Jeremy,

No; the voluntariness is key. Where did I suggest otherwise?

Well, I started this thread of conversation by asking a question about the rough handling of the few by the many in some non-consensual societies (e.g. Athens and Roman-occupied Palestine); got a response that the authority in question wasn’t necessarily rightful authority; asked if you meant mere power; and got a response that it was more than mere power that we were discussing, at which the shift over to consensual societies happened. As I said, I’m just having trouble understanding what claim you ultimately are defending about the relationship between numbers and authority, and trying to get clearer.

In a formula like “when a voluntary society stands up for a common end, that has authority to it,” there are at least three things doing conceptual work: (1) social (majority? supermajority?) consensus, (2) authority, and (3) the voluntary nature of the society (which I presume means that dissenters from the consensus have complete freedom of exit). But if (3) is doing no work in the relationship between (1) and (2), then the same claim would have to apply to non-consensual societies as well as consensual societies. If, on the other hand, (3) is doing some work, and is a necessary condition for (1) and (2) to have the claimed relationship that they have, then the question is what difference there might be between this claim about “voluntary society” (which, given freedom of association and freedom of exit, might consist of one person alone, or all rational creatures in the universe, or any size and arrangement in between) and the usual anarchist claim that all rightful authority derives from individual sovereignty and voluntary association (which again might mean one individual person, or the whole cosmopolis, or any size and arrangement in between). Maybe you meant to say something different, which I’m not grasping, in which case what I’d need to know to better understand it is how the claim about numbers and authority relates, if at all, to nonconsensual societies (where presumably the differences, if any, between these two claims would arise).

Or maybe you didn’t mean to say anything different, and just meant to restate the libertarian-individualist claim in other, panarchistic terms; but then I don’t see how that would connect with the claim libertarianism shouldn’t be about what is right or moral. Clearly, if this is the right understanding of your position, then your theory has already built in a very robust universal constraint of some kind on claims to the authority of superior numbers, which has nothing in itself to do with superior numbers, viz. the requirement of unanimous sustained consent to participation in the social project, whatever preferences or beliefs the majority faction may have. But if that requirement is an essential part of the claim you’re advancing, then it becomes increasingly hard for me to see how your claim is substantively different from mine, or how the requirement of consent is distinct from what I would call “natural law” or “inalienable natural rights.”

Admittedly, you might have a theory about the underlying status of the consent-requirement that is very different from what I would be willing to entertain — for example, you might think that while the consent-requirement is binding on every claim of authority, it’s only binding because, as a matter of taste, you prefer to hold people to a consent-requirement rather than not to hold them to it. But then, obviously, the question to ask is why anybody other than you should care about what requirements you would prefer to hold them to. I prefer that everyone drink unsweetened iced tea instead of sweet tea, but I’d never dream that these preferences give me the right to require bitter tea or resist vulgar sweetening by force. But requiring consent and resisting tyranny seem to be on quite a different footing.

As for what that footing may be, well, “sublime,” “over-arching,” “transcendent,” “Platonic,” etc. are your words, not mine. I’m not actually advancing any claim about the status of the moral constraints on claims of authority except to argue that they are not contingent on the beliefs or preferences of particular human beings. There are lots of things that are that way (e.g. the germ theory of disease) that don’t require much in the way of appeals to a separate and superior realm of Forms (or whatever) to talk about them.

My beliefs are just opinions, too. By treating them as such, I’m more likely to be able to present them in a way that others who don’t hold them find acceptable. Why? Because I understand the arbitrary nature of my beliefs, so I don’t pretend that they have some special truth that will compel somebody to acknowledge.

I don’t think that your solution, at least insofar as I’ve understood it, is nearly as eirenic as you seem to think it is. Look at it this way: my standards for consent and for the use of force against other people are either rooted in something outside of my particular preferences and tastes, which is in principle accessible to other people; or else they are not. If they are not, then I’m proposing to force other people to adhere to my own standards, whether or not those other people have any reason, even in principle, to care about the standards that I’m forcing them to hold to. This is, in the end, a proposal for trying to remake the whole world in my own image, for no reason other than the brute fact that it is my own image. If, on the other hand, they are rooted in something outside of my preferences and are in principle accessible to other people, then what I am proposing is that people other than myself do indeed have a reason to care about this stuff already, whether they’re aware of that reason or not, and my goal is not to remake them to suit my own preferences, but rather to take an interest in them as they are in their otherness, and in the things that they, as my fellow creatures, care about. That view gives me every reason to try and find the best way to communicate with those particular people and lead them from where they are now, towards a greater awareness of the reasons they already have; instead of what the other view seems to have on offer, which is a sort of talk in which “suggestion” that just amounts to bashing my no-less-but-no-more-justified preferences up against their no-more-but-no-less-justified preferences, until mine somehow win, on the basis of something other than shared reasoning.

TGGP:

The trespass is across the border which is said to be collectively owned by the citizens of the U.S. You can say such a notion is unlibertarian and I’ll agree. My opposition to open-borders is unlibertarian and results from my belief that libertarianism by itself is insufficient …

Well, yes, I suppose that if one of your goals is to violently control who can or cannot pass through land that you’ve never even seen and that you’ve never done a damned thing in your life to earn a real title to, you will eventually find that libertarianism isn’t “sufficient” to meet those goals.

Well, I certainly agree that the Romans had the power to crucify Jesus.

Is that all you mean when you say that superior numbers confer authority?

It should be about what is possible, leaving the question of what possibility we pursue to the individuals

Would it be wrong for me not to “leave the question of what possibility we pursue to the individuals?”

If so, then isn’t that, in itself, a claim about what it is (or is not) “right” or “moral” to do?

If not, then why should you care whether I leave it up to the individuals or not, since there’s nothing wrong with my not doing so?

It is not as if this has never been tried before.

When the First Intifada broke out, the PLO was in exile in Tunis, and in the absence of their militaristic posturing, the small-scale, freestanding popular committees that coordinated most of the anti-Occupation activism spent the first few years of the Intifada focusing overwhelmingly on nonviolent forms of resistance, among them burning identification cards, opening schools in defiance of military curfews, boycotts, general strikes, and refusal to pay taxes. The response from the IDF was relentless and punitive, with many of the committee leaders thrown in prison on sentences of up to ten years, and their money, land, and property confiscated. (Not surprisingly, the attacks on tax resisters, such as the committees based out of Beit Sahour, were especially harsh.) And, at the end of it all, here we are.

I think that the virtues of nonviolent resistance are very often underestimated or flatly ignored, while the effectiveness of violent resistance is all too often overestimated, and its terrible costs either ignored or, worse, romanticized. I think that more focus on nonviolent civil disobedience and direct action would probably make a worthwhile contribution to the Palestinian freedom struggle. But we should certainly remember that these strategies have already been used in the past, on a mass scale, and they didn’t make victory actual, let alone undeniable, then. We should not not pretend that nonviolent strategies would make even moderate success undeniable now, either.

Spooner:

But whether the Constitution really be one thing, or another, this much is certain – that it has either authorized such a government as we have had, or has been powerless to prevent it. In either case, it is unfit to exist.

Polzkill:

In a perfect world, in a world of the theoretical, of course he is correct.

Actually, part of Spooner’s point, if you’re paying attention, is that here in the real world, the strategy of using paper constitutions to limit the invasiveness of governments is demonstrably impractical. There’s little if any evidence that his views on the theoretical, in-principle relationship between the natural law and the U.S. Constitution changed substantially between The Unconstitutionality of Slavery and No Treason No. 6. (For details, see Roderick Long’s paper.) What did change was that he became convinced, in light of the recent triumph of bayonet-point Unionism, that it was practically useless to go on citing the Constitution as a basis for attacking tyrannical laws, and that a new strategy was called for. Hence the shift to arguments explicitly based on natural law and directed against all forms of government authority, including governments based on paper constitutions.

Polzkill:

Far better for us all if these great men would have ENGAGED more and FOUGHT more than they did.

Frederick Douglass:

But I fancy I hear some one of my audience say, it is just in this circumstance that you and your brother abolitionists fail to make a favorable impression on the public mind. Would you argue more, and denounce less, would you persuade more, and rebuke less, your cause would be much more likely to succeed. But, I submit, where all is plain there is nothing to be argued. What point in the anti-slavery creed would you have me argue? On what branch of the subject do the people of this country need light? … The time for such argument is past. At a time like this, scorching irony, not convincing argument, is needed. O! had I the ability, and could I reach the nation’s ear, I would, to-day, pour out a fiery stream of biting ridicule, blasting reproach, withering sarcasm, and stern rebuke. For it is not light that is needed, but fire; it is not the gentle shower, but thunder. We need the storm, the whirlwind, and the earthquake. The feeling of the nation must be quickened; the conscience of the nation must be roused; the propriety of the nation must be startled; the hypocrisy of the nation must be exposed; and its crimes against God and man must be proclaimed and denounced.

Polzkill:

I can’t prove it, but I’d wager you anything you like, at any odds, that If we took a plebiscite on whether people wished to live under the Constitution or not, that they would vote in the affirmative, and so would the rest of the world.

Well, so?

I can’t for the life of me see what this has to do with Spooner’s explanation of the criminality of government legislators, judges, executives, etc. My point is precisely that Spooner’s argument have nothing at all to do with the outcome of majoritarian voting games.

As for your claim that the same cabal of usurpers who, under the auspices of the United States Constitution, claimed the right to pass fugitive slave laws and crush the Whiskey Rebellion by force of arms, somehow believed that the Constitution allowed for a right of individual dissenters to freely withdraw from the political obligations that they sought to impose (!), I guess your understanding of the Constitutionalists is different from mine. As it is from the understanding of Spooner, who never made such a risible claim about the motives or expectations of the minority faction who wrote and signed off on the Constitution. (He did believe that the legal meaning of the text sometimes conflicted with their motives and expectations in writing it; but that’s an entirely different claim.)

Me:

Yeah, [enslaving hundreds of people] was pretty shitty of Jefferson. He was also a hypocrite, a rapist, and President of the United States, all of which I think were pretty shitty of him. What’s your point?

Polzkill:

As much as any single man in history, he was the force, a goddamned genius of liberty, the POWERHOUSE behind what freedoms we DO have today.

Maybe so. Certainly, if the dude is the best there is on offer by way of concrete historical achievements towards liberty, then I guess that could help explain why we’re in such a sorry state today.

In any case, my point is that the presumption that anarchists would just have to recognize and respect the obvious merit of a slaver, rapist, hypocrite, and President is a pretty weird presumption from which to start your argument.

Me:

You seem to be presuming that trying to get somebody elected President of the United States is the only way to get “things [to] improve”. But it’s not the only way. It’s not the best way, either, or even a particularly plausible way. Or, at least, if you think that it is, that’s certainly not a self-evident truth that you can just presuppose. It’s a tendentious claim that you’ll have to justify with some kind of argument.

Polzkill:

At least you qualified this with the words “seem & “presuming”, otherwise that’s exactly what you would have been doing. The argument you suggested for me; that WOULD be a pretty stupid argument I made, eh?

I charitably suggested that you might be presupposing that premise, or something like it, because if you’re not presupposing that getting Ron Paul elected President is the only way to improve the situation, all you have the following argument:

1. These folks here aren’t contributing to efforts to get Ron Paul elected President. (given)
2. Therefore, these folks here aren’t contributing to improving the political situation. (conclusion)

… which is a flat non sequitur. As yet there’s no reason at all to suppose that (2) follows from (1). If you add the extra premise I suggested, then you’ll have:

1. Getting Ron Paul elected President is the only way to improve the political situation. (implicit)
2. These folks here aren’t contributing to efforts to get Ron Paul elected President. (given)
3. Therefore, these folks here aren’t contributing to improving the political situation. (conclusion)

Not all of these premises are true (the implicit premise 0 is clearly false), but it is at least formally valid; if all the premises were true, the conclusion would have to follow.

If I was being too charitable, well, I’m sorry. I take it back. If you’re not actually presuming what I said you seem to be presuming, then your conclusion isn’t supported by question-begging premises; it’s not supported by anything at all.

Polzkill:

Doctor Paul, inspired THOUSANDS of people like me to go out and fight these degenerates.

Yep. Let’s all measure the inputs to the allocation process instead of measuring the outputs.

But, well, I guess when you’ve got a prior commitment to methods that require enlisting tens of millions of other people and harnessing tens of millions of dollars, which don’t even operate but for a few months out of every four-year cycle, and which operate on winner-take-all rules that require you to win just about everything before you can win just about anything — methods which, in short, have no plausible hope of even minor progress on the margins for decades to come — measuring the inputs is about all you can do. There are no outputs to measure, and there won’t be in the forseeable future.

Tracy,

Well, then it definitely sounds like electoral mission creep to me. “Well, we got in here to do A, but that failed, so let’s stay in here and do B instead.” Again, perhaps it’s time to cut your losses and find a better strategy, rather than just keeping in electoral politics because that’s where you started out?

Anthony,

I’m glad that Ron Paul and his boosters have gotten people excited about libertarian ideas. I wish that there had been more thought (especially by the boosters, since I take it that Ron Paul was busy doing other things) put into what to do with all these excited, activated people after the close of the campaign. I don’t think there has been much thought about that, and to the extent that there hasn’t been, that means that a lot of time and energy and tens of millions of dollars are going to go straight down the toilet, as the Paulitarians either burn out and wander away, what with the end of their groups’ raison d’etre, or else pitch themselves into the next “educational” failing electoral campaign, either as marginalized Republicans or as members of the LP. A project like “transforming the Republican Party” is more or less guaranteed to be a tar-baby for this putative “Revolution.”

I predict that, unless something quite unusual happens over the next couple of months, in the direction of redirecting former Paulitarians toward some other concrete project outside of electoral politics, then, four years from today, Ron Paul’s campaign will have made no more difference to the political consensus than Howard Dean’s in 2004, or Pat Buchanan’s in 1992.

Matt Polzkill:

Of course Spooner greatly respected the Constitution, that’s why he devoted a large chunk of his life to studying it & writing about it (his treatise on how chattel slavery is unconstitutional is genius). His MAIN problem with it is that no one follows it.

Lysander Spooner, No Treason No. 6: The Constitution of No Authority:

Inasmuch as the Constitution was never signed, nor agreed to, by anybody, as a contract, and therefore never bound anybody, and is now binding upon nobody; and is, moreover, such an one as no people can ever hereafter be expected to consent to, except as they may be forced to do so at the point of the bayonet, it is perhaps of no importance what its true legal meaning, as a contract, is. Nevertheless, the writer thinks it proper to say that, in his opinion, the Constitution is no such instrument as it has generally been assumed to be; but that by false interpretations, and naked usurpations, the government has been made in practice a very widely, and almost wholly, different thing from what the Constitution itself purports to authorize. He has heretofore written much, and could write much more, to prove that such is the truth. But whether the Constitution really be one thing, or another, this much is certain – that it has either authorized such a government as we have had, or has been powerless to prevent it. In either case, it is unfit to exist.

That’s some kind of respect he’s got there.

Matt Polzkill:

He correctly explains that paper can’t magically create a just society & that the people calling themselves “the government” are in fact the greatest criminals because they ignore or subvert it.

That is certainly not Spooner’s explanation of why the people calling themselves “the government” are the greatest criminals.

His explanation of why they are the greatest criminals is that they impose binding political obligations on free and independent people without the latter’s genuine individual consent.

Matt Polzkill:

Yeah, and Jefferson had slaves and…my god, what a way to go about things!

Yeah, that was pretty shitty of Jefferson. He was also a hypocrite, a rapist, and President of the United States, all of which I think were pretty shitty of him. What’s your point?

Matt Polzkill:

I’m sure liberty will just drop in your laps someday, or maybe Jesus Christ will come down. Have a nice wait, if things improve, the rest of us will know who NOT to thank.

You seem to be presuming that trying to get somebody elected President of the United States is the only way to get “things [to] improve”. But it’s not the only way. It’s not the best way, either, or even a particularly plausible way. Or, at least, if you think that it is, that’s certainly not a self-evident truth that you can just presuppose. It’s a tendentious claim that you’ll have to justify with some kind of argument.

The Ron Paul Revolution of transforming the Republican Party won’t end with Dr Paul.

Is that the “Revolution’s” goal now?

I thought the goal was to elect Ron Paul President of the United States, or at least get him the Republican nomination for President. But I guess if at first you don’t succeed, you can always move the goalposts.

This sounds like electioneering mission creep to me. In order to do A (get libertarian, anti-war policies) you decided to do B (get Ron Paul elected). To do B you’d have to do C and D (raise money and convince Republican primary/caucus voters). To do D you found out you’d have to do E (either recruit and register new Republicans or convince enough influentials within the Republican party and the media to get your message to the existing Republicans). But now you’ve found out that to do E effectively you have to do F (“transform the Republican Party” (!)). To do F, you’re planning to do G (run a bunch of Pauliticians in other, lower-level Republican primary races). But to do G, you’ve got to go back to C and D. And around and around we go.

Maybe it’s just time to cut your losses and look for other ways to do A without getting sucked even further into the quagmire of electoral politics.

I’m not sure that Ron Paul supporters ever believed Paul was the Messiah.

Maybe not. But at least one does think he’s “The Greatest American ever” Another thinks that he’s a light that shineth in the darkness, and the darkness comprehended him not.

And this is a great example of why I think we’re diverging even as we state many similar principles. If concentrated power is the enemy, not the abrogation of rights, then there’s a lot that happens at the local, familial, and small group level that falls outside of the strict boundaries of libertarian concerns. So it’s natural that a “thick” libertarian would not approve of that kind of libertarianism.

I need to read the essay on thick and thin libertarianism again to make sure that I’m using those terms correctly; feel free to correct me or clarify muddy thinking.

Well, thin libertarianism is the position that “libertarian concerns” should be narrowly construed, as being exhausted by whatever your favorite specification of the non-aggression principle is (abrogation of individual rights, violations of equal liberty, initiation of force, whatever). Thick libertarianism is the position that “libertarian concerns” should be construed more broadly, as including a definite stance for or against at least some attitudes, practices, traditions, practices, projects, institutions, etc. that are logically consistent with, but not entailed by, the non-aggression principle. (All the forms I’ve discussed in my writing on the topic, at least, are forms of “thickness” in which the cause for concern is that the commitments that go beyond the logical entailments of a commitment to non-aggression are still linked to a commitment to non-aggression in some other, weaker, but still interesting sense — e.g. causally linked, or in application to specific cases, or in virtue of being two different conclusions of a common set of prior premises.)

Strictly speaking, if a “thin” libertarian is being consistent about the non-aggression principle, then she will still concern herself with things that happen outside the scope of the State insofar as they involve the direct use of violence — so, for example, her version of “libertarian concerns” would still properly include non-State forms of systemic coercion like race slavery or violence against women. A “thick” libertarian would agree, but take it one step further to include things other than the express acts of violence, which she takes to be importantly connected with the express acts of violence (e.g. white supremacist prejudices, patriarchal rape culture, etc.).

I don’t think the distinction lines up neatly with the question of whether the libertarian or anarchist in question focuses narrowly on anti-statism or generalizes to cases other than the State. (Cf. 1. Some “thin” libertarians do tend to write as if the State were the only significant form of systemic coercion, and “thick” libertarians may be more likely to recognize the existence of other forms of systemic coercion, but in principle a “thin” libertarian might very well recognize other forms, while a “thick” libertarian might in principle regard statism as the only significant form of systemic coercion around, and devote her time spent on “thick” concerns entirely to the stuff that she takes to be causally or conceptually supporting statism.)

So thick libertarians will probably tend to be much more interested in things like a critique of institutionalizing or otherwise concentrating social power, even without that critique cashing out at some point in references to rights-violations. Thin libertarians will tend to argue that those concerns are either uninteresting, or, if interesting, still outside the scope of libertarianism per se.

I’m not sure how far this clarifies the point that you were interested in clarifying.

… I think numbers *do* constitute authority …

Authority for what?

Do you mean to suggest that, for example, that superior numbers gave Anytus’s party the rightful authority to kill Socrates, or the Roman occupiers the rightful authority to crucify Jesus?

If so, why? If not, then what do their superior numbers give them the rightful authority to do?

Jeremy,

I’d like to suggest that the chief reason libertarians and anarchists spend more time assailing government than they spend assailing “mere” crime isn’t so much that the former is institutionalized while the latter isn’t. There are plenty of examples of “mere” crime that’s institutionalized — the Mafia, for starters — that libertarians and anarchists also don’t spend much time fulminating.

What I think is more likely is that libertarians and anarchists spend a lot of time and rhetorical energy on government because over and over again we see that the violence of the State apparatus, no matter how intense and no matter how obviously harmless or helpless its victims, is ideologically mystified, morally excused, and either widely treated as legitimate or else simply rendered invisible, whereas most “mere” crime is not. It doesn’t take a lot of rhetorical energy to convince most people that the Mafia is a band of thugs; most everybody knows that being a band of thugs is their business. Most people don’t know, or don’t consistently realize, that being a band of thugs is the government’s business. Hence the effort to demystify, delegitimize, and get people to come down and look at the actions of governors and their hirelings the way they would look at similar conduct by someone without a badge or a pompous title on letterhead.

Note that when libertarians have been especially concerned with exposing and condemning some form of systemic violence carried out mostly outside of the formal State apparatus — for example the “private” violence of race slavery, or violence against women, or adult domination of children — it is more or less always a parallel system of violence which is, like the State, mystified as being something other than violence, culturally excused, and either explicitly socially accepted or else kept silent and made invisible. Even when (as in the case of, for example, violence against women) there may be various kinds of institutional support or institutional denialism for the violence, but the paradigmatic locus of the violence is in informal actions by one ordinary person against another, carried out in private settings.

I should note that the mystification of State violence also seems to play an important role in arguments that try to undermine the ideal of a consensual society by appealing to the ignorance, folly, or vice of mortal creatures. Of course we are all prone to ignorance, folly, or vice in this vale of tears. But that is precisely the reason to oppose all forms of coercive power. Every government is run by those same imperfect, sinful people that it supposedly exists to straighten out, and certainly the would-be bellowing blowhard lords of the world are no more immune to pride, cruelty, or sharp dealing than ordinary business-people, workers, etc. Quite the opposite. If it’s utopian to imagine perfecting human nature, then certainly you have every reason to centrally concern yourself with institutions, practices, projects, traditions, etc. which take all the ignorance, folly, and vice of those who come out on top of the power-struggle, and then magnify it, concentrate it, regularize it, and insulate it from both criticism and resistance.

That libertarians are simply more consistent in their advocacy of non-agression is no mind-boggingly unique contribution to political discourse; it’s actually just a preference

I don’t know what you mean by this. Clearly one can have a preference for consistency — I’d hope everyone does — but is the phrase “just a preference” supposed to indicate that preferring consistent application of moral principles over inconsistent application of moral principles isn’t backed by some prior logical and/or moral obligation? That it’s just a matter of taste, like preferring milk over lemon in your tea? If so, why do you believe that? If not, then what work is the word “just” doing here?

And I agree with you that, as distasteful as it may be to us, government is comprised of genuine traditions, norms, and social identity.

Again, I’m confused by what you mean here. Are there libertarians or anarchists who deny that government is comprised of genuine traditions, norms, and social identity? (What then do they believe it is comprised of? Idiosyncratic rather than traditional practice?)

The point of anarchistic critique is not that government somehow exists separately from traditions, norms, and social identity, but rather that some traditions, norms, and ways of understanding your social identity are foolish, vicious, or otherwise objectionable, and in particular that the the statist elements of those traditions, norms, and social identity are in need of critique, reform, or revolutionary transformation.

One realization I’ve come to is that I don’t have a problem with force being exerted by society, so long as it is society, and not a particular class of society, executing the force.

And again, I’m confused by what you mean. Force is never exerted “by society.” It is exerted by individual people who live in a society, and, when it’s coordinated, it is always coordinated by an organized faction within that society (whether spontaneously or deliberately ordered), not by the “society” as a whole. This is no less true of “citizen militias” than it is true of professionalized police or government armies. (Barring universal conscription, there will always be a fair number of people who decline to participate. And there will always be a fair number of people — young children, frail people, paralyzed people, etc. — who are incapable of participating. Aside from any limitations through cultural or institutional prejudice, the nature of the practice necessarily limits participation.)

As far as I can see, the only important question here is, not who is or is not exercising the force, but rather how it is being exercised: whether it is being exerted prudently or destructively, and, when it is exerted, whether it is being exerted to vindicate just claims or to violate and suppress just claims. Insofar as there’s a question of “who” involved, it’s only a question of which factions, and which forms of organization, are the most likely to abstain from destructive or aggressive uses of force, and most likely to pursue wise and righteous uses of force. I think the superiority of citizen militias here over unaccountable paramilitary cops or imperial standing armies is obvious, but the reasons for that superiority have little if anything to do with some mythic direction of force by the General Will. It just has to do with what we, each of us individually, in our ordinary lives, are prone to do under different circumstances, when we are dependent on others for our safety, or when we have unaccountable power over others, or when we are able to defend ourselves, or when we are working cooperatively with our neighbors, etc. etc. etc.

John,

The most unfortunate thing about “anarchism” may be the name, which may lead one to believe anarchists are against all gov’t, when really (as I understand it) they are perfectly willing to cooperate with their neighbors for the common good, a good that must inevitably, at times, impinge upon their personal good.

But, John, the reason that anarchists call themselves anarchists is that they are against all government–as they understand government. If you want to introduce your own definition of the word “government,” which includes absolutely any arrangement for cooperation between individual people, no matter how informal, consensual, non-territorial, non-monopolistic, and accountable to external constraints of justice, then you’re free to use the word “government” that way, but your definition of the term (which I think is much further from the common use of the term than anarchists’ definition) would seem to be of little help either in understanding why anarchists call themselves what they call themselves, or in advising them on what they ought to call themselves to maximize clarity.

What they are not willing to do, and what no man [sic] should be willing to do, is to deprive the many in favor of the few,

I don’t see what numbers have to do with it. Of course it’s terrible when the many are forcibly deprived in favor of the few, and this is what almost always happens under the auspices of government (even so-called majoritarian government), where the governing class is always an elite minority parasitic upon the productive labor of the governed. But is it any less terrible when the minority, or an individual person, are forcibly deprived in favor of the majority, which has certainly also happened over and over again in history? (Cf. Socrates, Jesus, the Christian martyrs, Catholics in Reformation England, Protestants in Counter-Reformation Spain and France, Jews and Muslims and Romani all across Europe…) The only reason I can see why “the many” would, as a group, be entitled to demand that they will not be beaten or robbed or swindled by an elite few is because each of them, naked and alone with nothing other than her humanity, is just as entitled to demand that she will be beaten or robbed or swindled by anybody else, whether they are few or many. That’s rights, as I see it, and everybody’s got them whether or not they have a large enough posse.