Comments Elsewhere

David, I’m well aware of the technical definitions of “efficiency” in economics and of the party line that given these technical definitions, economic claims about efficiency are strictly non-normative. But I’m disputing that party line, and what I’m asking for is an elaboration of those definitions that doesn’t fall back on normative terms. (As for Samuelson, I think there is simply philosophical confusion, both by him and by his colleagues, about what he is doing. He might very well think that his claims about economic efficiency are strictly non-normative claims; but that’s hardly demonstrated by his endorsement of policies he knows to be economically inefficient on other grounds. That only demonstrates that he thinks that there are other norms that trump whatever normative weight “economic efficiency” may or may not carry.)

For example, Pareto efficiency is standardly defined as a situation in which no further Pareto improvements are available, and a Pareto improvement is defined as a change that makes at least one person better off and nobody worse off. But “better off” and “worse off” are themselves normative terms. Schuele specifies that he means to refer to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. But Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is standardly defined by direct reference to Pareto efficiency. Scott didn’t use the standard definition for K-H efficiency, but instead glossed it in terms of “wealth,” but “wealth” is itself a normative term. (Having a large pile of something only counts as being wealthy if the thing you’ve piled up is a good thing to have lots of.)

So the challenge is: explain to me what Schuele meant, or plausibly could have meant, by “economically efficient” without falling back on normative language. If you are using Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as standardly defined, or as glossed by Scott, you will have to explain how you are using the terms “better off,” “worse off,” “wealth,” or whatever in such a way that they are not in fact normative, in spite of appearances.

Thanks for the link. Liberals’ and lefties’ ongoing failure to name Truman and LeMay as two of the worst evildoers of the past century (whether due to inattention or to unwillingness) is definitely galling. I’m increasingly beginning to think that if antiwar folks want to make some serious changes to the intellectual and political climate, we need to spend less time harping on obvious disasters like Vietnam and more time taking on the hard cases — like the “Last Good War” mythology surrounding U.S. conduct in World War II. Lots of people who think of themselves as liberal, leftist, or progressive sorta kinda realize how horrible some aspects of the U.S. war effort were (internment, say; maybe also the atomic bombings, depending on whom you’re talking to), but very few seem to realize it in any way that puts the pieces together or makes a serious difference to how they judge that war effort in particular or the basic tenets of modern warfare in general. And it seems increasingly to me like that’s a big part of what we need to work at changing. What do you think?

Incidentally, it looks like the cut-and-paste wires got a bit crossed, though; the link under my name goes to one of Jill’s astonishingly cute dog photos. My addenda to the lists I’ve seen going around are at GT 2006-01-04: Evildoers.

Schuele claimed that laws against suicide might be “economically efficient.” In ordinary language, “efficient” is a normative term, not a purely positive one; “efficiency” is a virtue and “inefficiency” a vice in any method that can be so described.

Of course, you could claim that the “economically” qualifier indicates a term of art, not the ordinary language use. Fine, but the technical definitions of both Pareto efficiency and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency typically appeal directly to normative categories such as “better off,” “worse off,” “wealth,” etc.

Exercise for the writer: give me a definition of “economic efficiency” that both (1) makes it a positive rather than a normative category, and (2) justifies the normal use of the term in economic analysis and advocacy. (Until you have done so, your claim that Kennedy is confusing positive and normative claims seems unfounded.)

I’m sure you’re right that DeVos’s religious beliefs contribute to (and express) a particular kind of authoritarianism which is intimately connected with corporate statism, and I’m not much keener on would-be liberal or Left billionaires than I you are (although I think you and I may disagree over the relationship between anarchism and the Left properly understood). But my question was more one of focus: whatever may be wrong with Rich DeVos as a person, I’m not sure how relevant that is to understanding the problem with taking money from unwilling people for the private interest of a billionaire’s pet sports team. My question is whether you think that a rotten guy getting the loot makes the looting any worse than it already was (and, to flip it around, whether a good person getting the loot would make the looting significantly less bad).

Oh! And the icon is not Benjamin Tucker (although that’d be another good icon for my account…). It’s the German logician Gottlob Frege (1848-1925).

Patrick,

You seriously mistake me if you think that I endorse the low-altitude firebombing of over 100 Japanese cities by LeMay’s forces at the orders of Roosevelt and Truman. They are included in the figures when I say that somewhere between half a million and one million Japanese civilians were massacred in the course of the terror-bombing. I do not think that the difference between nuclear terrorism and “conventional” terrorism by means of low-altitude firebombing is worth investing with any great moral weight. My complaints are directed against the campaign as a whole, not the use of nuclear weapons at the end of it. As for how to describe the aims of both the firebombing and the atomic bombing, Truman and LeMay made it quite clear, when LeMay said “There are no innocent civilians, so it doesn’t bother me so much to be killing innocent bystanders,” and Truman said, “It was to spare the Japanese people from utter destruction that the ultimatum of July 26 was issued at Potsdam. Their leaders promptly rejected that ultimatum. If they do not now accept our terms, they may expect a rain of ruin from the air the likes of which has never been seen on this earth.”

It was also made clear when they steadfastly refused to give any specific warnings to civilians to evacuate the areas that they were planning to incinerate. (You could object that they couldn’t warn the civilians without warning the military. That’s true, but irrelevant, if you claim that the purpose was to degrade the military-industrial infrastructure, which couldn’t easily be moved on short notice, rather than massacre the population.)

If you want to give a brief in favor of terrorism at the level of entire cities in order to coerce unconditional surrender, then you’re free to do so, but you do have an intellectual responsibility to call it what it is.

In any case, all of this to one side, whatever you may think of Truman or Roosevelt, based on his own public statements and the reminiscences of the soldiers who served under him, it ought to be pretty clear that Curtis LeMay — who actually planned and carried out the details of the bombing campaign — was nothing short of a bloodthirsty maniac who reveled in death and destruction. (He continued the theme after WWII, becoming the chief nuclear hawk among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, coined the phrase “bomb them back into the Stone Age” in reference to the Vietnam War, and became the Vice Presidential candidate for George Wallace’s 1968 Presidential campaign, on a platform of white supremacy and more militant anticommunism.) Seems like this is much clearer qualification for a Worst Ten list than sleazy politicized televangelism.

Patrick: “Anyway, setting aside this issue, people who wish to critize the United States can’t have it both ways:”

This is a false dichotomy. If you don’t accept that unconditional surrender followed by occupation was a necessary or proper goal for the war effort, then you needn’t sign on to either the nuclear incineration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or the continuation of the firebombing and an eventual marine invasion.

heretyk:

… why do i desire happiness? i’m not sure, but i do.

If we desire happiness for its own sake, then you’ve just answered your question: we might desire something for at least one reason other than good results, viz. because it is happiness, or a constituent part of happiness.

If, on the other hand, we desire happiness only because it causally contributes to some further set of results that we desire, then we just ask why we desire that, until we reach whatever it is that we are ultimately trying to get to by means of happiness. Wash, rinse, and repeat.

Point being, the appropriate question to ask in the debate over consequentialism is not, “Is there any reason to favor anything other than good results?” That’s obvious: there is, whether or not we clearly understand what those other reasons are. Neither consequentialists nor non-consequentialists hold any other position, if they have thought their position through. The live question between them is how narrow or how broad a range of things are in fact desirable for their own sake. Moral consequentialists typically say that the range is pretty narrow, or at least that it must categorically exclude certain sorts of things. (E.G.: non-psychological things, or things of which no human is aware, or specific performance of actions, or ….) Non-consequentialists hold that the range is broad, or at least that it can include the sorts of things that consequentialists typically categorically exclude.

heretyk:

… for what other reason but good results to we desire something?

Come on, this is an easy one. There are things that are desirable in themselves, and things that are not desirable in themselves but are desirable for their results, and things that are desirable both in themselves and for their results.

If you do not have some account of the things that are desirable in themselves, then you correspondingly have no account of the things that are desirable for their results, since you don’t have any account of which results should be counted as the desirable ones and which should be counted as the undesirable ones. (Suppose you found that one result is more pleasant and the other more painful. Well, why do you desire pleasure, or the absence of pain? For their results?) If, on the other hand, you actively maintain that there aren’t things that are desirable in themselves, then your position is simply incoherent, since you’ve cut out the possibility of distinguishing desirable from undesirable results, even in principle.

So what reason do you give for thinking that one set of results is better than another?

Let’s not forget that the owner of the Magic, Rich DeVos, is a right-wing Republican businessman (he co-founded Scamway) and fundamentalist Christian, with an estimated networth of at least $3 billion.

Would the extraction of money from unwilling people to cover the costs of an arena for a billionaire’s basketball team be any better, if that billionaire were a committed Leftist and deeply committed to religious tolerance?

Can we get a dishonorable mention for Franklin Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman and Curtis LeMay? I think that the massacre of 500,000 – 1,000,000 civilians during the terror-bombing of Japan may even be a tad worse than Right-wing demagoguery, or turning over a fort to the bloodybacks.

Phalamir: “Know-Nothings”, “jingoists”, Klu Klux Klansmen” – or simply “cunts”.

… because being compared to female genitalia is insulting. Ho ho ho. Overt misogyny is funny.

Craig R.: “Fucktards” would work for me, …

… because being like someone with mental retardation is contemptible. Ho ho ho. Overt contempt for the disabled is funny.

It is possible to make fun of, or express contempt for, the guilty, without meanness to innocent people who have nothing to do with whatever it is you’re on about. Maybe you should try some time.