Posts from 2006

This dude went nuts…

This dude went nuts at Ephraim saying that abortion is a serious issue… He wasnt saying otherwise dipsh!t. He was saying that all we focus on now is social issues.

I think you may be missing the point.

I was questioning Harel’s separation of abortion from “debate on matters that actually impact the daily lives of Americans.” Because the availability of abortion does actually impact the daily lives of about 150,000,000 Americans. Viz., women.

I’d raise similar questions about your use of the phrases “real politics” as if it didn’t include abortion and “social issues” as if the availability of an important medical procedure were just a matter of the cultural beliefs people ought to hold, rather than a material reality in women’s daily lives.

Broadly speaking, it’s alarming when men who consider themselves to be on the Left talk as if an issue weren’t something that matters to most people’s daily lives, just because the people whose daily lives it affects happen not to be male.

Twisty wins at contemptuous…

Twisty wins at contemptuous invective!

Les: The thing about BDSM is that it gets people off by being transgressive, etc.

I believe that part of the point is that BSDM isn’t. It’s practitioners just really, really want you to believe that it is.

Aero: Many of the commenters need to remember that making assumptions about something you know nothing about is not an intelligent thing to do. Especially the comments about doubting the consensuality of a BDSM scene. Hell, that’s why I like kinky sex; because there is so much more communication going on before, during, and after than usual vanilla sex.

More than one commenter (Dim Undercellar, in particular) is speaking from personal experience in the BDSM “scene.”

Noting this in passing, I move on to ask: if one of the benefits of “kinky” sex is supposed to be the greater level of communication, what’s to stop you from communicating with your partner before, during, and after so-called “vanilla” sex? It seems like the alleged benefit here is not all that closely connected with BDSM and other forms of “kink.” So if that’s what it is that gets you off, why the specific draw to fetishes that have nothing essentially to do with it? (N.B.: it’s not as if anti-BDSM radical feminists haven’t criticized the attitudes that get brought into the bedroom with so-called “vanilla sex”, for involving, among other things, too little in the way of communication and clear boundaries. Andrea Dworkin wrote a whole book on the subject, entitled Intercourse, just to take one example.)

Jake: It takes a…

Jake:

It takes a $500 million and 12 to 15 years to discover and bring a significant drug to market today. Who is going to invest that kind of money without patent protection?

Boo hoo. Without tariff protection, who is going to invest in American automobiles?

Shannon Love:

If a decision-making about a resource cannot be effectively allocated to private entities via a property mechanism then state will allocate the resource via politics.

Property rights are not “allocated to private entities” by the State. They are earned by honest labor. The real choice is not between State-granted tenure to private monopolies (fascism) or total State property (state socialism); it’s between individual rights and State piracy of any kind.

How you apply this to the issue of government-enforced patent restrictions I’ll leave up to you.

Beck:

So are patent laws moral? I would argue that in general they are for the same reason that copyright laws are moral. If Person X devotes Y time and Z money towards developing a product or service, then that person deserves to benefit from the use by others of the product.

You’re right that the morality of patent restrictions is the real issue here, not the consequentialist pay-off. I’m baffled by your moral case for patents, however. People deserve lots of things; for example, I think that William Lloyd Garrison deserved a million dollars rather than a life lived constantly on the edge of penury for his long and difficult labors against the evil of slavery. But it doesn’t follow from the fact that somebody deserves a certain reward that they have the right to extract it by force. Which is of course what copyright and patents do: create monopoly profits by forcibly suppressing competitors.

You might claim: “Well, look, if I put my time and work and hard-earned money into making an automobile, that’s my property, and I have the exclusive right to sell it. Stopping competitors from selling the car I made isn’t extracting a monopoly profit by force, in any interesting sense; it’s just suppressing brigandry. It’s the same way with ideas for new drugs or with the book that I just wrote.” But there’s an obvious difference between the two cases: in order for me to take the car you made and sell it, I have to deprive you of your ability to sell or use it. That’s why it’s robbery: I deprived you of the property that you own. In order for me to “sell” an “idea,” I don’t need to deprive you of your ability to sell it. I can independently discover it by investing my own time, money, and labor without interacting with you at all; or I can discover it by investing my own time, money, and labor in taking apart and understanding your invention after I buy it; or you can tell me your idea and I can turn around and use the idea you’ve given me. But in all of these cases I’m selling things while leaving you in full possession of your idea. So what have I robbed you of? Nothing. You still have exactly what you had before.

You might point out that, while I’m not depriving you of the chance to sell the expressions of your idea, I am depriving you of the chance to sell the expressions of your idea at the rate you think you deserve. No I’m not: you can sell it at any rate that you want to, and customers will make their own decisions as to whether or not to buy it. You might point out that by underselling you on expressions of your idea, I’m depriving you of customers who might otherwise buy it at the higher price. Well, so what? You don’t have an ownership claim over customers. Sorry.

scott: ‘Good point, Rad…

scott: ‘Good point, Rad Geek. I should’ve put “world governments” instead of “the world.” Admittedly, this entry wasn’t written from a very anarchist perspective.’

Well, fair enough, but I’m still not sure why. I mean, maybe “respect” for elections from other world governments will end up with better results for freedom and justice, and maybe it won’t. Part of it probably has to do with what “respect” means in this context. (If it means, e.g., not going to war over it, sure. If it means taking seriously the idea that the election makes the resulting coalition a proper collective bargaining agent with which to dicker about the rights of all Palestinians, probably not.)

I think the important thing here is that government elections don’t place any legitimate demands on anyone, and so aren’t “respectable” on their own account — at the very most they may be strategically useful for getting other people who buy into majoritarian popular sovereignty to hold back on doing nasty things that they might otherwise do. But I think that one of the most important insights in anarchism is the observation that at its very best, that’s just a means to exchange a more obnoxious band of pirates for a less obnoxious band of pirates. And thus that these kind of appeals need to be taken with a heaping helping of salt, when they are taken at all.

Jason: This reply surprised…

Jason:

This reply surprised me, as I had understood you to favor a full privatization of marriage. If you do favor this option, then it seems you are forced to concede my point, and to admit that government acts at best to protect, never to create, a marriage.

Well, my position is that the concept of a marriage analytically includes recognition within a community; a purely private marriage is no marriage at all. But “private” and “community” can mean different things in different contexts, and “marriage” has at least two, and probably three distinct (though related) meanings: (1) a legal construct counting the spouses as under a single household in the eyes of the government, (2) a religious sacrament sanctifying a romantic and sexual union, and probably (3) some kind of more generalized form of union, recognized within civil society, that underlies (1) and (2). I think that marriage-1 ought to be abolished, marriage-2 is purely a matter for the churches (and has no meaning at all outside of the kinds of sanctifying rituals that churches are or aren’t doctrinally open to), and I don’t have very strong opinions about marriage-3, for a variety of reasons.

I would find this strategy [of striking “marriage” ought of the law books and punting the issue to case-by-case decisions in family court] both impractical and disingenuous. I want a set of rights and obligations that are basically identical to those of married heterosexual couples; as such, I feel I should be up-front and honest about this desire. I also mistrust a patchwork or piecemeal solution for two reasons: 1) Many of the most important rights — including immigration protection — will almost certainly never be obtained short of full civil marriage, and 2) A patchwork of rights and protections is both substantially less convenient for those seeking to obtain them — and substantially easier to revoke than an actual marriage. Notice how in Massachusetts, even those seeking to repeal same-sex marriage are not proposing to nullify the marriages that have already been contracted.

(1) Careful with the language here: if you think that gay marriage already exists even without government recognition, then you already do have a set of rights and obligations basically identical to those of married heterosexual couples; the government just fails to recognize the rights and obligations that you really do have. So what you want is for the government to respect your rights and recognize your obligations, not for you to get those rights and obligations.

(2) I don’t understand why you think that the strategy of punting the issue to case-by-case family law is disingenuous. I’m not proposing that gay marriage advocates conceal what they are about; what I am suggesting is appealing to people’s better natures, and their likelihood to understand the issue better when it’s a matter of understanding particular situations in real people’s lives than when it’s a matter of a cultural-religious turf war to be debated and legislated on. If folks tend to get it better at the level of particulars than at the level of universals, then dialectic should start with the particulars; but that’s a matter of seeking better understanding, not a matter of sidestepping understanding.

(3) I think that “many of the most important rights” discussed in these debates actually ought to have nothing to do with marriage at all in the first place. Exemptions from immigration restrictions are a chief example: the solution is an open border policy, not fiddling with marriage law. You might say that gay marriage has a better shot than open borders at political success in the near future. Fine, but so what? The best direction for political conversation isn’t always determined by the easiest option.

(4) I don’t know whether “a patchwork of rights and protections” is an apt phrase to describe what I’m advocating. What I’m advocating is a common law approach to the issue instead of the ex ante statutory approach that the entire contemporary debate over gay marriage presupposes. Part of the reason that I advocate that approach is practical: I think it will work better, will make it easier to make marginal gains rather than praying for the one decisive blow, and it will minimize the damage in cases where it fails. But part of it is also that I think that the current notion of “marriage,” as recognized in law, is itself a patchwork of a number of things that do not essentially belong together, and including a number of things that shouldn’t exist at all. It’s not that I’m advocating a patchwork; it’s that I think we already have an ugly, motley thing and I’m suggesting we unravel it.

Jason: Indeed I am….

Jason:

Indeed I am. If government did not exist, marriage still would exist. Marriage would still exist at least so long as two people promised one another (and their God(s) and communities) that they would care for one another no matter what, that they would help one another through good times and bad, and that they would forsake all others.

Fair enough; that’s not how I use the word “marriage,” but if that’s how you intend to use the term, and use it consistently that way, then you’ve probably got a linguistic right to it. However, it does seem that this complicates the argumentative ground between you and, for example, Rauch. I haven’t read Rauch’s book, but I have read previous articles, and from those and from the passage on political strategy that you cite, it seems pretty clear that he’s claiming that gay marriage is something that doesn’t yet exist in most of the United States, that ought to be brought into existence by means of democratic political processes. If that’s his conclusion, then he and you might just be using the word “marriage” in two different ways.

Just as a side note, do you take a vow to forsake all others to be essential to a marital relationship? If so, aren’t you defining (open) polygamy out of existence?

To the extent that certain third parties decline to recognize my marriage, they are thwarting my pursuit of happiness, and they are frustrating the very purpose for which I appointed them, and for which I pay their salaries.

I think this is a very romanticized picture of what government officials do and how they are selected and paid. I’m not sure you ought to hinge your case for the requirement on it. In any case, though, the point again is that this seems to complicate the question of where the debate between you and Rauch lies. It’s not that you disagree that third parties ought to be required to recognize the union, apparently; it’s that you disagree over which third parties ought to be required (or, better, in which roles third parties ought to be required) to recognize it.

In these senses, I think Nancy gets things just about right, particularly in the last paragraph. It would be a just and equitable solution for the government to offer civil union contracts to all, but it would not be a practical one. Shame that it isn’t, though, as the word marriage so often has such strongly religious overtones that it leads us into trouble.

My suspicion is that many people tend to react much more positively to legal recognition of family rights within queer relationships much better in particular cases than they do to the abstract question of “gay marriage;” for example, that even many overt bigots who spit fire at the notion of “gay marriage” would object to a court invalidating your will and giving all your effects to your sibling or third cousin or whatever rather than giving them to your spouse. (Similarly denying your spouse the right to act on your behalf in medical decisions.) So why not skip straight over civil unions, even, and simply eliminate “marriage” as a legally recognized category altogether, i.e., to simply devolve the legitimate issues you cite to family law, to be decided case-by-case. This has the advantage of shifting the fight to the terrain on which you’re strongest; it also has the advantage of offering a nice rhetorical strategy for both pro-SSM camp (“eliminate heterosexist privilege! put all families on an equal footing!”) and the anti-SSM camp (“take marriage out of the hands of the judicial activists! let the churches define marriage for themselves!”)

Jason: We could very…

Jason:

We could very easily say that these gay people did own property, …

Right; because property has a well-defined meaning outside of the context of government recognition of property rights. (It’d have to, for libertarian claims such as “taxation is theft” to even be comprehensible.) Are you suggesting that, analogically, gay people are already getting married (thus that gay marriage already exists), and that the only political question remaining is whether government will recognize those already-existing marriages?

Jason:

This is the situation with marriage: It is an individual institution, made by, for, and about indviduals. And it should enjoy the protection of the government for exactly that reason, since government exists to protect the individual and to permit him the pursuit of happiness, free from the interference of others.

So your complaint is that certain third parties (viz. government officials) aren’t required to recognize gay marriages?

alexander: Oddly enough, Ayn…

alexander: Oddly enough, Ayn Rand denounced libertarians as right wing hippies who want to throw bombs, use drugs and disband the FBI.

Well, she objected to the name “libertarian,” and to some individual people who described themselves as such. But Tuccille is right about libertarianism; it usually did begin with Ayn Rand, and her reception among, and influence over, the growing libertarian movement of the time was certainly very different from her reception among, and influence over, the growing conservative movement of the time. (And many of the members of “conservative” groups who were influenced by her ended up leaving — e.g. in the departure of the libertarians from YAF.) Incidentally, I don’t think there’s any correct sense of “conservatism,” no matter how broad, that includes free markets as a matter of moral principle, let alone militant atheism or hostility to cultural traditionalism. But this is well off the topic by now; in any case, Rand’s (astonishingly reactionary) attitudes towards sexuality and women’s proper relationship to men are fodder enough for the point you wanted to raise, quite apart from any questions about “conservatism” proper.

alexander: Well, that is like saying that people who object to communism owing to their experiences in the USSR lack any genuine knowledge of Marxist ideology. (Or people who had a bad experience with the Inquisition lacking any knowledge of christian doctrine.)

I hope that you understand that comparing whatever bad experiences a man in the United States may have had with feminism, or with something that he thought or imagined to have something to do with feminism, to the reign of terror in the Soviet Union, or in Europe under the Inquisition, is insulting. Not just to feminists, but also to the victims of Communism and the Inquisition.

We have to deal with the reality, not the theoretical.

That’s fine, but someone who has not taken the time to so much as, say, read a sustained discussion by a feminist of feminist thought and action, or a serious book-length memoir or history of the feminist movement — and, to be clear, this encompasses every anti-feminist I’ve ever met who based his or her position on bad run-ins with something he or she took to be related to feminism — has not done the basic homework necessary to understand the reality. Basic facts about the positions advocated by major feminist thinkers or the actions and historical trajectories of important feminist groups are an important part of what the reality of feminism is.

Vacula: Rad Geek, I’m not saying it’s justified for MRAs who’ve had bad experiences with one or more feminists to hate all feminists or reject all feminist theory. I was appreciating Hugo’s awareness of the danger in looking to personal (bad) experiences as the most effective motivation for feminists. That’s an approach that fails to really trust that the ideals of the movement are worth pursuing on their own merits. If a feminist can say “all MRAs are personally biased against feminism because they don’t understand it and have had bad personal experiences with unworthy feminists,” what prevents an MRA from discounting feminism (if primarily motivated by bad personal experinces) as a movement of “angry women who resent men because they’ve been taught to feel victimized”?

Well, fair enough; unreflective appeals to personal experience or testimony can be dangerous. But I think there are some important differences between the appeals that some feminists make to first-hand experiences of victimization by men and the appeals that MRAs (for example) make to first-hand experiences of what they take to be bad treatment at the hands of what they take to be feminism. One difference being that women can be pretty sure when their victimizers are men whereas MRAs often seem to have a very confused idea of when they are encountering feminism at all (e.g. the frequent identification of bad experiences in family court with oppression at the hands of some kind of congealed feminist power-structure; it’s not just unrepresentative feminists, but also people who have very little relation to feminism at all that MRAs take to be victimizing them in the name of the mythical feminist hegemony). Women’s first-hand experiences of victimization by men generally also include a number of things that are indisputably wrongs (e.g. rape, battery, street harassment, overt prejudice against women, etc.) whereas MRAs first-hand experience is at best a mixed bag (whether or not you were treated unfairly in family court is a much more complicated question than whether your husband was wrong to beat you; other common objections, such as the purported anti-male bias in education, are simply delusory). There are a lot of other distinctions that can be drawn. Broadly speaking, I don’t think that “starting from personal experience” means “treating everyone’s say-so as equally decisive in political questions,” which is important, since treating everyone’s say-so as equally decisive is obviously a dead-end strategy. (I also don’t think that starting from personal experience means not trusting the ideals of the movement to be worthwhile on their own merits; I do think, though, that trusting women’s first-hand experiences is — as the Redstockings, for example, argued — both an important ideal of the movement and an important way of discovering what the further ideals of the movement should be. (To be clear, I don’t think that Hugo was arguing against either of these things, or that you were; I’m just trying to clear up where I’m standing.)

All that said, I think that you make an excellent point above when you point out (among other things) that the sort of first-hand experiences that feminism should be interested in are broader than women’s first-hand experiences of victimization by men, and that among other things women’s first-hand positive experiences of (e.g.) sisterhood ought to be given attention as well.