Cal,

I won’t presume to speak for “all modern economics.” (My own education in economics is mainly in the Austrian tradition.) But I will say that you have evidently misunderstood Von Mises and Rothbard if you think that they are claiming the same thing that you say they are claiming. You have repeatedly attempted to distinguish the revealing of value in action and the value itself — an attempt which presupposes that you have some clear concept of what it is for to value X which can be characterized independently of the revealing of a preference of X over Y, in the context of a choice, as if you could somehow understand the value that Jones attaches to X without having considered whether he would prefer X over alternatives given the choice. If you’ll re-read the line in Von Mises that you yourself bolded, you’ll find that that presupposition is precisely what Von Mises denies. The entire point of his discussion is that an understanding of value — in the sense of “value” relevant to economics — only falls out of an analysis of purposive choices among alternatives. There are other senses of value which he considers, some of which are comparative (e.g. wishing) and others of which may not be (e.g. psychological attitudes, such as having feelings of pleasure or admiration), but the point of considering these alternative senses of “to value” is to show that they are not the sorts of valuing that (Von Mises holds) are studied by the science of economics.

Cal: Charles, you’ve missed the point entirely …

Maybe so, but I can’t see how the passage you’ve bolded would show me that. Von Mises conceives of “the actual behavior of individuals” in terms of the selection of more highly valued states of affairs over less highly valued states of affairs, as he says in the passage I quoted further down. To say that a scale of values has no independent existence apart from the actual behavior of individuals is to say that it has no independent existence apart from the revealed comparative preference for one state of affairs over another. (Any other sense of valuing is, for Von Mises, not part of the subject-matter of praxeology.) Hence, Von Mises’s understanding of “value” in economics is explicitly comparative, not a matter of appreciating or admiring a thing or a state of affairs in isolation from comparisons to alternative states of affairs. Just what do you think I am missing?

Cal: think about your question…

I don’t think I had a question, except to ask Kyle for the sources from which he was drawing his view of what senses of “value” are relevant to subjectivist economics. (Because that view of the matter seems, to my best understanding, rather idiosyncratic, and directly in conflict with the versions presented in, e.g., Von Mises and Rothbard.)

Marja: The first meaning [of ” to value”] being to admire, or to appreciate [sans the price-finding meaning of appreciate!]… The second meaning being to compare one good to another.

Kyle Bennett: Marja, values are not ordinal (nor are they cardinal), they are non-numerically defined. As Cal said, they are ranked ordinally only when comparisons become necessary. How one does that is purely subjective and not subject to external analysis…. There’s only one meaning relevant to subjective value economics. …. Your second meaning is not in any way, shape, or form part of valuation under the STV.

Kyle,

Could you tell me what version of subjective value theory you are reading that tells you that the concept of “value” in marginalist economics is not comparative? Looking briefly at a couple of sources, I find that Ludwig von Mises tells us (in Human Action I.IV.2 that “one must not forget that the scale of values or wants manifests itself only in the reality of action. These scales have no independent existence apart from the actual behavior of individuals. The only source from which our knowledge concerning these scales is derived is the observation of a man’s [sic] actions. Every action is always in perfect agreement with the scale of values or wants because these scales are nothing but an instrument for the interpretation of a man’s [sic] acting.” Earlier, we are told (in I.I, “Acting Man” [sic] that action is always an expression of preferences (hence necessarily comparative) — that “Acting man [sic] is eager to substitute a more satisfactory state of affairs for a less satisfactory. His mind imagines conditions which suit him better, and his action aims at bringing about this desired state. The incentive that impels a man to act is always some uneasiness ” Von Mises argues that only this sort of comparative valuing (as opposed to other things which you might call “valuing,” such as idle wishes or moral doctrines) is relevant to economics, since economics is the science of human action.

Similarly, at the beginning of “Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics,” Rothbard tells us that “Individual valuation is the keystone of economic theory. For, fundamentally, economics does not deal with things or material objects. Economics analyzes the logical attributes and consequences of the existence of individual valuations. … But the essence and the driving force of human action, and therefore of the human market economy, are the valuations of individuals. Action is the result of choice among alternatives, and choice reflects values, that is, individual preferences among these alternatives.” [emphasis mine]

Whatever valuation in Marja’s first sense may be, it is not the sort of value that prominent subjectivists have thought to be relevant to economics. They have, as far as I can tell, generally or exclusively argued that Marja’s second meaning of “to value,” not the first, is what’s relevant to the economic study of human action.

langa: Those on the left are afraid of alienating the radical feminists, many of whom consider porn to be the worst thing in the world.

Huh?

1. Antipornography radical feminists generally oppose, and have repeatedly come out against, the kind of nasty remarks and polemical abuse that’s directed against women in pornography from people (mainly men) on the political Left and Right. Whether you think we are right about pornography or not, I don’t think this is an accurate understanding of the position towards women in the pornography industry.

2. I can find no evidence at all that much of anybody in the mainstream Left is particularly afraid of alienating antipornography radical feminists, or really cares what radical feminists in general think (whether they are antipornography or not). Do you really think that someone like Catharine MacKinnon or Susan Brownmiller has very much influence over what people in common liberal or Leftist discourse, outside of specifically feminist political spaces, think it is or is not acceptable to say?

The idea that people on the male Left really want to object to nasty remarks about the women in pornography, but fear of radical feminist backlash is somehow holding them back, strikes me as bizarre.

Anon73:

Well, Aster mentioned the word “pogrom” before you did, so it’s natural you would repeat it. But I asked because I am unsure about what would count as a “pogrom” in your light.

E.g. would a pogrom against women in prostitution have to involve large-scale murders and massacres (which certainly has happened, many times, but is rarer than other forms of mass violence against women in prostitution)? Or would it be enough if large numbers of women in prostitution were being forcibly rounded up, restrained, beaten or tortured, forced out of their homes and livelihoods, and locked away in prison camps for months or years at a time? If the latter sort of dispossession and terrorization counts, then that’s been the official policy and program of countless patriarchal states throughout the world — among them the state of Denmark until the 1999 partial decriminalization.

Briggs,

I think that’s true, but I don’t think it’s funny. (Neither ha-ha, nor particularly strange.)

It’s entirely ordinary for women to be treated like crap by both the official Right and the official Left simultaneously, and especially women who are perceived as being defined by their roles in the system of sex-class (e.g. sex workers and other publicly sexualized women).

There are very few rules when it comes to the girls, and especially not girls who aren’t seen as “nice” according to prevailing male standards. Or I should say that there are a lot of rules: just not rules of courtesy or common decency, but rather rules of Patriarchal Correctness, which are themselves quite rigid in their expectations of who has the right to act like a dickhead, or even has a positive obligation to act like a dickhead, and who ought to be kept in their place.

Anon73,

I’m not sure what you mean by a “pogrom,” but the decriminalization of prostitution in Denmark is only about 10 years old now — prior to 1999 women in sex work faced the violence of the state, and the partial decriminalization that was put through in 1999 still hurts sex workers by legally constraining their options for work (e.g. by prohibiting brothels). Sex workers in Denmark are, in the very best of circumstances, precariously grey-market workers who have faced centuries-old organized government repression right up into the past decade, who face unjust legal restrictions right now, and who have every reason to worry about facing a return to full-on government prohibition in the future if patriarchal politicians are allowed to have their way with the terms of the debate, I’d say there’s every reason to worry about persecutions, prisons, and pogroms. It’s not exactly unusual for governments — the Danish government included — to go around ruining peaceful sex workers’ lives or to abduct them off the street and lock them in cages against their will.

Hence, solidarity.

... Yes, I certainly agree with you about that. If there is a use to labels like "left-libertarian" and "right-libertarian," it's certainly not as a tool to

Andy,

I agree that you should organize and engage in winnable battles. What I disagree with is your assessment of which battles are most winnable, and at what costs. The facts on the ground are that efforts at legalizing and regularizing status by means of piecemeal legal reforms HAS NOT WORKED, whereas efforts at getting the benefits of legalization by alternative means outside the system has worked to some extent. The existence of large, flourishing shantytowns is proof enough: the parallel systems that they create outside of ordinary legal channels for securing homes, work, property rights, personal security, dispute resolution, community recognition of family arrangements, etc. just are demonstrations of working alternatives to legalization. These alternatives seem to have done a much better job at actually improving ordinary people’s lives on the margins than legal-reform campaigns have thus far.

My problem with legalization schemes and similar legal reform campaigns isn’t that they somehow offend against my sense of purity. It’s that they rarely deliver what they promise, and what they do deliver is typically at very high cost and very low quality. I don’t have a beef with practicality; what I have a beef with is the kind of dogmatic appeal to “practicality” where it is assumed that something must be the more practical option just because it involves compromise with the existing political system and operates according to conventional rules of political etiquette. In fact, I think the reverse is often the case: the political game is typically rigged, and you can get better results faster, cheaper, and more reliably by working out ways to route around the damage.

See also http://radgeek.com/gt/2008/01/26/inwhich/ and http://radgeek.com/gt/2009/02/07/countereconomicoptimism/ for comments on practicality and winnable battles.

Andy, I agree that you should organize and engage in winnable battles. What I disagree with is your assessment of which battles are most winnable, and at what costs. The facts on the ground are that efforts at legalizing and regularizing status by means of piecemeal legal reforms HAS NOT WORKED, whereas efforts at getting the benefits of legalization by alternative means outside the system has worked to some extent. The existence of large, flourishing shantytowns is proof enough: the parallel systems that they create outside of ordinary legal channels for securing homes, work, property rights, personal security, dispute resolution, community recognition of family arrangements, etc. just are demonstrations of working alternatives to legalization. These alternatives seem to have done a much better job at actually improving ordinary people's lives on the margins than legal-reform campaigns have thus far. My problem with legalization schemes and similar legal reform campaigns isn't that they somehow offend against my sense of purity. It's that they rarely deliver what they promise, and what they do deliver is typically at very high cost and very low quality. I don't have a beef with practicality; what I have a beef with is the kind of dogmatic appeal to "practicality" where it is assumed that something must be the more practical option *just because* it involves compromise with the existing political system and operates according to conventional rules of political etiquette. In fact, I think the reverse is often the case: the political game is typically rigged, and you can get better results faster, cheaper, and more reliably by working out ways to route around the damage. See also http://radgeek.com/gt/2008/01/26/in_which/ and http://radgeek.com/gt/2009/02/07/countereconomic_optimism/ for comments on practicality and winnable battles.