More to come later when I have a bit more time. For now:

Paul,

Yes, I know that our methodological differences spring from the fact of you (and Roderick) being followers of Wittgenstein in this matter and my being a follower of Popperian critical rationalism and his view that “nothing of substance depends on words”.

Doesn’t Wittgenstein rather famously also suggest that “nothing of substance depends on words”? (Cf. for example TLP 4.003, TLP 6.53, etc.)

Maybe the differences that you (and Popper) have with Wittgenstein — and with me and Roderick — actually have to do with something other than this methodological dictum?

I would suggest that our intellect is more fruitfully employed in criticizing and refuting their erroneous theories rather than in designing a more consistent scheme of words with which they can continue to articulate their errors.

The aim of the linguistic criticism isn’t to furnish them with new language for articulating their errors, but rather to furnish us with new language for criticizing and refuting their erroneous theories. You might think that we could save time by just doing so with the old language we already had at hand, but if Roderick’s right about the conceptual misdirections embedded in that old language, then it simply is not useful as a means to that end.

You could say, “common usage can go hang; stipulate meanings for your own terms to get any questions of meaning out of the way as quickly as possible, and then devote your energy to making your case, rather than punching at the tarbaby of other people’s conceptual confusions.” But as a practical matter, common usage really is harder to divorce yourself from than this suggests: even when you make explicit stipulative definitions it can be hard to divorce yourself from the conventional paradigm cases and the connotations you’re familiar with (I think this often actually happens when many libertarians start talking about “market processes,” but that’s another long discussion for another time). And, perhaps more importantly, what Roderick’s doing in the passages you cite is part of a different intellectual task than formulating your own theory: the task that he’s engaged in is in fact criticizing someone else’s false theory (statist political economy), so part of what he needs to do is to engage with what they are actually claiming and how they are supporting it. Otherwise, he is just punching at a strawman. So engaging with the way in which package-dealing language is commonly in framing the theory he’s criticizing, and the way in which that language insulates the theory from criticism (by concealing where, and with whom, the dispute actually lies) is part and parcel of the task you are trying to urge him to devote himself to. Specifically, it involves knocking out one of the supports used to hold up the false theory — e.g. by taking away the state socialist’s ability to rely on the admitted evils of neomercantilism in order to make a case against free enterprise. And by making clearer where the dispute lies, it also makes clearer the sorts of evidence that need to be adduced in order to criticize whatever supports remain.

On the other hand, you could always argue that Roderick’s just saying something false about how the already existing language in the debate is commonly used, and that it is (as Frank claims) really much less ambiguous or incoherent than Roderick is claiming. But then you’re punching at that tarbaby no less than Roderick is, since determining that that’s the case just does involve doing linguistic analysis.

Kennedy,

Roderick’s a philosopher, and moreover an Aristotelian. He is more optimistic about the possibility of changing hearts and minds than you are, but when he starts talking about conceptual confusions and “anti-concepts” it’s safe to assume that he considers clarity on the matter something desirable in itself, not only for its consequences. Confusions are worth exposing because they are confusions, not just because they serve nefarious purposes (although, in fact, they do).

I think he’s probably right that there is some hope for a renewal of a left-libertarian alliance, but the points he makes about the terms “capitalism” and “socialism” are still worth making whether or not they have any practical impact on the populace at large, movement types, or indeed anyone else at all.

Paul,

The issue here isn’t the need for “precise” meanings — as a late Wittgensteinian I think that the quest for those is itself a form of linguistic delusion — but rather for consistent ones. If Roderick is right that “capitalism” and “socialism” as commonly used don’t have a consistent meaning, then even if you regard them as mere “tools” for the formulation and testing of theories, they are not useful tools for that purpose. If you’re interested in getting down to facts then it is in your interest to critique uses of language that obscure them or deflect you from them.

That said, it is a serious error to compare the relationship between clear language and true theories to the relationship between letters and words, or between hammers and nails. Of course it’s true that whether or not to use a particular word to express a particular idea is a purely pragmatic decision that you ought to make on the basis of the audience and the conversational context. But Roderick’s issue is not with the word “capitalism” as such, but rather the way in which that word is commonly used. And that’s quite a different issue. In this sense, language is a means to (among other things) formulate and test theories, but it is not an instrumental means to an end that can be spelled out independently of it. Theories are, after all, made of language, not just made with it, and using language clearly is a constitutive means to an end of which it is itself a part. (In a sense, singing “Tochter aus Elysium” in the second line is only a means to the end of singing the Ode to Joy. But it would make little sense to say “Quit worrying about singing ‘Tochter aus Elysium’ in the second line; just worry about singing the Ode to Joy right, and the second line will sort itself out.” If you fail to use the right means here, then you have also failed to achieve the end.)

Frank:

I think that what Popper is recommending here is that one should try to avoid getting bogged down in definitional disputes and, more controversially, that ultimate precision about terms is not required for most purposes. The rough and ready approximate understanding of these terms does generally suffice.

Roderick’s point has nothing to do either with the alleged need for precise definitions, or with the “right” definition to attach to the words “capitalism” and “socialism.” What he says is that “the rough and ready approximate understanding of these terms” as commonly employed conceals an internal inconsistency. Criticizing common usage, if it is indeed as he says it is, doesn’t turn on any claims about precision in definitions; it turns on the idea that incoherent meanings don’t get you anywhere.

Of course, you also claim that you disagree with him on the way in which the words are commonly used. But then your issue with him is one of substantive disagreement over what the linguistic situation is, not the sort of methodological disagreement that Paul’s quotations from Popper are trying to suggest.

As far as that substantive disagreement goes, I agree with you that it’s usually pretty clear that calling yourself “anti-capitalist” usually conveys pretty clearly that you’re opposed to the free market. But I don’t see how that’s inconsistent with what Roderick said. If your understanding of capitalism is something like “this free-market system that currently prevails in the western world,” then saying you oppose “this free-market system that currently prevails in the western world” will (among other things) commit you to opposing the free market. The problem is that it also commits you to thinking that what you’re opposing is the actually existing political economy in which we live. If your “pro-capitalist” opponents buy into the package-deal that you are employing, then they will think that they are committed to defending the actually existing political economy in which we live as part of defending the free market. But since we don’t live in anything like a free market, it’s foolish for them to do so.

And frankly I simply have no idea what is meant when someone calls herself “pro-capitalist” or “anti-socialist.” Some people tend to use these terms strictly to describe their adherence to free market principles; others tend to ue them strictly to describe their solidarity with actually existing big business; others (probably most) tend to use them to describe the chimerical combination of the two attitudes that they’ve mistakenly bought into. In practice I have seen plenty of people denounce voluntary strikes for higher wages, advocate for “right to work” laws which explicitly violate the right of free contract, endorse explicitly protectionist arguments for copyrights and patents, apologize for government lending agencies such as the IMF and World Bank, endorse state auction “privatization” schemes, etc., all in the name of being “pro-capitalist” or “anti-socialist.” Clintonian liberals, for that matter, often use this sort of language to justify anti-trust interventions and the institution of government-run, completely fabricated “markets,” such as those in transferable political correctness “credits” of various sorts. Of course, whenever someone does that (and they do it very often), you could insist, “But no, you see, ‘capitalism’ really means a free market! Not patronage for big business!” But then it’s you, not Roderick, who’s getting bogged down in semantics. It is precisely by exposing and dealing with the inconsistencies in common usage that we can avoid that kind of unproductive squabbling.

Paul,

The method that Popper suggests is perfectly reasonable, if your interlocutor is using language clearly and consistently, and if the terms she is using do not presuppose something that is false. But the linguistic situation that Roderick’s addressing isn’t like that: his claim is precisely that the words “capitalism” and “socialism,” as commonly used, don’t have a clear and consistent meaning, because they are defined so as to have an internal inconsistency, and to rest on a false presupposition (viz., the identity of the free market and actually existing neomercentilist outfits). If someone is using language unclearly or inconsistently it does no good to accept their terminology as-is in an attempt to get down to the factual questions, because there is no way to get down to factual questions through nonsense. Hence the point of using techniques like precisifying definitions, analytic distinctions, simple abandonment of some terms in favor of others (e.g. “capitalism” for “the free market” or “laissez-faire,” etc.)

Of course, you may disagree with Rod that the situation with “capitalism” and “socialism” is what he claims it to be, but then that’s a substantive disagreement over how people are in fact using the terms, not a disagreement over the method of criticizing unclear or inconsistent usage.

Kennedy:

There’s no private return for thinking clearly about such things and no private cost for getting it wrong.

Isn’t there?

Kennedy:

Long says most people don’t know what they’re talking about when they discuss capitalism and socialism. That will remain true no matter what he does.

So what?

Don’t you have reasons for trying to think and speak clearly, whether or not you expect it to affect other people somehow?

Kennedy:

There’s no private return for thinking clearly about such things and no private cost for getting it wrong.

Isn’t there?

Kennedy:

Long says most people don’t know what they’re talking about when they discuss capitalism and socialism. That will remain true no matter what he does.

So what?

Don’t you have reasons for trying to think and speak clearly, whether or not you expect it to affect other people somehow?

Jonathan: That’s basically what a union does: negotiate terms of employment in bulk. There’s no reason why “team buying” can’t happen in healthcare without the government’s help.

In point of fact, mutual aid societies in the U.S. and the U.K. were doing exactly that around the turn of the 20th century, through the institution of “lodge practices.” Care from a G.P. under a lodge practice contract typically cost about one day’s wage per worker per year.

Until the government and the government-backed doctors’ guild destroyed them, that is.

Ann: Do you think everyone should be allowed to pick and choose, and to follow only those laws that they personally consider tasteful?

No, everyone should be allowed to pick and choose, and to follow only those laws that are, in fact, just. Forcing people to comply with unjust laws is tyranny, and doing so in the name of “the rule of law” is just tyranny with a powdered wig on.

You express a great deal of anxiety over our willingness to break laws. This is certainly a legitimate concern. … One may well ask: “How can you advocate breaking some laws and obeying others?” The answer is found in the fact that there are two types of laws: There are just and there are unjust laws. I would be the first to advocate obeying just laws. One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Conversely, one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. I would agree with Saint Augustine that “An unjust law is no law at all.”

—Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., “Letter from Birmingham Jail.” Emphasis added.

Brian: And it is respect for the rule of law in general. Sure there are many unjust laws but that doesn’t seem particularly relevant to whether or not we should respect the rule of law per se.

lirelou was explicitly using “accordance with the rule of law” as a grounds for restricting the decriminalization of immigration, apparently because the restrictions under which immigrants have been suffering up until this point must continue to be enforced, just to be fair, or something. It does seem to me that this is one thing that people sometimes mean when they talk about respect for the rule of law — that is, systematically and carefully enforcing the terms of actually existing laws, whether or not they are just. The idea is that if you refuse to enforce a law based on your substantive disagreement with it, you are corrupting the legal process by inserting arbitrary discretion into what should be an impersonal mechanism. If that is what is meant, then it ought to be clear that “the rule of law” deserves respect only to the extent that, and in such cases as, the laws being enforced actually are just laws: consistency in justice is a virtue, but consistency in evil is only relentlessness. Where the promulgated law is unjust it should be ignored or defied, as openly, in as many cases, and by as many officials, as possible, since scrupulous enforcement of unjust laws just means scrupulous criminality against the innocent, and to hell with anything that says otherwise.

It may be that you have something different in mind when you say that you respect the rule of law. The phrase is a pretty fluid one, and more than one meaning has been assigned to it. For example, maybe you mean the (perfectly respectable) idea that the grounds for an act of legal force should be public, consistent, and general. Or maybe you mean something else. But if that’s the case, then given the argumentative context in which lirelou was using the phrase, I doubt that (s)he and you mean the same thing by it.

Randall: The liberal tradition incorporates both respect for the rule of law and refusal to comply with unjust laws.

Well. The fact that a tradition incorporates two claims does not guarantee that the claims are actually compatible with one another. Maybe the tradition is making incoherent demands. Lots of traditions do.

That said, I’d need to know more of what you mean by “the rule of law” to say anything substantial here, for reasons similar to the ones I outlined above. If it means that you should comply with just laws and ignore or defy unjust ones, then I wonder whether you’re using “the rule of law” as anything other than another name for political justice as such.

Dave:

My opinion is that that these paramedical people give good care when rote memory thinking is all that is needed. Of course many of them develope tremendous skill with practice. A good physician is truly educated on a deep level. Not all people are suitable for this. I would not begrudge a doctor treating patients’ serious complex problems a broad education and deep fund of knowledge just to increase the supply. What a doctor doesn’t know can kill you.

Do you think “lay people” (to use the popular cant) are too stupid to figure out that complicated and dangerous procedures are best performed by a more thoroughly trained doctor? Too foolish to be able to figure out when it’s not really necessary, or not worth it under the circumstances, and when it might be better to see a nurse practitioner, midwife, or some other sort of trained healer who has had training other than the sort you get from a med school? Too childlike to be left alone to make these decisions about risk, cost, and reward for themselves, rather than having the government, at the behest of the Doctors’ Guild, force them to pay to see a doctor rather than someone with less medical training, “for their own good”?