Micha: And I see the milquetoastiness of IHS as a feature, not a bug. Inforcing ideological uniformity entails devolving into a cult, ala Ayn Rand’s inner circle.

I don’t understand this argument at all, Micha. Arthur was referring to the way in which the so-called “urbane” libertarian outlets tend either (1) to shy away from hard or unpopular applications of libertarian principles — such as anarchism or criticism of bayonet-point Unionism — in the name of public relations, or else (2) to hold positively the wrong view on what libertarian principles entail. If (1) they are dissembling about their views in order to avoid public embarrassment, and if (2) they are being inconsistent. In either case, criticizing dissembling or criticizing inconsistency is a distinct issue from intolerance of dissent, n’est-ce pas?

This is not to say that the paleos in particular haven’t been intolerant of dissent on many occasions. They certainly have been. But I think the reasons have to do with something other than the radicalism of their views.

Micha: I’ll take the minarchist, pro-interventionist deviationism of Beltway libertarians over the not-so-thinly veiled racism, homophobia, goldbug-crankism, evolution-denial, fundamentalist Christianity and Confederacy apologetics of the Paleo alternative any day of the week.

Well, O.K.; it’s your business which features you choose to treat as decisive or defeating for dealing with someone as a friend, ally, or comrade. But I don’t understand how this meshes with your previous argument. As far as “enforcing ideological uniformity” goes, how is treating anti-racism, gay-positivity, evolutionism, “urbanity,” “cosmopolitanism,” or whatever as a litmus test different in kind from treating anti-interventionism or Civil War revisionism as a litmus test? Surely both of these involve demanding a certain degree of ideological uniformity; it’s just that they differ in the particular ideological features that they require.

This is not to adjudicate whether the paleos are right about their litmus tests, or whether you’re right about your litmus tests, or whether you’re both wrong, or whether it’s just a matter of taste. But I don’t see that the difference between their standards and your standards amounts to what you seem to suggest it amounts to.

(Personally, I tend to think that you’re both right, or both wrong, depending on the level and purpose of association that you’re talking about — who you’re willing to form issue-based coalition with, who you’re willing to read and cite, who you’re willing to consider yourself part of a common movement with, and who you’re willing to be friends with are all quite different questions.)

Not being a hip or “urbane” libertarian, perhaps these questions were not directed at me. Nevertheless…

Mark: Do you judge Thomas Jefferson so harshly? He was no less than a slave owner!

Of course I do. What a stupid question. Why would you take it for granted that libertarians must approve of slavers, rapists, hypocritical scoundrels, and Presidents of the United States?

Mark: Do you distance yourself from the Declaration of Independence because you worry what other people think that says about your views of racism?

No. Admiration for a document or an argument, and admiration for its author, are two different things.

Mark: Do you think that it was a tactical mistake for the founders to establish the minarchist government they did …

Yes. Also a moral mistake.

Mark: … should they have established a familiar tyranny on American soil until such time as they agreed on an ethically pure political philosophy?

No.

They should have simply left people alone. You act as if this were not an option. Why?

Kuznicki: I agree with almost all of what Horwitz writes here, though I will say there’s a mighty fine line between using secession as an interesting riff in libertarian theory, and using secession as a dog whistle to draw out the neo-Confederates. On one foot: While the right to secession for a just cause is inalienable, there’s an… interesting… tendency to forget all about causes, and justice, when talking about secession in the American context.

There surely is, and where it happens, including or especially among professed radical libertarians, it should be called out in the name of historical truth. But I’m not sure whether I understand the connection between your last sentence and the previous one. Are you claiming that the right of secession is qualified or limited if the motives behind secession include the pursuit or perpetuation of “an unjust cause”? If so, why?

If A is governing B, and B is violating C’s rights, and B ends up seceding from A in order to perpetuate the violation of C’s rights, then there may be a libertarian case for A having a right to intervene, as a third party, to aid C against B. Not because B lacked the right to secede, but because A has a right to intervene even against independent rights-violators in order to rescue their victims. But if so, then the right to intervene that A enjoys is surely conditional on a number of factors (such as the availability of other means for rescuing C, whether the proposed intervention will or will not create a state of affairs that materially improves on the former situation for C, whether the proposed intervention will or will not involve sins of commission against innocent bystanders, etc.). And I can see no basis for saying that the injustice of the cause that motivates B’s secession provides any kind of basis for A to blast his way in, occupy the territory, and forcibly restore an open-ended, ongoing regime. If C’s human rights and A’s right to rescue jointly establish a right for A to intervene against B, then that right only goes as far as the actual task of rescuing C, and no further.

The statements on race and homosexuality are perfectly vile and deserve condemnation, whoever wrote them. However, I’m a bit baffled by this:

Paul’s newsletters have themselves repeatedly expressed sympathy for the general concept of secession. In 1992, for instance, the Survival Report argued that “the right of secession should be ingrained in a free society”

Well, shouldn’t it?

Most of the time, when we talk about a free society, part of what we are talking about is a society in which the powers of rulers derive from “the consent of the governed” rather than from unilateral command. But that would seem to mean that where consent has been refused or withdrawn, a right of secession must be recognized. Do you disagree?

and that “there is nothing wrong with loosely banding together small units of government. …”

Is there something wrong with this? If so, what?

Constant: I have never said, “if you want to know what a libertarian is, look at Ron Paul”. Do people do that? I guess if people do that, then that’s probably a mistake if they don’t agree with his whole platform. But do people really do that?

I don’t know whether anyone’s done that, but a lot of people have given money to the campaign, or put up signs and banners (“Ron Paul 2008,” “Ron Paul Revolution,” “Google Ron Paul,” etc.), or made personal endorsements of Ron Paul’s campaign, all of which they’ve justified on the grounds that Ron Paul’s campaign literature, debate answers, etc. promote libertarian ideals, and so getting more attention for his campaign will, in turn, educate more people about libertarianism and perhaps persuade more people to embrace it.

Presumably that’s only a good argument to the extent that Paul’s campaign actually is promoting libertarian ideals. If the money, for example, goes to produce nasty nativist-statist propaganda rather than propaganda that actually promotes libertarianism, then the money may be going towards promoting Ron Paul, but it’s not going towards promoting, or educating people about, libertarianism.

Anthony,

Suppose that Prez Ron Paul decided — as Harry Browne, for example, promised to do when he ran on the LP ticket — to issue blanket presidential pardons to all nonviolent drug offenders in the United States, including both those in federal and those in state custody. In one sense, this action wouldn’t increase the net extraction of taxes against anybody (it would dramatically reduce spending by both state and federal government). But then, neither would the action of declaring all local government schools abolished. In some other sense, both actions would make use of some non-zero amount of tax money — to pay for the paper and the pens and the administrative costs of notifying the prison and so on — but that money would have been extracted whether it was used to pay for one thing or for the other thing, and neither nullifying drug laws through blanket pardons nor declaring local government schools abolished would directly increase the amount of taxes extracted in the future, either. (In fact, both actions would stand some small chance of indirectly decreasing the level of taxation.)

That said, would you make a similar argument to the effect that if even one taxpayer objected to releasing nonviolent drug offenders from state prisons, the nullification-through-blanket pardon would (1) have an identifiable victim, and (2) victimize that victim in such a way as to be fairly characterized as “an astonishing act of centralized tyranny”? If so, why? If not, what’s the difference between the one case and the other?

Stephen W. Carson: Would he abolish public schools? I hope I don’t need to remind anyone that that would be an astonishing act of centralized tyranny for a president to do.

An act of centralized tyranny against whom?

For something to count as an act of tyranny, it must have an identifiable victim. Whose individual rights would be violated by the President abolishing local government schools?

Robert,

One shouldn’t ignore the effects that conscription had, and the shifts in consensus within the military where it has been abolished. But in a line of work where your boss has the legal power to treat striking or quitting as a hanging crime, the line between volunteers and conscripts is fuzzier than it might at first appear.

That mattered a lot for the boys who signed up voluntarily in the Great War, not knowing what they would find in the trenches. And it matters a lot today in this age of stop-loss and endless reserve call-ups.

You wrote: “The question is are we going to be concerned about winning a philosophical argument or are we going to be concerned about some American soldier in Iraq being blown up by a roadside bomb in 2010?”

Dude, this is a ridiculous cheap shot and you know it. I could just as easily go around telling those, such as Gordon, who attempt to give philosophical defenses of voting for Ron Paul, “The question is are we going to be concerned about winning a philosophical argument or are we going to be concerned about some woman dying in a back alley in 2010?” or “The question is are we going to be concerned about winning a philosophical argument or are we going to be concerned about some immigrant dying of dehydration in the Arizona desert in 2010?” Your argument cuts as much ice as either of these, which is to say, none at all. All the parties to this debate are arguing over issues that have real and grave human consequences in the near term.

As for radical feminist literature and action, Roderick and I discuss that at length in our essay, so it would be more productive to engage with what we said there. For what it’s worth, there’s nothing inherently unlibertarian about broad sexual harassment policies, free daycare or employer paid maternity leave (or, what radical feminists are more likely to advocate, radical transformation of the economy away from an employer-employee model and towards ownership of the means of production by working women and men). These ideas may be wise or foolish for other reasons, but libertarianism as such only comes up when we turn to the question of whether these kind of measures are to be attained through voluntary means or by means of the State. As Roderick and I explain in the essay, while there are many radical feminists who advocate State action, there are many others who distrust State action for practical reasons or even reject it entirely on principle.

You write: “I also recall prominent radical feminists arguing that sex between a man and a woman in marriage was a form of rape.”

Can you specify which radical feminist(s) you’re referring to and where she or they say this? (If you’re referring to Andrea Dworkin’s discussion of martial rape laws in Right-Wing Women, that’s not actually an accurate statement of her conclusion, but in any case you should know that even if it were, she was discussing the ramifications of a legal context has mercifully ceased to exist since the book was written.)

As for the radical feminist menace to the safety of men’s wing-wangs, the legitimacy of violence depends on whether it is aggressive or defensive. Given the radical feminist emphasis on the prevalence of violence against women, I’d suggest that even if that talk were meant literally rather than rhetorically, that wouldn’t necessarily be an objection to it.

These are willing volunteers who have pledged their lives to the nation state. They are nothing less than his partners in crime.

To the extent that soldiers willingly engage in deliberate violence against innocent people, they are certainly complicit in the crime and should be held accountable.

On the other hand, I don’t think it’s quite true that all soldiers in the American military are “willing volunteers.” Normally when someone willingly signs on for a job, they can always quit later if they have second thoughts about either the job in general, or about specific requirements imposed on them by their employers. Everywhere else in the world besides the military, this is called “quitting.” In the military it’s called “desertion” and it can be treated as a hanging crime if the government so chooses.

Soldiers, even so-called “volunteers,” who want to leave the military, but are coerced into staying by the threat of imprisonment or death, should not be considered willing participants, any more than victims of the draft should.