MBH:
But now I tend to think it’s an open question.
Well, everything’s an open question — nobody with any sense is promising a strategy on the grounds that it absolutely guarantees success. The question is what tendencies would push in what direction. And my argument is that, generally, the tendency will probably be towards dissipating great fortunes, (creatively) destroying incumbent corporations, and undermining capitalist social relations. For reasons I’ve already discussed at length. If, on the other hand, that’s not what prevails — if the strategy fails, as it might — then failure is just going to be failure to keep the state abolished in the first place — that is, for powerbrokers to try to recuperate the cultural prestige and externalization of costs that they had through the state. But that would just be to recreate the state. Of course, the reemergence of a state is a well-known and much-discussed danger for any anarchistic society, but you’ve given no reason as yet to consider it inevitable, and all of this is certainly no reason to think that having to rebuild the state from scratch would be somehow more advantageous to the robber barons than is simply availing themselves of a ready-made state that they already have.
GE’s a terrible example because it would certainly be too expensive for them.
A terrible example for what? We were talking about enforcing intellectual monopolies without the state, so it makes sense to discuss a company that subsists mainly on its patent portfolio. We could talk about Microsoft, GlaxoSmithKline, Time Warner, or whoever you want, but I don’t think that changing the company will change the outcome. If it turns out that this kind of proposal is absurd for any of the major intellectual monopoly leeches, then it seems likely that intellectual monopoly would indeed collapse in a stateless society, as predicted.
But what about, say, Citi, Magnetar, and a few other hedge funds?
Uh, well, what about them? CitiGroup controls fewer resources than G.E., not more (they have a much lower market cap, make much lower revenues, and lost about $1,606,000,000 last year, while G.E. made $11,025,000,000 in profits. Citi is also obviously not any more independent than G.E. from continuous and ongoing government privilege and subsidy as a basic part of their business model; you may recall that they’ve been bailed out by the feds four different times, were insolvent as of November 2008 prior to massive infusions of extorted cash. There is also the minor fact that the United States government currently owns about 1/3 of the bank.
If paying for enforcement on their own dime and without cultural sanction is not going to be sustainable for G.E. there is absolutely no reason to believe it would be sustainable for CitiGroup, or any other money-monopoly firm, either. (The financial sector, as a whole, is uniquely and peculiarly dependent on a very complicated network of interlocking government regulations, cartels, and massive direct subsidies.)
And if that’s the case, how could the highest level companies not control the flow of capital to such a degree that they essentially owned the US armed forces?
If there were no U.S., which is the hypothetical situation we were considering, there would be, ex hypothesi, no U.S. armed forces, either. Perhaps you mean hiring up the men and buying up the equipment after the U.S. military disappears? But if so, how is that a different case from any other case of hiring on private enforcement? How does it differ at all from the case I just discussed?