You write: “In fact, many have tried, my favorite being G. E. Moore, who in 1903, wrote Principia Ethica… an entire (lengthy) book solely to attempt to define the word.”

I’m pretty sure that’s not what Moore was trying to do in Principia Ethica.

The major conclusion of the first chapter (“The Subject-Matter of Ethics”) is that good is indefinable (in the sense that the concept of good cannot be analyzed into any set of more basic concepts).

The rest of the chapters in the book are intended, not to define good (which Moore argued was impossible) but rather to criticize other ethical theories which he takes to be based on what he calls the “Naturalistic Fallacy” (the fallacy of passing off a substantive theory about what things are good, as if it were simply a definition of what good is); and then developing a method to develop a positive theory of his own (which is based not on attempted definitions of ‘good,’ but rather on the rigorous testing of intuitions about what is good in itself (as an end).

You write: “‘Cheating’ is not unethical here, and trying to force these things on other people without a thought to why, that is clearly arrogant ignorance. “

Well, so what’s wrong with “arrogant ignorance”? Certainly, if we accept your claims here, it seems that Westerners engage in “arrogant ignorance” all the time, accept it as O.K., or even virtuous, and have deep cultural reasons for doing so — just as you say is the case for the practice of “cheating” by Indonesians. But are you proposing that, even though Westerners apparently do this all the time and are O.K. with it, it’s nevertheless wrong — unethical — for them to practice “arrogant ignorance”?

If not, then why criticize them for it, when you won’t criticize Indonesians for “cheating”?

If so, then it seems that there are at least some things which you recognize as good (humility and knowledge) across the board, and other things which you recognize as bad (arrogant ignorance) across the board, regardless of culture, and regardless of how much the people practicing of it happen to approve of their own behavior. N’est-ce pas?

... Anthony, Sure, and to the extent that minarchos are better on these topics, it's correspondingly easier to work with them; and to the extent that a

... Do you mean Nozick? ... Rand and Nozick both hold that the minimal state as they envision it should raise revenue only voluntarily, through donations or

... I agree with you, of course; in fact, I think that Childs is spot-on to point out that if the goal is "objective" law, then that ought to entail that

... I agree that "the nightwatchman state" (1) is vague and (2) can include a defense of taxation. And that "minarchist" includes voluntary taxationists such

... Right, but if "Randism" means the views of Ayn Rand, her view *is* that competition in the protection of rights ought to be forbidden. Cf. "The Nature of

... I don't think that Nozick's argument is that rival defense agencies *necessarily would* use less reliable methods than the dominant agency. Rather, his

... Well, Jesse didn't say that Rand's views on government were *consistent* with the rest of the views that she is committed to. I agree with Childs, and for

Nathan Benedict:

Well, I can’t prove that this would be the case, but I have some evidence as to why it might be so. Look at air travel.

Well, what am I supposed to find out by looking at air travel? It’s certainly true that people will put up with a lot of temporary physical discomfort for up to a few hours at a time, in order to fly more cheaply. It’s also true that the longer they have to put up with it, the more price-inelastic their demand for comfort becomes. (E.G., as far as I know there is no regulatory reason why airlines couldn’t charge for meals on a trans-Atlantic flight, just as they charge for meals on domestic flights. But generally they don’t.) This may tell you something about what people are willing to put up with in a place where they expect to be living for the next several months at least; in any case, the issue of physical comfort or discomfort is also different from the issue of how likely you are to be dicked over by the terms of the contract. (Lots of people buy “non-refundable” tickets in order to save money; but as it happens most airlines are relatively willing to extend a fair amount of latitude even on such tickets if you end up having to change your travel plans. They could be a lot more hardassed about this than they actually are, but presumably what they’d save by doing so doesn’t compensate for the business they’d expect to lose. And there’d be pressure to be even more forgiving if the air travel market were more competitive than regulatory cartelization has made it.)

Nathan Benedict: But there seems to be enough people willing to do anything to save a buck that such onerous contracts would not have any difficulties finding takers.

Maybe, but again, what makes you think that the price savings to landlords would be great enough to make a significant difference when compared when the countervailing force of increased small-scale competition within the rental market? Just pointing to the existence of demand is not enough to show that something is actually going to be economically viable; you do need to show that the marginal costs faced by the supplier are such that there would actually be profit in it. In any case, the likely effect of increased competition in the market — in particular, increased competition from small-scale or informal-sector players — and the reduction of regulatory fixed costs for landlords, would tend to be lower rental prices, even at the same or better quality of service, no? Hence reducing the amount of advantage that a slumlord could extract by lowering prices below the already-lower rates.

... I think that it would be wonderful for _The Match!_ to be available online, but whoever might attempt to put it up should be aware that, given Fred