John: If it was so that medical care and mutual aid was so easy to come by, then why was their a perception that the poor and elderly were dying sick in the streets?

It depends on what period this “perception” is supposed to apply to.

1. If you’re referring to the heyday of the mutual aid societies in the late 19th century through the 1910s, the answer is simply that this “perception” exists because statists often promote bogus perceptions of crisis without much supporting data, in order to put over the need for their desired programs with the politicized public. Some actual data on the circumstances faced by the poor and elderly, rather than impressionistic and sensationalistic “perceptions” would be useful here. I have some actual data on how available these arrangements were to ordinary workers, which I present briefly in the article — typically between 20% and 50% of workers in major urban areas in English-speaking countries were covered, and these numbers were rapidly rising in the 1900s, prior to the political campaigns to eradicate the associations and raise medical prices. If you want a fuller presentation of the data, I recommend David Beito’s excellent book, From Mutual Aid to the Welfare State, especially Ch. 6, “The ‘Lodge Practice Evil’ Reconsidered.” If you have actual countervailing data that tends to cut against the conclusion I draw, feel free to present it, but if what you’ve got is just ill-specified “perceptions,” well, so what?

2. If, on the other hand, you’re referring to the decades leading up to the passage of major government entitlement programs for the “poor and elderly” — programs like Social Security (1935) or Medicare (1965), then you need to keep in mind that these programs were introduced and rolled out decades after the non-corporate, grassroots, free-market alternatives that I discuss in the article had been deliberately dismantled by politically-driven campaigns — coordinated mainly by establishment medical guilds, using their power over government licensure of practitioners as their primary means of enforcement — to drive them out. (The blackballing campaigns against lodge-practice doctors in the U.S. ramped up in the mid-1910s and succeeded in forcing dramatic declines in lodge practice starting in the 1920s. See Beito, p. 124 et seq.) So, to the extent that government could point to a crisis of health care accessibility or affordability for the poor and elderly, just before the New Deal and Great Society transfer programs were created, it’s because government was pointing to a situation where the kind of grassroots, consensual social organizations that had made health care accessible to the poor and elderly had already been rubbed out by government in the decades prior. Once again, an example of government breaking your legs, then handing you crutches, and telling you, “See, without me you couldn’t even walk!”

Also, secondarily, because, insofar as there was a genuine crisis, it was, in no small part, the direct result of the non-corporate, grassroots, free-market alternatives that I discuss in the article having been deliberately dismantled in the decades prior. The grassroots voluntary mutual aid associations that I discuss in the article flourished in the late 19th century up until the 1910s; in the 1920s,

By the time that government programs such as Social Security (1935) and Medicare (1965) were being proposed and rolled out, the “lodge practice” arrangements and similar mutual aid associations had already

John: However I am not ready to drink the cool-aid …

I don’t want to be a dick about this, but can you not use that phrase when what you mean is “I don’t accept your delusional beliefs?” It’s an offhand jokey reference where the “punchline” is the murder of 276 children, and the senseless deaths of almost 1,000 people, just 30 years ago. Jokes like that suck.

John: … and say that we need to rid ourselves of the FDA or of medical accreditation. Kevin Trudeau is a salesmen of alternative cures for a variety of ailments [etc., etc.]

The existence of quacks and dangerous drugs today, in spite of already-existing heavy government regulation, seems like an odd argument for relying on government regulation as a means of getting rid of quacks and dangerous drugs.

In any case, the free-market position is not that we need to get rid of drug testing or medical accreditation. The free-market position is that the state should not force any particular scheme for drug safety or efficacy testing, or for medical licensure, on you or me without our consent.

The important thing, from the standpoint of individualist principle, is that, if you want to pay for snake oil without any consideration of demonstrated effects, you should be free to do so. And if I want to spend money only on drugs that scientific research has demonstrated to be safe and effective, or on doctors who have garnered the recognition of their peers as honorable and competent professionals, then I should be free to patronize only those that consensual consumer-protection outfits and professional medical institutions have approved.

In a freed market, there will certainly be both drug testing and medical accreditation; it will simply be drug testing and medical accreditation that relies on informed choice, or education and persuasion, rather than on the force of the law. How do I know that such institutions will exist? Well, of course, because they already exist, or have existed in the past. Before the modern prescriptions system was created in 1951, the role of objective watchdog for drug safety and efficacy in the U.S. was handled by the American Medical Association (which maintained a private drug-testing laboratory and published annual guidebooks of drugs that received their seal of approval). They provided a system of voluntary, independent oversight that worked — until government “fixed” it.

Similarly, nobody that I know of is proposing that existing methods of accrediting doctors or other medical practitioners be abolished. Where would you get such a ludicrous notion? There’s already plenty of non-governmental means of accrediting doctors — among them, well, the doctoral degree in medicine, which is issued by medical schools and still would be issued by medical schools in a freed market, based on standards of training and mastery. Similarly for nursing degrees, certification by professional associations like the AMA, etc. What radical individualists oppose is not accreditation, but state licensure laws, which add an unnecessary layer of politically-directed licensing restrictions on top of already-existing, voluntary professional standards and certifications within the medical profesion. The problem with this is, first, that they are coercive, and hence violate the rights of patients and practitioners; and, second, that the standards for governmental licensure are imposed through political decision-making and legislative fiat, rather than being determined through open debate and consensus over best practices within the health care market.

As a result, they often use the force of the state to shut down debate and impose requirements that have nothing to do with medical fact and everything to do with political pull — as when state licensure laws were used to attack feminist women’s health centers, midwives, or other alternative medicine providers, even without any evidence that any identifiable patients had been harmed or were even dissatisfied with the service. Or, to return to our original topic, when state licensure laws were used to blackball doctors who were providing perfectly adequate care, but who were seen as “underselling” (that is, providing competent care at costs that were affordable by ordinary working people) during the political campaign against lodge practice in th 1910s and 1920s.

John: The truth is that of all the industrialized countries, America is the only one with a private for profit system,

Didn’t you read the article? “America” doesn’t have a private health care system. It has a government-imposed health care system. The market is dominated first, by direct government control, and, second, by the operations of a handful of corporate privateers who depend entirely on a combination of government subsidy and government-imposed barriers to entry for their day-to-day operations and long-term strategy.

A freed market in health care would look completely different from the “system” that you and I face today.

John de Laubenfels: Would you give companies that research and produce new drugs NO protection from competition,

You are correct that I do not believe that protectionism for pharmaceutical corporations is an adequate argument for imposing government-granted monopolies.

If you want to “protect” pharmaceutical companies’ existing business models, do so on your own dime by boycotting competitors and directing your money to first movers. (Hey, it worked for Tolkien.) But I’m not nearly so invested in protecting current business practices in the pharmaceutical industry, and I’d rather that you don’t use government monopoly to force your protections on my pocketbook.

John de Laubenfels: starting the moment someone gets ahold of the new drug, analyzes it, and creates a knockoff? Nothing for all the money the original company has spent doing trials? I don’t think that such a system would be either fair or likely to motivate companies to produce new, life-saving drugs.

On the cost of doing drug trials, of course, in the same sentence where I advocated the abolition of patents I also specifically stated that I supported the abolition of the FDA, which would dramatically reduce the compliance costs involved in developing new drugs and bringing them to market. So I don’t know what you’re referring to here. (Of course, if companies want to do internal testing they can do so, but in voluntary independent oversight systems, the costs of running trials are typically assumed by the independent watchdog organizations themselves, as part of their institutional charter.)

However, if it turns out that it’s no longer profitable for big, for-profit corporations to do medical research, then — horrors! — it may just turn out to be the case that medical research has to be carried on by non-corporate or not-for-profit institutions. But I hear we have some of those. And I’m not typically impressed by broken-window arguments that fail to take any account of the value of the unseen alternative uses to which money might be put, if not for the coercive government intervention.

MBH:

If you are subsidized, then your insurance policy cannot cover abortions. But that’s how the law has stood since 1976 (see Hyde Amendment). So the new legislation changes nothing.

Of course it does. Specifically, the new legislation (through a combination of subsidies, captive-market mandates, and new regulations on insurance corporations) is designed to corral more women (and men) into government-subsidized plans. That is, last I checked, the point of the “reform.”

Of course, more thoroughly statist options (like, say, putting everyone on Medicare, as some “social democrats” have proposed) would be even worse, in that total conversion of the healthcare industry to political allocation would mean the total subordination of women’s reproductive healthcare to the political mandates of Hyde et al. But this proposal is bad enough. And if your response depends on a claim that government subsidies to one good don’t tend to crowd out substitute goods, then I have to wonder where you would get that notion.

MBH:

If that’s not Left-Libertarian enough, I hope this is. Charles suggested it. Please click the red ‘Recommend’ button at the bottom if you like.

Although I certainly do support grassroots-organized community free clinics (on the model of the Panther clinics or the feminist women’s health center / women’s self-help clinic movement), I certainly do not favor having goverment “create” community health care centers. And while I very much appreciate the notions of (1) divorcing the idea of “universal health care” from “government health care”; and (2) doing so through voluntary grassroots alternatives to corporate health insurance, I will say that I strongly doubt that any one big voluntary plan for everyone everywhere is going to cut it. What I want to see is a thousand mutual aid societies blooming, and a thousand different approaches to the problem — not for there to be some one network that everyone signs onto, but rather that every one have some network that she individually can sign on to.

Aster:

The point is that while theoretically libertarians decide these things on individualist principle, in practice the judgment calls on policy options get made according to conservative and patriarchal priorities. This doesn’t have to be the case, but is.

Maybe so, but I may I suggest that MBH’s position on government health care reform is, well, idiosyncratic among self-identified libertarians? And so that the argumentative moves he makes may not be indicative of how most of us would handle the issue?

Aster: This one was merely nightmare fuel, as I said. … An ecological collapse is not a sign of our failure to be humble before nature but of our failure to be rational in regards to nature’s reality. Failing societies lose the capacity to produce to match their habitual levels of consumption, and the process of trying to hold on to effects without causes sets everything afire with debt and inflation. … I agree intensely that the only way out is forward. … But I look at the mentality of the social classes who make the relevant decisions and I tremble. … One could hope that the system will change when it realise that its disfunctionality will come at the cost of its own survival. But I’m not placing my chips on the numbers in accordance with hope, and I don’t think one needs hope to pursue happiness.

Well, maybe not, but if you’re worried about this, why not work on building an alternative for yourself and your neighbors, to the extent that you can under current conditions? I don’t know how the cost of the components varies in New Zealand, but in the U.S., you can get the basics for building out a partial off-the-grid home power system (which can be expanded out on the margin, to take over more and more capacity, as you get the money and the experience with the system) for a few hundreds of US$, and can set it all up with off-the-shelf parts with the help of a DIY manual or two. (I can point you to some resources, if you’re curious. The notion that off-the-grid home power systems cost tens of thousands of dollars is the result of the Green State trying to insist on all-at-once rather than piecemeal solutions, and, especially, on sending people to professional “certified installers” who charge thousands of dollars for the labor.)

Of course, getting up your own home energy production won’t solve the big problem just on its own. But if you’re worried about losing electricity, it will solve that part of your little end of the problem, and that’s something.

I have no hope at all for any global or national systems to change. But I do have a lot of hope for changing things by getting out of global or national systems. And, perhaps, for helping others along the way to doing the same.

Rational modes of production begin at home….

SO,

I broadly agree with most everything you suggest. Generally speaking, with or without technological leaps in green energy, I definitely think it’s the case that decentralizing power production is both do-able for a surprising number of people under present circumstances. And that it’s certainly the best way by far to address peak-oil related concerns.

Soviet Onion: I imagine they’ll like that solution much better than the current environmentalist fixations which, among other things, include glorifying AIDS and pesticide-ban enabled malaria epidemics as forms of “natural population control”

I don’t think it’s fair to describe this kind of anthropocidal stuff as “current environmentalist fixations.” Any more than it would be fair to describe a Ra’s al-Ghul scale mass die-off of humanity as a “current Anarchist fixation,” even though I can think of some doofs who published calls for that sort of thing in Earth First! and other deep-ecology journals while self-identifying as Anarchists. The movement has a lot of different facets and shouldn’t simply be defined by its worst exponents.

Soviet: We’ve only got about a half-billion years before the sun boils the oceans and turns “Mother Earth” back into the lifeless rock she used to be.

Fortunately we apparently only need about 1,000,000 more years before we can all relocate to the Vorlon homeworld, anyway.

Marx was wrong.

There, that was easy.

It’s worth noting as well, in addition to the points that Roderick and Tracy make, that the relevant question, in this particular case, actually isn’t whether the economies of scale in online retail sales would be large or small under freed-market conditions. For all I know, they might well turn out to be considerable. (Certainly, there is a natural economy of scale involved in a lot of long-distance shipping and tightly-packed warehouse storage.)

But the real question here is what the economies of scale are, not only for potential competing retailers, but in all competing uses for the distribution center worker’s labor — since the question is not only whether the worker could make as good a living or better setting up as a competitor for Amazon, but also whether or not the worker could make as good a living or better in other lines of work outside the industry, or possibly outside of the cash-wage economy entirely. So there is not only the question of opportunities for entrepreneurial competition with Amazon downstream in the retail market, but also the question of opportunities for entrepreneurial competition with Amazon upstream, in the labor market.

If it is true (as Kevin has argued, and as I argued in Scratching By) that, absent the state, most ordinary workers would experience a dramatic decline in the fixed costs of living, including (among other things) considerably better access to individual ownership of small plots of land, no income or property tax to pay, and no zoning, licensing, or other government restraints on small-scale neighborhood home-based crafts, cottage industry, or light farming/heavy gardening, I think you’d see a lot more people in a position to begin edging out or to drop out of low-income wage labor entirely — in favor of making a modest living in the informal sector, by growing their own food, or both, quite apart from the question of economies of scale in the formal retail sector. If that’s the case, then, on the one hand, workers who dropped out wouldn’t have to deal with Amazon’s taskmastering at all; meanwhile, back at Amazon, in order to convince others to stay in, Amazon would have to offer them a corresponding premium to make it worth their while — whether in the form of wage increases, improvements in conditions, or both.

IOZ: Your first clause suggests you didn’t understand the post;

Well, whatever. If you didn’t have the LP in mind, maybe you could tell me what “lame, purely American third-party movement” you did have in mind.

IOZ: Self-professed libertarians are fond of this game, of course; they refuse to provide any sort of normative definition of their supposed philosophy, and then attack any criticism as being a merely idiosyncratic definition of that which they steadfastly refuse to define.

Well, no; far from refusing, I’ve written specifically about the definition of the term “libertarian” many times (for example, see the note here or the comments scattered throughout Liberty, Equality, Solidarity). I just didn’t do so again here. I have a pretty good notion of what I mean about my political philosophy when I describe it as “libertarian” (it has something to do with theories of justice based on the respect for the law of equal liberty; it’s also the opposite of “authoritarian,” and so has something to do with rejecting status-based theories of political legitimacy). There are of course other meanings to the term, with equally good historical pedigrees, which we could also discuss. But I didn’t say much about that above because in this here conversation, you’re the one trying to push a sweeping conclusion, supposedly in response to a specific article by Kerry Howley, without ever stopping to consider whether the thing you spend all your time hacking at is even the thing that Kerry Howley is talking about when she talks about “libertarianism.”

If you attempt to support a sweeping conclusion by insisting on one definite meaning for the term, among many that have historically been in common usage, without giving any reason for thinking that this is the right meaning to insist on, or that it is at least the same meaning which was being used by your conversation partner when she used the word “libertarianism” to describe what she believes, then it’s on you to supply the reasons behind your heretofore unsupported assertions.

IOZ: As for a Frenchman coining “libertarian” prior to the American Revolution,

The American Revolution was more than 115 years ago.

My point also wasn’t based solely on how the word was used in 1857. It was also being used to mean something quite other than a “third party movement” in 1967 (when it was being used by folks like Rothbard, LeFevre, Karl Hess, et al., and when the LP did not yet exist); the Libertarian Party was, after all, named after the body of ideas, and not vice versa. Many of the people at the time considered themselves libertarians but wanted nothing to do with the LP. Many of those people are still alive and still feel the same way. Many of us who came to the movement much later also came to the body of ideas, without much or any interest in the party named after it.

IOZ: do you really want to go down that road? I will see your Libertarian and raise you a Republican and a Democrat.

O.K. Are those supposed to be counterexamples to my point? If so, how? “Democrat” and “republican” each have commonly accepted meanings in political theory which are quite independent of the political parties which use those names today. If I were to talk about democratic political theories (say, the political thought of the Athenian democrats, or whatever), and you were to reply by saying that the problem with all that is that Democrats really are nothing more than a crappy, opportunistic center-left party, then you would be engaging in exactly the sort of equivocation that you’re indulging in with respect to libertarianism.

Charles F. Oxtrot,

Funny. But the translation is inaccurate, due to the fact that I wasn’t speaking Strawman.

If you knew anything about the version of libertarianism I’ve endorsed in my writing, you’d know that <a href=”http://radgeek.com/gt/2007/11/08/sprachkritik_privatization/>I’m opposed to most government “privatization” schemes (I want government abolished, not auctioned off), and that I’ve repeatedly written about the nasty and exploitative practices of large corporations and other centers of economic power (the thing is just that I advocate non-governmental means of dealing with callousness, envy, greed, and exploitation, because I see government as part of the problem on that one, not part of the solution). Of course, there’s no reason why you should have to know anything in particular about the views expressed in my writing; but if you don’t know what you’re talking about the best course would be not to talk about it.

But please do feel free to go back to arguing with the imaginary Internet libertarian buzzword bingo-card in your head.

Will:

I sense you get pretty frustrated about the fact that you tend not to be persuasive to people with a background in relatively orthodox economics (or mildly heterodox economics).

Maybe. But if you use your sense of sight to read what Kevin wrote, it seems like part of what’s frustrating for him in the current exchange is that his views on benefits of specialization and economies of scale were misrepresented so that the crude cartoon version of his analysis could be waved off as “totally incompetent.” I don’t know about you, but I don’t find that a very auspicious beginning for a conversation.

There are lots of ways to discuss a view that you don’t find persuasive, and lots of people have criticized smaller or larger parts of Kevin’s writing on agriculture and local production. (I have, for one. William Gillis has, from a position arguably to the left of Kevin’s. Etc.) But there’s responsive criticism which attempts to clarify and hone in on the issue, and thee’s non-responsive attacks. What you’re doing in this most recent comment is something like the former. What you led off with is more like the latter.

And so I’m incredibly skeptical of the idea that more than a few people would find it worthwhile to support a restructuring of institutions to shift to a radically different structure of food production.

Well, the suggestion is not necessarily that lots of people would direct their economic activity towards restructuring etc. Some food faddists like that kind of thing, but the main suggestion here is that that would be an unintended consequence of the final prices for the produce of capital-intensive centralized agriculture with long-distance shipping rising relative to the final prices for the produce of more localized, informal, and labor-intensive county-scale, neighborhood-scale, or home-scale alternatives. (Note that you would see this effect even if absolute prices for all kinds of produce were to fall.)

The real price of food is declining. True or false? Real average wages are increasing. True or false? I think the evidence is very, very clear that both are true. And I think this largely explains the dramatic decline in the household production of food. But you apparently don’t. Why not? Would you agree that if the cost of food continues to decline as a percentage of the average wage, then the average-wage worker WILL hit a point where she is better off buying than growing?

1. What’s happening to real wages over time is a lot more complex than that, because, as I’m sure you know, modal workers don’t make mean incomes. When you separate it out by socioeconomic class, you get very different pictures for different kinds of families. Particularly over the last 35 years or so.

2. As specified, you haven’t yet given enough information to determine whether or not a wage-worker will or will not reach an equilibrium point where the trade-off of cash for saved labor is worth making. If tomato prices decline relative to wages for non-food-related wage-labor, then that would tend to favor doing the wage-labor, buying the tomato, and pocketing the difference — if there’s no comparable decline in the marginal time that it takes to grow the tomato yourself. But I don’t think that the antecedent of that conditional has been established.

And if your alleged facts are facts, why are they not exploited to create huge fortunes? If I’m a farmer with x acres, and I would get more output per acre by switching production techniques and substituting labor for capital, why wouldn’t I sell a bunch of my machines, buy a bunch of labor at the average wage or below, and make higher profits?

Well, if we’re just looking at the input side, and not the effects of (say) government action on competition, then Kevin’s alleged fact was that if you hold the acreage fixed, large-scale mechanized agribusiness will produce less total output than soil-intensive horticulture, but it will produce more output per marginal hour of labor expended on the acreage. The question then is whether it’s more profitable for the farmer to economize on the costs of labor or to economize on the costs of land and capital. For people with relatively little access to large, concentrated tranches of land and capital, the trade-off may go one way; for people with better access, perhaps even access that’s facilitated or directly provided by the actions of state or federal government, the trade-off may go the other way.

John,

1. It’s not my case. It’s Kevin’s case. He gives the argument for it in his book and a series of articles which I’m certainly not prepared to reproduce in full here in the comments thread. My point so far has simply been that specific criticisms Will has offered as a reply to the case are in fact crude misrepresentations of the case he’s allegedly replying to.

My own view is that Kevin probably overreaches on the extent to which centrifugal effects on agriculture will result specifically in sustenance kitchen-gardening. But I’m not prepared to wave that off as “bullshit” in the absence of a reply to the evidence he gives, and I’m not about to try and make the case that he overreaches based on the (clearly false) claim that he just denies the existence of benefits from specialization or economies of scale.

1. That said, it’s also simply not true that centralized growing of fruits and vegetables “aren’t subsidized” in the U.S. They receive far less in the way of direct federal subsidies (in the form of domestic price supports and export subsidies), compared to (say) cereal grains, soybeans, sugar, etc. But many vegetables (e.g. potatoes, onions) are bought up heavily through government purchase and donation programs (school lunch program, military procurement, etc.), many are included in government agricultural export financing and promotion programs (e.g. the Market Access Program), the market is just as heavily regulated as the cereal markets in favor of large incumbents by means of USDA and state and local regulations, they are covered by federal crop insurance bail-outs, and — this happens to be awfully important in the agricultural markets near where I live — benefit very heavily (especially with crops like melons, which are now mostly grown in the Southwestern desert) from government irrigation subsidies and engineering projects.

Moreover, Kevin’s point is not simply concerned with the effects of direct government subsidy to producers. It’s part of a larger case which significantly has to do with (among other things) the suppression of potential competitors and substitute goods, either by government-enforced cartelization, direct legal suppression of the product, by direct legal suppression of necessary inputs, or by the ripple-effects of economic distortions that make the inputs artificially expensive compared to how they’d be in a free market, or that make the inputs for centralized business models artificially cheap.

Is all of that enough to demonstrate that there’d probably be a large scale shift towards home food production in a free society? I dunno. In any case, we’re still talking about a really heterogeneous set of products (the economics of tomato growing are quite different from those of cantaloupe farms, and both are awfully different from banana plantations), and all this is no doubt beyond the scope of this comment thread. But it’s certainly a reason for believing that the market we have to look at now is pretty damn skewed, and so that pointing to revealed preferences under those market conditions is not a very reliable guide to what would be economically efficient in a genuinely free market, which was my point in mentioning all this stuff in the first place.

Will,

As you please, but to back someone into a corner you need to actually start with the position that they have, not some a strawman position that’s easier for you to attack. To attribute a claim to Kevin which he does not hold (for example, that there is just no such thing as gains from specialization or economies of scale, and that he is just in “denial,” rather than having given a specific argument with specific evidence as to why there are countervailing costs and diseconomies that are important in the case of a particular set of potential producers and a particular good) and then smugly ridicule this cartoon version of your interlocutor, rather than replying to the argument that was given you, is something quite different. To then describe your interlocutor as “totally incompetent” at economic analysis on the basis of this ridiculously crude strawman, when he has repeatedly and at length set out a more nuanced view, is awfully graceless, not to mention unreliable as a way of getting to the truth.

As for ad hoc rationalizations of prior convictions, I suppose that the charge against Kevin would be just if Kevin hadn’t ever set out in any systematic or comprehensive way to provide evidence for his claims that a shift, on the margin, away from wage-labor (yards, whatever) and towards home food production, might be preferable for some significant number of current wage-workers under free market conditions, or that state intervention systematically tends to favor hypertrophic centralized producers, to subsidize centralized capital-intensive agribusiness (and centralized, cash-lubricated capital-intensive business in general), etc. Or if he simply stopped and then refused to consider any kind of countervailing factors that might tend to push in the opposite direction under the conditions he is supposedly considering. But if he has provided such a systematic investigation and argument ahead of time, and has considered the countervailing factors, then we’re not talking about an argument ad hoc; we’re talking about the application of prior evidence to a specific case. And, well, you know, I hear he did already write some stuff about that stuff, even at some length. Maybe you think that what he wrote about it is underargued, or “terribly unconvincing,” or maybe even that it’s “bullshit.” But you’ve not yet given any reasons that anyone else can inspect or has any reason to care about for finding it so. Because, at the level of principle, I am fairly sure that no competent economist would deny that there are limits to the benefits of specialization and to economies of scale, that those limits are not homogeneous across all goods and all producers, and that large-scale government interventions may have large-scale systemic ripple-effects which tend to skew the trade-offs in some markets towards artificially centralized or capital-intensive equilibrium points. And on the level of detail, Kevin has presented some detailed evidence in favor of his take in many different books and articles, whereas you’ve offered “people like yards” and some contemptuous ad hominem swipes at smug urban eco-asshole basil growers, without any concerted effort to show that Kevin’s wrong on any particular point that he made. Maybe you don’t want to spend the time necessary to respond point by point, or even on one point. Which is fine; everyone’s got preferences and priorities. But if you’re not prepared to present a systematic response, then summary handwaving about what’s “bullshit” and what’s “terribly unconvincing” to you seems like an immoderate way to respond to an argument you’re not actually willing to reply to. And the fact that you don’t like the conclusion of the argument (that revealed preferences on this point under actually-existing capitalism reflect the influence of government intervention and not what people would likely do in a free market) doesn’t mean that citing the premises by way of explaining how Kevin came to the conclusion is an “ad hoc” response.

As for my own prior convictions, you seem to know more about my prior convictions than I do. Try finding anything that I’ve personally written which makes a detailed claim about how much wage-workers would shift towards kitchen-gardens for personal or family use in a free society. Insofar as I’ve argued about any of this stuff, it’s in the form of pretty broad claims about shifts on the margin, ceteris paribus, away from centralization, dependence on cash savings, and employer-employee relationships, in a free society. I’m not an especially good gardener myself, would most likely still be doing web development to pay for my food if laissez-faire broke out tomorrow and would be happy to do it, and generally have a much less detailed set of expectations about what free labor would look like in practice than Kevin does.

I do, however, have a pretty strong prior conviction in favor of playing an argument where it lies. And what I get really tired of is seeing Kevin put as much work as he does into putting out interesting, original, and detailed writing and analysis specifically on the question of economies of scale and benefits of specialization, producing reasoned responses to inappropriate and out-of-context applications of the economics of scale, division of labor, and roundabout production, only to see that work casually misrepresented and ridiculed as if he were simply unaware of, or trying to wish away, elementary pin-factory economics.

Will,

This, for example, is bullshit…

Maybe, but I can’t see that you’ve earned this assertion by means of argument, at least not as presented here.

(1) People like yards.

Sure. And people also dislike their jobs, and like cheap fresh produce.

People also typically like gardening work more than their jobs up to some point of labor-intensiveness, after which they start liking gardening work a lot less.

Given all this, the question is one of trade-offs among alternative uses for land and labor — whether people’s desire for (say) maintaining a grassy yard as a consumption good is strong enough, on the margin, to outweigh the countervailing benefits of small-scale biointensive vegetable gardening on the same land and with the same labor-time.

No doubt this will in fact be different for different people: some people really like yards; other people really hate their jobs; etc. But of course Kevin is not suggesting that, given the choice, all workers will prefer to transform some marginal units of lawn into marginal units of a kitchen garden as a means of reducing work hours. Nor is he even claiming, in the passage quoted, that any workers will withdraw entirely from the wage system in favor of gardening. What he does suggest is that, given the choice, some (significant number of) workers will prefer to trade out some (significant amount of) marginal wage-work, yardwork and yard-land in favor of marginal increases in garden-work and garden land. Of course, it’s easy to throw around isolated bits of data about what people “like” and don’t “like” in the abstract without considerations about opportunity costs, substitute goods, or division of the stock into marginal units, but given that Kevin’s point was about people’s preferences over alternatives on the margin, I can’t see how that gets any serious economic work done by this kind of response.

You might then ask, “Well, why don’t they already do what Kevin suggests? Seems like people’s revealed preferences tell us all we need to know about the trade-offs involved.” Which would be true — (1) if decisions were being made under conditions of adequate information (so that there is no need for, say, “mutualist propaganda” to offer information to people currently dependent on wages for their food about available alternatives which they may not have known about), and (2) if those preferences were revealed in a free market, where (among other things) substitute goods aren’t subsidized by the government, the wage-system isn’t made artificially difficult to escape by government-imposed needs for ready cash on hand, research and dissemination of information aren’t artificially skewed towards the needs and interests of competing business models, necessary inputs (notably, a patch of land, space to compost, etc.) aren’t made artificially expensive by government price-fixing and government-imposed restrictions on use; etc.

But they aren’t.

(2) The claim that it’s cheaper for families to grow their own than to buy from a store amounts to a denial that there are gains from specialization plus a denial of economies of scale (a Carson specialty), …

Well, no, what it amounts to is a specific application of a denial that gains from specialization and economies of scale are (1) unlimited (2) homogeneous across all goods and all producers.

Whether the application is apt or not is something that depends on more data than you can get from a one-paragraph pull quote (and is something that Carson discusses at length throughout his work on questions relating to, e.g., cottage industry and home food production). But the principle being applied is that there’s an equilibrium point at which marginal gains from specialization are outweighed by marginal costs (transaction costs, heterogeneous preferences for marginal labor-time, etc.), and an equilibrium point at which marginal gains from economies of scale are outweighed by marginal costs of scale, and that this equilibrium point may be different for, say, low-wage service sector workers than it is for highly-paid professionals, and may also be different for tomatoes or chili peppers than it is for pickup trucks or jumbo jets. Remembering which is not “totally incompetent,” but rather a prerequisite for actually doing any kind of serious economics in the real world.

I’m pro-gardening, but I’m smart enough to know that my investment doesn’t begin to cover my opportunity cost.

Maybe the kind of gardening that you do, and the alternative uses of your time that you have in mind, are different from the kind of gardening that Kevin has done, and the alternative uses of his time that he has in mind.

Or maybe that’s a bad example because cars would not exist in freed markets because we’d travel attached to inexpensive homemade kites which the corporatist conspiracy has brainwashed us into believing are impossible!

Is this kind of rhetorical broadside at ridiculous cartoon versions of your interlocutor supposed to be funny?

Because it sure isn’t necessary to make the point you’re trying to make, and it’s also neither particularly fair nor particularly reliable as a way to get out a relevant response to the argument your interlocutor actually made,rather than other, different arguments that he didn’t make, but which you find easier to lampoon.