Micha,

Point taken; but I’d say that the issue here really just turns on what verb “thin conception of libertarianism” is supposed to be the object of. You can follow a thin conception of libertarianism without ever promoting libertarianism (of any kind), but you can’t advocate or promote a thin conception of libertarianism. But presumably someone who follows a thin conception may want to promote it, too, for reasons which they may think of as having to do with libertarianism (in which case I guess we’re talking about some slight thickening, at least in the strategic dimension, away from the degenerate case of thinness), or which may not have anything to do with libertarianism, but rather be for the sake of other reasons (which puts us back in the degenerate case, and may seem quite weird, but is in the end a conceivable option).

Of course, the real upshot here may be that it may be somewhat misleading to speak of “thick” and “thin” conceptions as if they involved a distinction of kind. Really the debate is between thickerer conceptions, with variations in degree along several different axes. Certainly, you could characterize my own position, in part, by saying that it’s much thinner than that of, say, orthodox Objectivsts — in the sense that my ideas about what would constitute the proper context and preconditions for a flourishing free society are much broader and less detailed — but much thicker than that of, say, Walter Block.

Mark,

Micha never claimed that exercising the rights of nonviolent association and dissociation might itself “involve coercion.” He said that doing so foolishly or viciously might causally contribute to the emergence of a social environment in which certain kinds of coercion are widely practiced. That’s a distinct claim, and one which is, I think, obviously true.

Mark,

Well. The scope of the debate is not actually limited to what are commonly called “lifestyle” issues, unless you mean to expand the word “lifestyle” out from its conventional meaning into something much broader (i.e. so broad as to cover absolutely any feature of social or personal life other than those immediately connected with the use of violence). For example, in addition to dealing with genuine “lifestyle” issues (e.g. what kind of sex acts and with whom you should or should not treat as worth indulging in; whether or not you participate in traditional religious rituals in your community or subculture; etc.), the debate also touches on more strictly intellectual issues (e.g. what kinds of explicit philosophical positions, or tacit worldviews, best cohere with libertarianism), and also with material and institutional structures that are larger and more formalized than any individual lifestyle choice — e.g. I believe that a free economy should have a large and vibrant network of wildcat unions and grassroots mutual aid associations; whereas some other libertarians believe that a free economy should be dominated more or less exclusively by large-scale corporations or proprietorships, with little or no unionization in the workforce. The difference between these two views is not settled by the non-aggression principle alone (presumably, we both reject, on principle, all forms of coercive social or corporate welfare, all State patronage to either big business or to organized labor, etc. etc. etc.). But it’s not really a difference over individual lifestyles, either; it’s a difference over the relative merits of certain organizing structures within social society that are much larger than any individual and which come about through deliberate, entrepreneurial social coordination, not simply from a series of uncoordinated individual lifestyle changes.

A consequence could involve being ostracized or criticized by others who live by the NAP, but should not involve being lynched or defamed by them.

You’re right about that. Thick conceptions of libertarianism aren’t intended as a way of carrying non-libertarian policies into libertarianism. The point is to make clear what kinds of things are worth criticizing, ridiculing, ostracizing, boycotting, striking, or whatever, and what kinds of things are worth praising, celebrating, materially supporting, etc. A thick conception of libertarianism holds that libertarians, as such, have some good reasons to take a definite stance on that, even where what’s being criticized, ridiculed, ostracized, boycotted, struck against, praised, celebrated, materially supported, or whatever is not directly, logically tied to the question of aggression or liberty.

Mark,

The debate between “thick” and “thin” conceptions of libertarianism encompasses several interrelated but more specific debates, having to do with (1) correct application of the non-aggression principle in hard cases; or (2) libertarian strategy and the possibility of there being cultural, intellectual, or other causal preconditions for a free society to emerge, survive, or flourish; or (3) views about the likely effects of liberty, and whether freedom will tend to produce more of certain rare positive goods, or to undermine certain prevalent (but non-coercive) positive evils; or (4) whether the best logical grounds for libertarianism (whatever that may be) also justify some further set of voluntarily-adopted beliefs, principles, projects, practices, traditions, institutions, etc. If you’re interested, I’ve discussed (1), (2), and (4) at some more length in my remarks from the Molinari Society symposium on thickness, and (3) briefly towards the end of my remarks on Matt MacKenzie’s paper on libertarian theories of exploitation.

Because the debate involves a lot of smaller debates that are interrelated but logically distinct from each other, and because many people who consider their conception of libertarianism to be “thin” (e.g. Jan Narveson) often actually end up endorsing a thicker conception in at least one of these respects (the “thinness” that they have in mind in their self-identification usually just amounts to accepting fewer thick commitments in total than are accepted by most self-identified advocates of a “thick” conception), I don’t think there is any good single formula to separate the thick from the thin. The closest that you can come to would be something like this: if you believe that libertarians should (in some sense or another, yet to be discussed) concern themselves (in some sense or another, yet to be discussed) with stuff other than just the non-aggression principle, and ought (in some sense or another, yet to be discussed) try to non-aggressively promote stuff other than just consistent non-aggression as part of their libertarian program, then you’re advocating a thick conception of libertarianism. If not, then you’re promoting a thin conception.

For what it’s worth, the internecine battle you’re thinking of, between paleolibertarians and so-called “cosmopolitan” libertarians, is not really a battle between thick and thin libertarians. Both those who think (1) that voluntarily cultivating some form of parochial traditionalism is (in some sense) vital to libertarianism, and those who think (2) that voluntarily cultivating some form of anti-traditionalist “cosmopolitanism” is (in some sense) vital to libertarianism, are advancing a thick conception of libertarianism, and battling over which thick conception is the right conception. (There are also those, like me, who think (3) that the battle, such as it is, is largely founded on a confusion, and who advance quite different claims about the best social-intellectual context for liberty from either of the two warring parties. There are also those who think (4) that libertarians shouldn’t be feuding over this stuff at all, and should just push the non-aggression principle and nothing else, wherever they go, whether to rock-ribbed but non-violent white supremacists, or to cocktail parties by snooty but non-violent New York intellectuals, or to rabble-rousing but non-violent popular liberation movements, or to kooky but non-violent survivalist-conspiracy theory types, or whatever. Only those who advocate (4) are advancing a thin conception of libertarianism.)

Hope this helps.

“[inhales] Fear. The city reeks with it….”

Constant: the emancipation of the slaves by a decree from a victorious Washington DC was still very right.

Yes, I agree, and this in spite of my belief that the Southern states should have been left alone to secede in peace. Forcing white Southerners back into the Union at bayonet-point and achieving power over them through conquest and occupation was a moral crime, but using that position of power, once achieved, to declare Southern slaves emancipated, is no crime; kidnappers and robbers have no right to go on kidnapping and robbing, so there’s no victim in that particular case. And it’s a very foolish form of libertarianism that would object on “federalist” grounds. I think, actually, that most libertarians would agree, in the case of emancipation, and that “federalist” objections to Roe v. Wade really have much more to do with ambivalence about abortion than they do with a consistent decentralism.

Constant: And similarly, we might say, Roe v. Wade was handed down by Washington DC, and thus Rad Geek was really twisting the facts with his summary of what happened, but it was still a great thing for Washington DC to do.

Well, my claim wasn’t that Roe specifically didn’t originate in D.C. Obviously it did. I was making a causal claim, to the effect that something other than the good graces of the Nine made it inevitable that either Roe, or some similarly sweeping victory, would eventually be won. So the facts that I cite as an explanation are those that I think best support the relevant counterfactuals. If the Nine hadn’t handed down a (mostly) pro-choice ruling in Roe, then (I would argue) the abortion law repeal movement would have won through a different proximate cause, such as state-level legislative repeal, and/or through a growing network for safe and affordable illegal abortions. On the other hand, if not for the repeal movement, I doubt that Roe ever would have been handed down. Hence the claim that the movement is a better explanation for the eventual repeal than the Supreme Court is.

The Thirteenth Amendment wasn’t a victory against government; it was a triumph of govt. It made a law universal by decree of a rump Congress and several states coerced into passing it while under military occupation. It spawned Jim Crow. If a rump Congress could force every American everywhere to live by a particular interpretation of such a morally divisive issue without any local input, it’s no wonder that the people on the losing side decided to change their methods and goals to that of using the same power to enact their own version of white supremacy upon everyone else.

Micha: And I see the milquetoastiness of IHS as a feature, not a bug. Inforcing ideological uniformity entails devolving into a cult, ala Ayn Rand’s inner circle.

I don’t understand this argument at all, Micha. Arthur was referring to the way in which the so-called “urbane” libertarian outlets tend either (1) to shy away from hard or unpopular applications of libertarian principles — such as anarchism or criticism of bayonet-point Unionism — in the name of public relations, or else (2) to hold positively the wrong view on what libertarian principles entail. If (1) they are dissembling about their views in order to avoid public embarrassment, and if (2) they are being inconsistent. In either case, criticizing dissembling or criticizing inconsistency is a distinct issue from intolerance of dissent, n’est-ce pas?

This is not to say that the paleos in particular haven’t been intolerant of dissent on many occasions. They certainly have been. But I think the reasons have to do with something other than the radicalism of their views.

Micha: I’ll take the minarchist, pro-interventionist deviationism of Beltway libertarians over the not-so-thinly veiled racism, homophobia, goldbug-crankism, evolution-denial, fundamentalist Christianity and Confederacy apologetics of the Paleo alternative any day of the week.

Well, O.K.; it’s your business which features you choose to treat as decisive or defeating for dealing with someone as a friend, ally, or comrade. But I don’t understand how this meshes with your previous argument. As far as “enforcing ideological uniformity” goes, how is treating anti-racism, gay-positivity, evolutionism, “urbanity,” “cosmopolitanism,” or whatever as a litmus test different in kind from treating anti-interventionism or Civil War revisionism as a litmus test? Surely both of these involve demanding a certain degree of ideological uniformity; it’s just that they differ in the particular ideological features that they require.

This is not to adjudicate whether the paleos are right about their litmus tests, or whether you’re right about your litmus tests, or whether you’re both wrong, or whether it’s just a matter of taste. But I don’t see that the difference between their standards and your standards amounts to what you seem to suggest it amounts to.

(Personally, I tend to think that you’re both right, or both wrong, depending on the level and purpose of association that you’re talking about — who you’re willing to form issue-based coalition with, who you’re willing to read and cite, who you’re willing to consider yourself part of a common movement with, and who you’re willing to be friends with are all quite different questions.)

Not being a hip or “urbane” libertarian, perhaps these questions were not directed at me. Nevertheless…

Mark: Do you judge Thomas Jefferson so harshly? He was no less than a slave owner!

Of course I do. What a stupid question. Why would you take it for granted that libertarians must approve of slavers, rapists, hypocritical scoundrels, and Presidents of the United States?

Mark: Do you distance yourself from the Declaration of Independence because you worry what other people think that says about your views of racism?

No. Admiration for a document or an argument, and admiration for its author, are two different things.

Mark: Do you think that it was a tactical mistake for the founders to establish the minarchist government they did …

Yes. Also a moral mistake.

Mark: … should they have established a familiar tyranny on American soil until such time as they agreed on an ethically pure political philosophy?

No.

They should have simply left people alone. You act as if this were not an option. Why?

How would you know how much or how little of “the research” on this topic I have read? The short answer is that you have no idea, because you haven’t begun to engage with the arguments at hand. If you want to demonstrate that there are important facts of which I am not aware you will have to, you know, actually point them out, and not just wave your hands at The Science and The Research without discussing any concrete findings.

Jonathan: For example, because the study of race was used in the past for nefarious purposes, discount any current data on race, even if it means potentially more effective medications for people of certain races.

This is a strawman. Nobody suggested that you should “discount any current data” on so-called “mental illness.” I said that the history of psychiatric abuse is a good reason for caution in appeals to consensus, which is something different. Similarly, people certainly should be cautious of research on racial difference, given the history of racialist pseudoscience. The epistemic authority of a scholarly community depends (in part) on its reliability in getting to the truth, and when there’s a long history of pseudoscience being promoted in order to provide ideological cover for prejudice, there is nothing logically askew in exhibiting a healthy degree of skepticism.

This is hardly ancient history. For example, Homosexuality was a recognized “disorder” until 1974, and so-called “Gender Identity Disorder” remains in the DSM to this day. Walter Freeman was still cutting up people’s brains not 40 years ago.

Of course, if you have an actual argument or empirical data to present, rather than just an appeal to The Science, then that argument and that data can and should be evaluated on its own merits, independently of whatever historical worries one may have. But since you have produced nothing of the sort, there is nothing to be assessed on its own merits; we have only the appeal to authority.

Jonathan: I’m not making an appeal to authority or scientific consensus.

Dismissing an argument on the grounds of an assertion, without further evidence, that its conclusion is “backwards, anti-science, and ignorant” is one of two things. Either it’s (1) an appeal to authority, which can sometimes be a cogent form of argument in the right context, or (2) simple abuse in place of an argument, which never is. I took the more charitable interpretation of supposing that you intended for your remarks to be (1), and so gave an argument as to why the appeal is misplaced, in this context.

If I misunderstood you, and should have adopted the less charitable interpretation, well, I guess I apologize.