Historical note:

“… the first democratic election in Afghanistan (not post-Taliban, but ever) earlier this year.”

This is not accurate. During the period of the Constitutional monarchy (1964-1973), the Afghan Constitution (which you can find translated online at http://www.dsg.unito.it/dircost/Afghanistan%201964.htm, if you’re interested) provided for universal suffrage and established democratically elected municipal and provincial councils as well as bicameral national Parliament with a democratically elected lower house (Wolesi Jirgah) and direct elections for 1/3 of the members of the upper house (Meshrano Jirgah). Afghanistan’s first nationwide elections were held in September 1965, and a second round was held at the end of the first 4 year legislative term in 1969.

“Max’s point was not that he wanted to boil people, or that he would enjoy it, or that we should.”

But Bob, nobody that I’ve read on this topic yet has claimed that Borders advocates boiling people alive. What Barganier and others have pointed out is that Borders’ own stated position *leaves the question open for deliberation* based on considerations of strategy and personal taste. Whatever you might think of that account, it’s not a libertarian account, but rather something else.

“The point was simply that it was neither moral or immoral. And I challange anyone to prove otherwise.”

The argument has already been taken up elsewhere (at http://radgeek.com/gt/2004/12/05/the_humane among other places). There is no possible non-question-begging argument that Borders could give for the (moral) permissibility of boiling innocent foreigners alive; any argument that shows a set of premises lead to that conclusion is, at the strongest, a reductio ad absurdam of the premises that are used.

Me: “Bargainer certainly didn’t; what he did say is that there is no open question about the morality of boiling innocent foreigners alive under a libertarian theory of justice.”

Micha: “But this is clearly not the case. The vast majority of libertarians are not pacifists when it comes to war between nations states. Most libertarians believe that war between nation states is sometimes justified, even though war between nation states necessarily involves killing innocent non-combatants.”

Thanks for the prodding, Micha; I deserve it. But surely this isn’t quite the issue. It’s true that there are plenty of undoubtedly libertarian accounts of justice in wartime that allow for knowingly killing innocent civilians in the course of attacking legitimate military targets (if you’re waging a legitimate war, anyway). But I’m going to be a bit of an aprioristic wank here and just stipulate that no libertarian account of justice allows for intentionally targeting civilians for attack. (If an account endorses it, I’d just argue that’s enough to make it something other than a libertarian account.) And the sort of cases that Barganier and Borders are fussing over are clearly in the latter camp—it’s hard to imagine how you’d be boiling civilians alive for the war effort unless you were intentionally targeting civilians to be pitched into the cauldron. And even if you could devise some sort of story to make it fit libertarian strictures, this would be beside the point: Borders’ stated position commits him, afortiori, not only to saying that the possibly-acceptable cases don’t violate any objectively binding moral obligations, but also that the clearly unacceptable cases don’t violate any objectively binding moral obligations, either. Whether or not there are some cases of boiling foreigners alive that can be open questions for deliberation under a libertarian theory of justice, there certainly are some cases of boiling foreigners alive that could not possibly be open for deliberation. But Borders gladly admits that his position means that both the former and the latter are up for deliberation, based on matters of strategy and of personal taste. I don’t think it requires a lot of hermeneutical acrobatics to see that that’s what Barganier’s taking Borders to task over. And I think on that point that Barganier is clearly in the right.

Micha: “Whether you find Max’s argument offensive, at least it is an argument. Barganier’s is a vile form of ad hominem, and terribly bad form.”

I don’t know whether Barganier is acting in bad form or not; his post is insulting, to be sure, and his encouragement of writing to IHS over the issue may be questionable. Fine. But he is engaging directly in an argument; the form is: Max Borders’ position entails a monstrous consequence; in fact, he admits this very consequence; no libertarian theory can involve that consequence; therefore, Max Borders position is deeply in conflict with libertarianism. That’s a straightforward and valid argument (moreover, I think, a sound one); it’s certainly not an argumentum ad hominem, let alone one of a particularly vile form.

Bill Woolsey writes: “So, regardless of whether boiling foreigners alive is or is not in the interest of America, it is neither moral or immoral.

“He went on to argue that he (like most people)
would find boilling people alive distasteful and
that he doesn’t believe that it is in the U.S.
interest.

“In no way was he advocating boiling people alive.”

But Bill, nobody that I’ve read on the matter has suggested that Borders does advocate boiling people alive. Bargainer certainly didn’t; what he did say is that there is no open question about the morality of boiling innocent foreigners alive under a libertarian theory of justice. Whether he advocates boiling innocent aliens alive or not, Borders leaves the question open for deliberation about its strategic value and our own tastes; and that is monstrous enough from the standpoint of common decency–let alone libertarian political theory–on its own demerits.

As for his own attempt to weasel around this problem by offering our “sentimental” reasons for finding the whole affair ghastly, they are incoherent, as I argue elsewhere. I won’t re-argue it at length here; the bottom line is that the only way we can make sense out of “sentimental shoulds” is by reference to how our emotions do or do not express judgments about what we ought and ought not to do. But that means that the reasonableness of the sentiments has to stand up to reflective judgment or else be dismissed as irrational (and so not giving any “should”). And that seems to tie our sentimental shoulds back into our normative shoulds: the sentiment of horror is only a reasonable sentiment if it expresses a judgment of a real state of affairs (viz. that it is really is horrible to boil someone alive).

There are some further epicycles that you could try to put onto the theory to explain away the judgment as something other than a moral judgment. Some of them I considered and rejected in brief; others can be dealt with elsewhere and at more length; but Borders set out none of them in the course of his argument. He just invoked the sentiments as a sort of magic charm to summon up reasons for action. But it doesn’t, in fact, advance the argument one inch.

As for comparing Borders to Prince Dracula–whether it’s juvenile or not is not something that I’m a fit judge of (since I’m rather partial). But I will say that Max Borders has explicitly stated, and argued at length, that there is no moral difference in principle between himself and Vlad Dracula. He has tried to argue at length and in several different places for a theory that would hold that absolutely any atrocity whatsoever could be committed against aliens without violating any principle of justice–from assault and pillage to impaling and boiling alive. It is his own stated position that the only difference between what he’s willing to do and what Vlad was willing to do is a matter of contingent circumstance, and a matter of personal taste. If that is not a monstrous position to hold, then what is?

“Some might say that obstructing military recruiters from seeking volunteers during wartime is tantamount to treason.”

“Some” might be abusing legal terms in ways that are, quite frankly, dangerous, and “some” ought to know better.

Treason is a federal crime, defined in Article III, Section 3 of the Constitution, which says “Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.” The Founders did their best to make very sure that the Constitution prevented the government from using charges of Treason to suppress peaceful dissent. That is why the language of the article clearly states that the law of treason to be invoked only for overt acts with the intent to wage war on the United States, or to provide concrete, material assistance to those who do.

If you have any evidence that anyone at a law school near you has committed such a serious federal crime, you should contact your local FBI field office. Otherwise, baseless insinuations against innocent people, for doing nothing more than exercising their rights to freedom of association on their own property in a manner you find disagreeable, amounts to little more than a shameful proposal for tyranny. You have every right to agree with disagree with the law schools’ decision; you have no right to make such scurrilous attacks against fellow citizens merely on the basis of a political disagreement.

I Am Not A Women’s Studies Major, so feel free to hit me with a copy of Our Blood if this is completely off-base, but my suspicion is that phenomena like this…

“Unfortunately (and I don’t know what school your friend attends) it’s not uncommon to not read Dworkin. I’m a Women’s Studies major at Loyola and the most “radical” feminist we’ve read in class was MacKinnon.”

… mostly come from a pretty widespread lack of attention to WL movement literature, in favor of academic work produced by professional Women’s Studiers. (Quick test: how many WS classes involve SISTERHOOD IS POWERFUL or NOTES FROM THE FIRST YEAR? How many of them involve GENDER TROUBLE?) Catharine MacKinnon gets a pass, unlike most radical feminist activists, because in addition to being an activist she also works within the academy as a legal theorist, and decks out her books with the appropriate number of footnotes.

Well, this is a bit late on, but you may still be interested to know that there is a transcription of Principia Ethica currently in progress at fair-use.org. So far it’s only gotten out to the beginning of the Open Question Argument (up to article 11 in Chapter I), but new material is being added on a fairly regular basis.

Ron: “Who are these citizen militias going to protect us from in 2004? Invading Canadians? Mexicans?”

I don’t know. Who is the National Guard or the professional Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force going to protect us from? If this is an argument against having a citizen militia it’s certainly an argument against having any military force whatever.

In fact I don’t think we need any professional military force, so I think that there’s nothing wrong with that idea. But that doesn’t mean that there is no need for civil defense whatsoever. Military threats to U.S. civilians are few, and would be fewer if we didn’t have a professional military being deployed around the world to kill people. But military threats aren’t the only threats to be defended against. There is organized crime; there are the night-riders’ modern brothers-in-arms, the gay bashers; there is disorganized street violence. Any reason you could cite for having armed police around is just as much of a reason for having individuals, or—if necessary—groups of people working together who are able to defend their lives and their homes. The question is whether the people or a separate, paramilitary police force is a better means to defending people’s safety. And I don’t think that the historical evidence is unquestionably on the side of the cops. In fact, when you come to defending the rights of Black people, or women, or lesbian and gay people, or transgender people, or Muslims, or Latino/as, or immigrants, or any number of other historically oppressed groups, I think it’s decisively against the cops.

“If it’s an ATF or FBI agent you feel a need to protect yourself from, you have much bigger problems than more guns would solve.”

It’s important to note here that I’m proposing citizen militias as an alternative to the cops, the feds, and the army—not as a force to enter into conflict against them. I think that if cops or feds are violating your rights, then you have every right to try to defend yourself, but shoot-outs aren’t any kind of strategic way forward. I support the abolition of gun control and peaceful political efforts along with it to reduce the role that military and paramilitary defense forces play in our day-to-day lives.

“Yes, I am in favor of modifying the 2nd amendment. Until that happens, I’d support most efforts to regulate gun ownership.”

But Ron, the question is whether “most efforts to regulate gun ownership” that are currently being pushed are legal at all. If you buy my argument about the intent and meaning of the Second Amendment, then it’s quite likely that a lot of them aren’t, because laws in violation of the Constitution are null and void. So it makes sense to push for an amendment that will limit the Second Amendment protections (although I think that would be a bad idea); and it makes sense (although I again think it would be a bad idea) to push for gun control legislation once that it achieved, but what legal basis is there to support the sort of gun control legislation you want before the amendment is so qualified?

“Living in an urban area of 6 million people, I’d be a lot safer if there were less handguns and automatic rifles around. A friend was shot in the face intentionally and an aunt took one in the chest accidentally. Both lived thankfully.”

Gun violence is terrible, to be sure, but I think the issue to confront is the culture of violence and fear that we live in, not the supply of guns (just as the answer to reckless driving is to address the recklessness, not to ban the cars). I live in one of the highest-crime urban areas in the country, but what I see day after day is that gun control regulations don’t keep guns out of criminals’ hands. They just force ordinary, peace-loving people (especially poor Black people, who have always been the major acknowledged or unacknowledged target of gun control) more dependent on a police force that is often indifferent or sometimes even actively hostile to them.

“It seems the Swiss are the ones best able to maintain a safe gun culture. I suspect much of it has to do with the relatively even prosperity of the swiss population.”

I don’t think that poor people with guns is the problem. If anyone needs to have access to means to defend themselves, it’s poor people in high-crime areas.

“It probably also helps that most recieve some training in gun safety. I don’t think it would work here without major social change.”

That’s fine. I’m all for major social change. Aren’t you?

Q: “If we cannot then why?”

A: The Taft-Hartley Act makes secondary strikes illegal, and effective general strikes next to impossible. If all else fails, the President can intercede to force the strike to end.

Q: “What are the cultural inhibitors if any?”

A: The main barriers are legal, not cultural. If there’s a major cultural issue, it’s the degree to which union bosses have sold their workers out in order to gain favors from the State.

Q: What kind of organizing needs to happen?

A: Free the Unions (and all political prisoners)!

What better way to start than by wildcatting a general strike against Bushism and complacent union bosses? Do you think it might work?

Oh, P.S.:

‘He frowned and said that hardly seemed fair to him. I mulled that over and said, “You’re right. Gay men should be able to have guns, too. That would put second thoughts in the heads of gay-bashers.”’

Have you encountered The Pink Pistols?