Keith,

You’re being an asshole, and you really ought to stop.

Whether or not you think that Anonymous is in fact Aster, and whether or not you think that Anonymous or Aster has treated you unfairly, in this discussion or in other discussions, that’s absolutely no reason to respond with polemical distortions of her views, or with down-and-dirty attacks of your own. You ought to be embarassed at having made such thuggish appeals to tooth-for-a-tooth rhetorical retribution (“like I told you before, if you want to throw rocks at me, I’m going to hit back and hit hard”). If you think that you’ve been strawmanned or unfairly attacked or otherwise wronged in this conversation, I can’t see why you think it’s a good idea to reply by getting just as nasty as you wanna be yourself — as, for example, with your (really vile) attempts to exploit common prejudice against transgender people in order to score some kind of rhetorical point (as if there were anything wrong with being trans or otherwise challenging patriarchally-correct notions of gender identity; as if there were anything wrong with sex reassignment surgery; as if any of this had a damned thing to do with anything in the discussion about libertarian alliances and strategy).

If you have something worth saying about libertarian alliances and strategy (and, for the record, I think what you have to say combines some genuine insights — e.g. about the importance of populism, the importance of secessionist decentralism as way to work across traditional Culture War front lines, the classism that goes into certain Progressive attitudes about poor, rural, Southern, or otherwise marginalized white folks, etc. — with a lot that is really wrongheaded), then you can say it without resorting to this kind of garbage.

And I will hopefully have more to say about your essay later, both on some substantive points and some terminological points. (I think that you have misunderstood the meaning of the term “thick libertarianism”; “thick libertarianism” is not identical with left-libertarianism, and you’ll find thick conceptions of libertarianism not only among left-libertarians, but also among paleolibertarians, orthodox Objectivists, and, while we’re at it, your own expressed views about pluralism, and Anonymous’s expressed views, too; what we differ over is not thickness, but rather on the particular commitments that are to be bundled together with non-aggression.) But I’ll probably come around to a real response in a venue other than this already-lengthy comments thread.

Nick Manley: Am I going to throw acid in the face of a woman who chooses to stay at home and raise her children? No.

Other Nick: What about “ridiculing” or “socially ostracizing” her “patriarchal” husband?

Well, what about it?

If her husband really is acting in a domineering or patriarchal way, then why shouldn’t he be ridiculed or socially ostracized for it? He’s an asshole. Those of us who think that domineering behavior and patriarchal attitudes are ridiculous, foolish, or vicious have every right, and every reason, to withdraw our social support from, or to make fun of, people who engage in them.

Of course, I also think it would be silly to presume that you can just look at the fact that a woman chooses to spend her time on caring for children in her home and somehow automatically infer from that that it’s the result of domineering behavior or patriarchal attitudes on the part of her husband. People make all kinds of choices and there’s nothing in feminism which requires you to rag on heterosexually married women who are, for reasons of their own, working at childcare rather than in a capitalist workplace. Or on their husbands.

Other Nick: My main beef with the kind of thick libertarianism Johnson is advocating is that it seems not to respect the right of a person to voluntarily enter an inegalitarian/hierarchical lifestyle.

How so? You have the right to do whatever you please, an it coerce none. And I have the right to criticize your choices, if I think they are ill-considered, foolish, vicious, or otherwise harmful.

There may be cases where it is rude to do so; there may also be cases where it is morally wrong. (There is such a thing as a virtue of tolerance, and of minding your own business. If you think that libertarians have good reasons, qua libertarians, to cultivate those virtues, even in cases where intolerance or busybodying would have been expressed through nonviolent means like ostracism or ridicule, well, then what you’re advocating is in fact a form of thick libertarianism. A thin conception of libertarianism would have nothing to say about whether people should be tolerant or intolerant, as long as they’re non-aggressive.) But be that as it may, I can’t see that you’ve made any case for saying that it is never the right thing to do. If a husband is (nonviolently) being an asshole to his wife, and she (consensually) stays in the marriage, because she thinks his assholish behavior is basically O.K., or even that it’s the right way for him to treat her, then I certainly see no reason why I have some kind of obligation to continue associating with that asshole or providing social support to him or to hold off on calling him an asshole in conversation.

Other Nick: I’m all for battling ideas with ideas but I draw the line at using means such as “ridicule” and “social ostracism” to win the battle. . . . I don’t think it is, but that’s beside the point. The behaviors I described are a form of coercion in my opinion and therefore shouldn’t be justified even if it can be argued or proven that they serve libertarian ends.

Nick, are you seriously suggesting that ridicule and social ostracism are “a form of coercion”? If so, when you say “coercion” do you mean what libertarians normally mean by it (i.e., an invasion of the target’s liberty rights), or do you mean something else?

If you seriously mean to suggest that making fun of somebody in words or pictures, or withdrawing your social support from them (by refusing to trade with them, refusing to talk to them at parties, whatever) is unjustified because it’s somehow a violation of the target’s liberty rights, then I think this is absurd, and that it’s not recognizable as any form of libertarianism that I’m aware of, since it would require a claim to the effect that nonviolent speech or expression is invading the target’s liberty rights, or that people have a positive obligation to provide social support to people who they do not want to associate with. (And I’m supposed to be the p.c. fascist here?)

I hope that I’ve misunderstood your view. But if I have, then I do need some help in figuring out what it is. Do you think that ridicule or ostracism are not literally violations of the targets rights, but that they are objectionable on some other grounds? If so, what are those grounds, and why do they rule out any and all use of ridicule or social ostracism, just as such, as legitimate nonviolent means for libertarians to achieve their social or cultural goals?

Nick: Such an alliance would, for example, criticize mainstream feminism (or more precisely what Christina Hoff Sommers calls “gender feminism”), male chauvinism, racial supremacists, race hustlers, etc. In contrast, it would support equity feminism, men’s rights groups, “equal opportunity” anti-racism, etc.

May I suggest that if your understanding of the different factions within the feminist movement depends significantly on Christina Hoff Sommers’s worthless, more or less purely polemical distinction between “gender feminism” and “equity feminism,” then you probably need to do some more work learning about the history, theory, and practice of the feminist movement before you try to figure out whether to support or to criticize it. (For a discussion of some of what’s wrong with Sommers’s discussion of “gender” and “equity” feminism, see for example my comments about this alleged distinction over at feministe.)

Nick Manley: The French Revolution and 1968 were both complicated affairs. I don’t think there were no positive aspects to them though.

Well. I don’t think Keith was claiming that there were no positive aspects to them. I think he was claiming that the criteria that are being used to criticize his strategic views are not being consistently applied.

David J. Heinrich:

Same sex relations may have a higher burden of proof, even if the teenager or near-teenager claims to be gay.

Um. Why?

Rob:

While Western cultures have made it the norm to prohibit sex between adults and anyone under 16 or 18, from my understanding of history, the majority of cultures throughout time (and even a lot of cultures today) have left the responsibility to decide with the parents of the child ….

It seems to me that somebody’s consent is getting lost in this discussion of “responsibility.” Can you guess whose?

Rob:

Concerning girls – if parents today were actually paying attention and protecting their daughters there would not be a need for government involvement in the issue of age of consent.

It’s interesting that, in a discussion of age-of-consent clauses in existing rape statutes — which usually do not say anything about gender — you’d spend your entire reply talking about “parents … protecting their daughters” and about the supposed sexual behavior of adolescent girls. I hear that adolescent boys sometimes have sex, too.

Jon,

Depends partly on what you’re looking for, of course.

On superhero comics, I don’t have much to contribute other than what’s already been said.

In the broader field of comics, I really, really strongly recommend Marjane Satrapi’s Persepolis books, Alison Bechdel’s Fun Home, and Dykes to Watch Out For (you might want to wait for a while on the last before buying; there’s supposed to be a big collection coming out this fall, with most of the run collected in one volume rather than spread out over 11 different (varyingly difficult-to-find) books.

piny,

I didn’t mean to suggest that adolescents never consider or make a physical transition, or to attribute to Michelle the claim that there ought to be therapeutic intervention to “correct” GID in young kids because a failure to do so would lead to them ending up gay. I didn’t infer from her mention of the “outcome” statistics that that’s what she believes. If I did inadvertently suggest that, I apologize for being unclear.

The point I was trying to make about age is that, as I understand it, an issue that’s unlikely to come up at the age of 7 or 8 in a case like this one. A few years later, closer to adolescence, sure, but at that point we’re moving rapidly away from the diagnostic territory of “GID in Children” anyway, and towards “GID in Adolescents and Adults.” My understanding may be mistaken; if so I retract that claim, but I’d still make the more specific claim that it doesn’t have much to do with what this particular kid and her mother say they’re concerned about at this particular moment, or with the details of how the school is dealing with them. And I’d also fall back on the other argument against the basic problem with the way that the medical establishment holds medical aids to transition hostage to medicalized labels and “disorder” diagnoses.

The stuff about “outcome” statistics wasn’t meant to suggest that Michelle personally believed that there was something wrong with adolescents being gay. Rather that if one believes that there’s nothing wrong with being gay, nothing wrong with not being gay, nothing wrong with being trans, and nothing wrong with not being trans (which for all I know is what Michelle believes; otherwise I would have been arguing about that rather than just asserting it), then that correspondingly undermines the claim that there’s anything that ought to be called “disordered” or of “clinical interest” here, and to that extent it’s unclear why you’d need a diagnostic category for it, let alone a diagnostic category that’s used to justify psychotherapeutic intervention (at least not for children who don’t actively seek it out for themselves, rather than being shoved into it by anxious adults), let alone a diagnostic category that’s counted as a mental “disability” for legal purposes.

If I had to guess at Michelle’s motives I’d be very unlikely to guess that it had to do with personal attitudes of homophobia or transphobia, and much more likely to guess that they have to do with the tendency in our culture to elevate professionalized psychiatry and medicine as the primary or only way to understand the things that are most important to our lives, and the “mission creep” for medicalized labels that this inevitably leads to, no matter how ill-founded or inappopriate that model may be in a given area. But that’s just speculation, and I’ll happily take it all back if I’m wrong.

Rosehiptea,

As Holly mentions, the major distinction in types of treatment has to do with whether the diagnosis is made in childhood or later in life. Shrinks are generally respectful enough of their adults patients’ wishes and strongly held convictions, at least on this specific point, not to simple-mindedly force them into efforts to “correct” their transgenderism. Not so for children, where all kinds of nasty behavioral therapy are commonly employed to “cure” them.

Michelle,

I think that when the common features of “diagnostic category” are explicitly described “symptoms,” while the thing itself is explicitly labeled a “disorder” and it is classified as an Axis I Clinical Disorder, it’s a bit odd to suggest that the purpose of the diagnostic category is primarily descriptive, rather than prescriptive. When professional medical practitioners describe a set of behaviors and attitudes in terms that are directly and deliberately taken from the medical study of disease, and describes them as causes for “clinical attention,” it is pretty strongly suggested that there’s something wrong with people who have that “disorder.”

As for the professional ethics in sex-reassignment surgery, it has basically nothing to do with the use of Gender Identity Disorder as a “diagnostic category” in eight year old children, which was the context of the discussion. However, I think that if the sole raison d’etre for this diagnostic category is in order to pander to the prejudices of doctors who can only be persuaded to acknowledge their trans patients’ considered judgment when said patients can get another doctor to sign off on it in the form of an Official Diagnosis certifying that they’re “disordered,” that’s a pretty slender reed to lean on. I’d hope that maybe we can start talking about changes that are important for our lives without first having to get a medical label slapped on it.

As for the study of “outcomes” in children labeled as having GID, cf. Speck’s reply. (Incidentally, last I checked, the DSM-IV TR says that 3/4 of anatomical boys diagnosed with GID end up living as homosexual or bisexual males in their late adolescence; the corresponding figure for anatomical girls diagnosed with GID are said to be unknown.)

But, moreover, I don’t see what the point of bringing this up is in the first place. If 3/4 of GID-diagnosed kids turn out to be gay, then so what? There’s nothing wrong with being gay and there’s nothing wrong with not being gay. There’s nothing wrong with wanting to live as a girl (or boy) when you’re 8 and then deciding you want to live as a gay man (or lesbian) when you’re 16. There’s nothing wrong with wanting to live as a girl (or boy) when you’re 8 and then deciding that you want to continue living as a woman (or man) when you’re 16. There’s nothing wrong with changing the gender you want to live as every four months, if you feel like it. If only a few kids diagnosed GID end up seeking sex-reassignment surgery as adults, what of clinical interest follows from that? It’s certainly not any kind of argument for therapeutic intervention with the kids with strong, persistent cross-gender identification (either potential outcome–remaining trans or not remaining trans–is fine, so what’s the big deal?). Nor is it an argument for trying to get the government to treat 8 year old kids with strong, persistent cross-gender identification as if they had a mental “disability.”

ThickRedGlasses,

“The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.” . . . People with Gender Identity Disorder are going to be significantly distressed by being in the wrong body, even if the social stigma goes away.

A significant part of my point is that the criteria having to do with “impairment in social [or] occupational … functioning” are basically bogus. They’re a way of shifting the responsibility for other people’s discrimination and bullying onto the victims of the discrimination and bullying. In reality, insofar as there’s a “disorder” here, it’s because other people have a problem, not because kids labeled as having GID have a problem.

As far as “clinically significant distress” goes, as far as I know, there’s been no positive evidence presented to the effect that the little girl in question feels that way, and I see little reason to assume that she does. Not everybody who wants to live as a member of a gender different from the one they were assigned at birth is especially concerned about the anatomical details of their body, especially not when they are still years away from puberty.

If, on the other hand, she does feel that way, then in any case that’s a separate issue from the accommodations that the school should or shouldn’t make for her. They don’t have much control over her personal feelings about her genitals. The issue at hand is how they will or won’t deal with the questions about her immediate social environment–whether or not teachers and classmates call her by her chosen name, allow her to to come to school dressed as a girl, do or don’t harass her, etc.

From a clinical standpoint, I’d question the utility of creating a gender-specific diagnostic category if the only purpose is to group together people who are (1) trans and (2) depressed or anxious or dysphoric about their bodies. There’s nothing wrong with (1) per se, and there’s already a ton of different diagnostic categories to cover (2), so why come up with a new one just to single out the fact that one subgroup of people who develop (2) are also (1)?

Holly:

Thank you for posting this. I love how the genital correctness blowhard brigade keeps falling back on the idea that anyone who doesn’t go out of their way to make life unpleasant for this kid (e.g. by refusing to call her by her chosen name, or by harassing or punishing her for wearing the “wrong” set of clothes to school) must, therefore be “bending over backwards” to suit her delicate sensibilities. Rather than, you know, just not going out of their way to be obnoxious to an eight-year-old kid in the name of heteropatriarchal social engineering.

ThickRedGlasses:

Wouldn’t this child be considered disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act? Gender Identity Disorder is considered considered a mental disorder, so shouldn’t this girl be covered by ADA?

I think we’d be better off not going there.

So-called “Gender Identity Disorder” is a basically political, not medical diagnosis. It’s been used repeatedly as an excuse for quack psychiatrists and anxious or controlling parents to inflict all kinds of torture, mislabeled “therapy,” in the name of “curing” their trans kids, or even mildly gender-deviant kids, of their “disorder”. In fact there is absolutely nothing wrong or crazy or disordered about a kid born anatomically male who wants to live as a girl (or vice versa), and I think it would be a serious mistake to reinforce and institutionalize the notion that there is, whatever short-term advantages you might hope to gain from it.

A few decades ago, Homosexuality was considered a mental illness and included as a category in the DSM. But if that diagnosis were still on the books, I think it would be counterproductive, to say the least, for gay liberationists to try and use it to get accommodations under the ADA.

I dunno. I think people who use the word “anarchy” use it as a package-deal: it’s not that it means chaos instead of freedom from rulers; it’s used to mean both chaos and freedom from rulers, because people who use the word that way think that the two are the same thing, or at least inevitably connected with each other.

So when people are package-dealing, there’s two ways you could respond. You could reject the term and come up with a new one. But what would you come up with? “Peace?” “Freedom?” That’s what anarchy means, but obviously the common uses of those terms are just as knotty as the common uses of “Anarchy.” “Lawlessness?” “Ungoverned?” Both of these imply chaos in common usage just as much as “anarchy.” “A spontaneous, polycentric, or non-hierarchical social order?” Gag.

Fortunately, there’s another thing you can do when dealing with a conceptual package deal: you can pick out the part of the concept you want to preserve and defend, and then explicitly challenge the presupposition behind the attempt to package-deal it with the part of the concept you don’t want to defend. For example, this is what gay men and lesbians did when they reclaimed the words “homosexual” and “bisexual” from the psychiatrists; the words used to be used so as to imply both (1) having particular types of sexuality, and also (2) suffering from mental illness. The gay liberation movement embraced (1) but chucked (2) out the door, and it didn’t take too long for much of the rest of the world to catch up.

It might seem like taking the reclamation route is somehow a drain on time, since it gets you tangled up in other people’s confused terminology. But I’m not at all sure that’s right. Identifying and challenging the confusion that’s implicit in the ordinary use of the word — e.g. the confusion between lawlessness and riot, or the presupposition that only government force can produce social harmony — is part and parcel of the strategy of reclaiming the term. In some important ways, it involves you much more in meeting people where they are, whereas minting new language can lead you into inadvertently sidestepping the real issue, by not confronting the confusion that’s at the core of the dispute over the meaning of e.g. “anarchy.”

Micha: And I see the milquetoastiness of IHS as a feature, not a bug. Inforcing ideological uniformity entails devolving into a cult, ala Ayn Rand’s inner circle.

I don’t understand this argument at all, Micha. Arthur was referring to the way in which the so-called “urbane” libertarian outlets tend either (1) to shy away from hard or unpopular applications of libertarian principles — such as anarchism or criticism of bayonet-point Unionism — in the name of public relations, or else (2) to hold positively the wrong view on what libertarian principles entail. If (1) they are dissembling about their views in order to avoid public embarrassment, and if (2) they are being inconsistent. In either case, criticizing dissembling or criticizing inconsistency is a distinct issue from intolerance of dissent, n’est-ce pas?

This is not to say that the paleos in particular haven’t been intolerant of dissent on many occasions. They certainly have been. But I think the reasons have to do with something other than the radicalism of their views.

Micha: I’ll take the minarchist, pro-interventionist deviationism of Beltway libertarians over the not-so-thinly veiled racism, homophobia, goldbug-crankism, evolution-denial, fundamentalist Christianity and Confederacy apologetics of the Paleo alternative any day of the week.

Well, O.K.; it’s your business which features you choose to treat as decisive or defeating for dealing with someone as a friend, ally, or comrade. But I don’t understand how this meshes with your previous argument. As far as “enforcing ideological uniformity” goes, how is treating anti-racism, gay-positivity, evolutionism, “urbanity,” “cosmopolitanism,” or whatever as a litmus test different in kind from treating anti-interventionism or Civil War revisionism as a litmus test? Surely both of these involve demanding a certain degree of ideological uniformity; it’s just that they differ in the particular ideological features that they require.

This is not to adjudicate whether the paleos are right about their litmus tests, or whether you’re right about your litmus tests, or whether you’re both wrong, or whether it’s just a matter of taste. But I don’t see that the difference between their standards and your standards amounts to what you seem to suggest it amounts to.

(Personally, I tend to think that you’re both right, or both wrong, depending on the level and purpose of association that you’re talking about — who you’re willing to form issue-based coalition with, who you’re willing to read and cite, who you’re willing to consider yourself part of a common movement with, and who you’re willing to be friends with are all quite different questions.)