Of course I agree with you that left-libertarianism (of the sort defended in those essays) is not the only possible thick conception of libertarianism.(*) I think that it is the correct thick conception to adopt, and that the others generally are not, and I have my arguments for that conclusion, but I think that in order for the arguments to be properly understood, the underlying conceptual issue (about what having a “thick” conception does, or does not, mean) has to be brought out.

(* The first article I linked actually nods towards this at the end, and it has a longer “director’s cut” that discusses the issue in more depth; the second article is an explicit play on the point, in making use of some of Rothbard’s socially conservative writing in order to make a point on behalf of left-libertarianism. Some of the most notable advocates of thick conceptions of libertarianism in clude radical libertarian feminists, traditionalist paleolibertarians, and orthodox Objectivists, a strange set of bedfellows if ever there was one.)

Mark,

The debate between “thick” and “thin” conceptions of libertarianism encompasses several interrelated but more specific debates, having to do with (1) correct application of the non-aggression principle in hard cases; or (2) libertarian strategy and the possibility of there being cultural, intellectual, or other causal preconditions for a free society to emerge, survive, or flourish; or (3) views about the likely effects of liberty, and whether freedom will tend to produce more of certain rare positive goods, or to undermine certain prevalent (but non-coercive) positive evils; or (4) whether the best logical grounds for libertarianism (whatever that may be) also justify some further set of voluntarily-adopted beliefs, principles, projects, practices, traditions, institutions, etc. If you’re interested, I’ve discussed (1), (2), and (4) at some more length in my remarks from the Molinari Society symposium on thickness, and (3) briefly towards the end of my remarks on Matt MacKenzie’s paper on libertarian theories of exploitation.

Because the debate involves a lot of smaller debates that are interrelated but logically distinct from each other, and because many people who consider their conception of libertarianism to be “thin” (e.g. Jan Narveson) often actually end up endorsing a thicker conception in at least one of these respects (the “thinness” that they have in mind in their self-identification usually just amounts to accepting fewer thick commitments in total than are accepted by most self-identified advocates of a “thick” conception), I don’t think there is any good single formula to separate the thick from the thin. The closest that you can come to would be something like this: if you believe that libertarians should (in some sense or another, yet to be discussed) concern themselves (in some sense or another, yet to be discussed) with stuff other than just the non-aggression principle, and ought (in some sense or another, yet to be discussed) try to non-aggressively promote stuff other than just consistent non-aggression as part of their libertarian program, then you’re advocating a thick conception of libertarianism. If not, then you’re promoting a thin conception.

For what it’s worth, the internecine battle you’re thinking of, between paleolibertarians and so-called “cosmopolitan” libertarians, is not really a battle between thick and thin libertarians. Both those who think (1) that voluntarily cultivating some form of parochial traditionalism is (in some sense) vital to libertarianism, and those who think (2) that voluntarily cultivating some form of anti-traditionalist “cosmopolitanism” is (in some sense) vital to libertarianism, are advancing a thick conception of libertarianism, and battling over which thick conception is the right conception. (There are also those, like me, who think (3) that the battle, such as it is, is largely founded on a confusion, and who advance quite different claims about the best social-intellectual context for liberty from either of the two warring parties. There are also those who think (4) that libertarians shouldn’t be feuding over this stuff at all, and should just push the non-aggression principle and nothing else, wherever they go, whether to rock-ribbed but non-violent white supremacists, or to cocktail parties by snooty but non-violent New York intellectuals, or to rabble-rousing but non-violent popular liberation movements, or to kooky but non-violent survivalist-conspiracy theory types, or whatever. Only those who advocate (4) are advancing a thin conception of libertarianism.)

Hope this helps.

Micha: And I see the milquetoastiness of IHS as a feature, not a bug. Inforcing ideological uniformity entails devolving into a cult, ala Ayn Rand’s inner circle.

I don’t understand this argument at all, Micha. Arthur was referring to the way in which the so-called “urbane” libertarian outlets tend either (1) to shy away from hard or unpopular applications of libertarian principles — such as anarchism or criticism of bayonet-point Unionism — in the name of public relations, or else (2) to hold positively the wrong view on what libertarian principles entail. If (1) they are dissembling about their views in order to avoid public embarrassment, and if (2) they are being inconsistent. In either case, criticizing dissembling or criticizing inconsistency is a distinct issue from intolerance of dissent, n’est-ce pas?

This is not to say that the paleos in particular haven’t been intolerant of dissent on many occasions. They certainly have been. But I think the reasons have to do with something other than the radicalism of their views.

Micha: I’ll take the minarchist, pro-interventionist deviationism of Beltway libertarians over the not-so-thinly veiled racism, homophobia, goldbug-crankism, evolution-denial, fundamentalist Christianity and Confederacy apologetics of the Paleo alternative any day of the week.

Well, O.K.; it’s your business which features you choose to treat as decisive or defeating for dealing with someone as a friend, ally, or comrade. But I don’t understand how this meshes with your previous argument. As far as “enforcing ideological uniformity” goes, how is treating anti-racism, gay-positivity, evolutionism, “urbanity,” “cosmopolitanism,” or whatever as a litmus test different in kind from treating anti-interventionism or Civil War revisionism as a litmus test? Surely both of these involve demanding a certain degree of ideological uniformity; it’s just that they differ in the particular ideological features that they require.

This is not to adjudicate whether the paleos are right about their litmus tests, or whether you’re right about your litmus tests, or whether you’re both wrong, or whether it’s just a matter of taste. But I don’t see that the difference between their standards and your standards amounts to what you seem to suggest it amounts to.

(Personally, I tend to think that you’re both right, or both wrong, depending on the level and purpose of association that you’re talking about — who you’re willing to form issue-based coalition with, who you’re willing to read and cite, who you’re willing to consider yourself part of a common movement with, and who you’re willing to be friends with are all quite different questions.)