarianism (as if there were a single uncontested definition!).

Third, you make the following specific claim about what Kery Howley has been doing in her posts on libertarianism and feminism: “her line of argument isn’t an attempt to characterize certain social pressure as immoral and to encourage libertarians to speak out against them (which is fine and I agree), rather she is simply trying to expand the definition of coercive force to fit her pet issues. It’s intellectual lazy at best, and dishonest at worst.”

As far as I can tell, this characterization of what Kerry has done in her posts is completely inaccurate. It’s an accurate description of the position Todd Seavey dishonestly attributed to her, but has nothing to do with what she says here, and nothing to do with what she says in “Libertarian Feminism versus Monarchist Anarchism,” in which she explicitly states that, while certain forms of misogyny may operate through “social pressure” rather than coercive force, “No thinking libertarian is only concerned with coercion; most of us worry just as much about conformity and passivity.” (That last sentence is, in fact, the only time in either post in which she mentions coercion at all — to deny that all of her concerns as a libertarian have to do with coercion.) For Seavey, and then you, to repeatedly claim that she is trying to describe purely verbal misogyny as “literally coercive” (Seavey) or “trying to expand the definition of coercive force to fit her pet issues” (you), when she states in so many words that her position is exactly the opposite, that she’s concerned with these so-called “pet issues” even though they do not involve the use of coercion — and then to have you, to crown all, accuse her of intellectual laziness or dishonesty on the basis of this up-is-down, black-is-white strawman of her position — is something that is utterly outrageous. I wish I could call it extraordinary, but in fact it is my experience that there is nothing extraordinary of feminists being treated with this kind of dismissive contempt and indifference as to basic accuracy about their stated positions.

PFJO:

“I think the problem here Ms. Howley, is that you seem to be mistaking libertarianism for a complete moral philosophy, which it isn’t. Libertarianism SHOULD only be concerned with coercion.”

Why?

Suppose, for example, that there are certain ideas or noncoercive social customs which will make it easier to eliminate coercion from society, and other ideas or noncoercive social customs which will make it hard or impossible to eliminate coercion from society. If so, don’t libertarians have strategic reasons to try to promote the libertarian-friendly ideas and customs, and to work (nonviolently) against the libertarian-unfriendly ideas and customs, even though both of them are non-coercive per se?

You’re setting out a thin conception of libertarianism here, as if it were obvious that anything not strictly logically entailed by the non-initiation of force is therefore completely irrelevant to libertarian politics. But I think it’s not at all obvious that this is the case. In any case, it needs much more argument than you’ve given it so far (since the rest of your comments after what I quoted merely elaborate the way you draw a distinction between “moral” and “political” questions — without an argument to justify drawing the distinction the way you draw it).

Kerry,

After reading over the recent series of posts, I think the difficulty here may have something to do with the fact that Todd Seavey can apparently read a post the explicit and entire point of which is to argue that, while nonviolent discriminatory social pressures are not coercive per se, “No thinking libertarian is only concerned with coercion,” and then immediately reply, without a hint of sarcasm, that it “seems” to him that you are claiming that social pressures are “literally coercive” (!) and that “you have a right to tax me or sue me in response” to purely verbal misogyny.

Or, to put it in other words, Todd Seavey is quite comfortable with just making shit up in the course of a conversation. He also feels free to attribute the opposite of your stated views to you, and then to treat his attack on that ridiculous strawman as a successful response to your comments, and then to go on to give you a lecture about his 20 years in This Movement Of Ours and his knowledge of movement figures and philosophy, which apparently doesn’t reach beyond the middle of the Eisenhower administration.

Or, to put it in other words, he’s lying and generally acting like a perfect jackass.

Thank you for these posts. Besides admiring your lucidity, I also admire your patience. Not because I think it’s going to do anything to change Todd Seavey’s mind; he’s hardly deserving your time. But rather because it has produced some very good posts on an important issue, in spite of the undeserving interlocutor.

GT 2008-10-24: Ending State violence against women in prostitution in San Francisco: in which I speak in favor of Prop. K, a ballot initiative which would result in complete de facto decriminalization of women in prostitution who work in the city of San Francisco. Not because I’m pro-prostitution (I’m not), but rather because I’m against vice cops being able to inflict fines or jail terms on women in prostitution.

GT 2008-10-10: Whiteness studies 104: Class, cuisine, and authenticity: in which I discuss NPR “Progressives,” class, and the construction of “real Mexican cuisine.”

m. leblanc:

If you’ll recall, you are only authorized to use deadly force in order to protect yourself from deadly force,

“Authorized” by whom? If you’re referring to the law, then you are absolutely wrong. Washington state law certainly does not require a threat of deadly force in order to justify deadly force in self-defense. RCW 9A.16.050 considers the use of deadly force a justifiable form of defense against rape, or any other form of “felony or … great bodily injury” against a person or a third party.

As well it should. If your claim is not about what the law allows for, but rather about morality or something of the sort, then I think it is absolutely moral for a woman to kill her kidnapper and would-be rapist in self-defense. Do you disagree? If so, why?

Jill:

which would mean that a lot of kids in more conservative or rural areas would get really crappy sex ed, or none at all. And likely crappy science and literature classes, too. Which is why I think libertarian principles applied to education are problematic.

Well, then. Thank goodness government schooling has done such a great job making sure that kids in more conservative areas don’t end up with really crappy sex ed, or none at all.

Oh, wait.

Bob,

I did, actually, understand the metaphor. The problem is I don’t like it, and I sometimes try to use flat-footedly literal readings to point out implications of metaphors that I don’t like.

I don’t mind “vulgar” language, and I certainly don’t mind giving William a shout-out for a brave and eloquent speech in front of the world, especially at such a time.

What does trouble me is metaphors that tend to identify courage with masculine sexual anatomy that more than half the population doesn’t have, because it identifies courage with masculinity (and in particular with an especially obnoxious form of male sexual aggression, i.e. proudly exposing your man-bits to an assembled crowd). And, contrapositively, it also suggests that there’s something wrong with not having balls — by identifying not having balls with being cowardly. That kind of metaphor points up irrelevant or nonexistent features in those who get the “praise,” and simultaneously excludes a lot of people (like, say, Betsy or Celia) who actually are both very brave and also literally ball-less.

It’s particularly troubling when the tenacity, endurance, and courage of that majority, in the face of suffering, terror, or death, have historically been, and often currently are, systematically blanked-out, denied, disparaged, or ridiculed and mocked (as silly, worthless, sanctimonious, or “bitchy”) — mainly because those forms of tenacity, endurance, and courage were and are practiced by people with no balls, and also because they were and are typically practiced outside of antisocial institutions devoted to killing foreigners or beating up demographically “suspect” locals — institutions such as the hollering, chest-thumping uniformed thugs trying to intimidate and assault their way through the streets in St. Paul. (And it’s largely from the vernacular talk within those military and paramilitary outfits, suffused as they are with a cock-swinging macho “warrior” mindset, that metaphors about things like balls of steel have generally entered our language.)

There are lots of good, visceral metaphors for courageous defiance — showing spine, having guts; even “courage” is one (etymologically, it means having heart). So why not use one of those metaphors, which would probably have worked just as well in the rhetorical context, and which don’t have the same sexual implications?

Thanks for spread the word on all this.

Just one thing. William Gillis’s address at the press conference was marvelous. But what have his testicles got to do with anything? And where in the video did he flash them? Seems to me like if he did, that would have been just rude, not to mention distracting from the main point.

GT 2008-06-23 (trigger warning), in which a grand jury declares that the Stark Count Ohio Sheriff’s Office did nothing wrong when a gang of several male and female deputies held Hope Steffey down in a jail cell, forcibly removed her clothes over her screams of protest while wrenching her arms behind her back, and then left her completely naked in a freezing jail cell in public view for six hours. (Cf. also GT 2008-02-05: the original story (trigger warning) and follow-ups on the case, including five more women who came forward with complaints about the use of retaliatory, humiliating, unnecessary strip-searches in the Stark County jail.) Steffey is pursuing a lawsuit in federal court.

GT 2008-06-26: State ownership of the means of reproduction (#2) in which I comment on the AMA’s recently adopted resolution calling for “model legislation” to prohibit women from choosing a midwife-assisted home birth.

GT 2008-06-11: Beating up your teenage daughter isn’t just a good idea. It’s the law. In which parents of several teenaged defendants sue for a restraining order against Justice of the Peace Gustavo “Gus” Garza, of Los Fresnos, Texas, and if possible his removal from the bench. After a 14 year old young woman was hauled into his court over skipping school, he ordered her stepfather to spank her with a heavy wooden paddle, in front of strangers in open court. Garza claims he didn’t “order” a spanking per se, and calls this a “punishment option,” because the threatened “alternative” was a $500 fine and a criminal record for the daughter if the stepfather refused to spank her. After the court-ordered spanking, Garza told the stepfather that he hadn’t hit her hard enough.

Several other parents have now come forward, including the parents of a 14-year-old boy with a muscular development disability who Garza ordered beaten as punishment for swearing at a bus driver, and have joined the lawsuit.

Tommy_Grand:

I read that, in the US, more men (usually boys) get raped than women — but the male rapes go unreported. I never understood how “unreported” statistics get tallied, but I know that the number of rapes I see cited is not the same as the number of rape convictions.

Ross Perot’s Trade Policy:

Tommy Grand, you can read lots of things on the internet. I suppose with prison rape that’s possible, but it wouldn’t make much of a dent in Brownmiller’s hypothesis if the criminal fringe that compels all women to curtail their behavior in the outside world also behaves the same way on the inside world.

This question I can help out on.

I know of no empirical data that suggests that men are raped more often than women are. It’s certainly true that very few rape survivors report what happened to them to the police, and that male rape survivors are even less likely to report it to the police than female survivors are. But there is fairly extensive research on unreported rapes, and it does not indicate that the unreported rapes against men are anywhere near numerous enough to make up the difference.

Obviously, there is no perfect way to determine the number of sexual assaults that aren’t reported to the police. However, the best ways at our disposal to get a grip on something like the rough scale of the problem are anonymous victim surveys, in which researchers randomly sample a population of men and women (most often with telephone surveys or paper surveys), ensure the anonymity of the respondents, and ask them whether certain kinds of events have ever happened to them. Victim surveys like these are the kinds of surveys that are generally being cited when writers refer to the large proportion of rapes (over 90% of rapes against women, and an even higher percentage of rapes against men) that go unreported. Since the victim surveys are anonymous, and carefully designed to be as specific and objective as possible in their questions; and since there are no legal or social consequences attached to responding to the survey, as there are for making a report to the police, these tend to give a much more accurate picture of the situation than police report statistics do.

One of the most systematic, largest, and most recent victim surveys was the National Violence Against Women Survey, conducted by Patricia Tjaden and Nancy Thoennes, for the Centers for Disease Control and the National Institute of Justice. The surveys were done in late 1995 through early 1996, with the research reports coming out from 1998 to the present, and (in spite of the name) collected a great deal of data about the incidence, prevalence, and nature of violence against both men and women, including battery, rape, and stalking. You can read a great deal about their findings on rape in their research-in-brief report (1998) (which includes a couple of pages of discussion on survey methodology, pp. 13-15), their full report (2000), and their recent research report on rape victimization (2006).

What they found is that about 3% of U.S. men (about 1 in 33), and about 18% of U.S. women (about 1 in 6), have suffered either a completed rape, or an attempted rape, in their liftimes. If you look only at completed rapes, and exclude attempted rapes, the numbers are about 15% (1 in 7) for women, and about 2% (1 in 50) for men.

If rates of rape have remained relatively stable since 1995-1996 (police statistics indicate that, if anything, they have gone up; but as noted, police statistics are hard to rely on) then about 0.3% of U.S. adult women (about 300,000 nationally) and about 0.1% of U.S. adult men (about 100,000) have been raped in the past 12 months; and that there have been about 876,000 rapes committed against women in the U.S. in the past 12 months, compared to about 111,000 rapes committed against men. (The incidence numbers are different from the prevalence numbers because female rape survivors are much more likely to have been raped repeatedly than male rape survivors.)

Thus, while it’s appallingly common for men to be raped, and more men have been raped than most people think, women are nevertheless much more likely to be raped than men are.

I have no idea if it’s accurate, but (lacking evidence) I cant discount the possibility. Assuming arguendo that it’s true (more males are raped than females) how does that affect the Brownmiller hypothesis? I mean, if perception (and therefore fear) is one thing and reality another, wouldn’t her hypothesis still be valid?

For what it’s worth, Brownmiller is certainly aware of child sexual abuse against boys and the rape of adult men in prison. She discusses the former in her discussions of child molestation and of serial killers. She discusses the later at some length in a section of Chapter 8, “Power: Institution and Authority” (pp. 257-268). Brownmiller was, in fact, one of the first writers to conclude (remember, she published in 1975) that the rape of men in prison was systematic, widespread, and an instrument of prison hierarchies of power. She believed (rightly, I think) that the phenomena tended to support her theories about the use of rape as an instrument of gendered hierarchies of power, not to undermine them.

If it were true that more men were raped than women, then no, I don’t think it would much affect her hypothesis, firstly because her hypothesis, as you note, has as much to do with the felt threat of rape as it does with the actual incidence of rape, so with men, if there were in fact widespread stranger rape, but it were never talked about much, and especially not as something that threatens all men in daily situations, you wouldn’t expect it to have the same social effects. Similarly, and just as importantly, since the threat of rape (by other men, not by women) doesn’t generally lead to men being exhorted to seek protection from women, you wouldn’t expect it to have the same dynamics for sex-class that the threat of rape by one group of men has on women, who often are exhorted to seek protection from other men. And, thirdly, what we know about the situations in which men are most often raped (it is extremely rare for men to be randomly targeted for rape by strangers, outside of some well-defined spaces like prisons; but, while most women who are raped are also raped by someone they know, not by a stranger, the existence of a significant number of men, who randomly target women for rape, in everyday situations, at large in the outside world, does create a significant threat, which Brownmiller is describing in her Myrmidon theory, and which does not generally exist for men. (If the rape of men were more common than the rape of women, then no doubt widespread rape might have other systemic effects on men; but not the effects, as discussed by Brownmiller, that the threat of random stranger-rape in the world at large has on women, since the threat profile for men would be different in character.)

But, as I said above, see the victim surveys on actual incidence and prevalence of rape. As far as I know there is no evidence that stranger rape, or intimate partner rape, or acquaintance rape is more commonly suffered by men than by women.