Posts from January 2006

Mr. Bad: “As for…

Mr. Bad: “As for Arwen’s ad hominem against Richard, I’m slightly surprised that you let it slide; I thought personal attacks were out of bounds here.”

This is something of a pet peeve of mine.

The fallacy of argumentum ad hominem is committed when you (irrelevantly) appeal to facts about the person advocating a view or advancing an argument, as a substitute for addressing the argument. In its circumstantial form, the appeal points out properties that are supposed to explain why the person is making an argument, and tries to use them to explain away or dismiss the argument. In its abusive form, the appeal points out properties that are supposed to make the advocate bad or untrustworthy, and so to dismiss or undermine the argument without considering it on its own merits.

Argumentum ad hominem is not committed whenever somebody insults another person, or engages in “personal attacks.” (It is only when the attacks are insults are falsely presented as a counter-argument to some point that the fallacy is committed.) Arwen didn’t do this to Richard. In fact, she didn’t engage in any personal attacks at all: she merely used sarcasm to point out that the standards that he was applying to the feminist movement, and to feminist theory as a whole, were unfair.

Hope this helps.

Clarificatory questions

Could you give an example of someone who you do think was a hero or a martyr of the civil rights movement?

And maybe also explain why you think that the purpose of the civil rights movement was to please or cater to white people’s sensibilities?

Perhaps it has something…

Perhaps it has something to do with the fact that “faith” was once counted among the cardinal virtues?

“Where [is] the wise? where [is] the scribe? where [is] the disputer of this world? hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world? For after that in the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe. … But God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise; and God hath chosen the weak things of the world to confound the things which are mighty; …”

This is not to say that the theme of “just believe” in children’s fantasy is an intentional or even an accurate expression of the purported theological virtue. Or that people were right to regard this kind of faith as a virtue to begin with. But I do think that this obviously has to be part of the correct explanation.

Tlaloc, I agree with…

Tlaloc, I agree with you that the question of what the law should be is more interesting, and important, than the question of what the law in fact is. But I do not think that this is nearly as essential to the argument as you seem to take it to be. Here are some quotes from you that I think are indicative of what is essential to the argument:

Tlaloc: This is why intent matter. Make sense now?

Tlaloc: Intention is critical. If the guy keeps the wallet because he thinks I’m thanking him for shooting the maniac behind me he did not rob me.

Tlaloc: I don’t think he should be charged with armed robbery since he had no intention to rob. He should of course be charged with B&E and assault.

Tlaloc: Because he is the one accused of a crime. Frankly this question has me stumped, why wouldn’t you consider the motivation of the kidnapper? Rape is a crime but sex is not. Motivation and action both play a role in distinguishing the two.

Tlaloc: Stating something does not make it true. You believe that consent is all important. I believe that consent is certainly important but that intent is also.

These comments clearly indicate that you are arguing at cross-purposes with the other commenters in this thread. Further that you are arguing at cross-purposes because you have the wrong idea, or a confused collection of ideas, of what “rape” and “consent” mean.

Rape is defined as non-consensual sex. I am going to simply stipulate this without argument, because it is obvious. If you don’t believe me, look it up in a dictionary. It is important to note that “non-consensual sex” does not mean “sex intended to be non-consensual;” it means sex that is, in fact, non-consensual.

Thus, what matters here — and also, incidentally, in other cases of assault and battery, robbery, and other similar crimes — is whether what happened was coerced or consensual.

And, here is the important part: when we say that something is coerced, that’s because of what happened to the victim. Not because of what’s going on with the perpetrator. If sex is coerced under duress (here, through the use of repeated physical violence, threats, and terror), then, under any sane moral standard, that sex is non-consensual, no matter what the coercer had in mind when he did the coercing. It’s non-consensual because the victim didn’t consent; not because the coercer intended for her not to consent. And if the sex is non-consensual, then it is rape.

If you want to argue about whether rapists should be treated differently by the criminal justice system, or in moral discourse, depending on the intent that they had when they committed the rape, then you’re free to do so. What you’re not free to do is make up your own definition for the word “rape” so as to make it dependent on the rapist’s, rather than the victim’s, condition.

“Capitalism”

I think before we can get any traction on this question we need to be clear about what the competing claims are about. When you “challenge those who argue that FDR ‘saved capitalism’” to provide further information, (1) what do you think your interlocutors are using the word “capitalism” to mean? and (2) what are you using the word “capitalism” to mean?

I ask because there are several different uses of the word “capitalism,” including (1) a voluntary economic order under conditions of laissez-faire et laissez passer (“the free market”), (2) active government support for big business through forcible accumulation, monopolization, and protection of industrial capital (“state capitalism” or “the corporate State”), and (3) a particular form of labor market, in which most goods are produced by wage-laborers working for a boss who owns the means of production (“the wage labor system,” or “boss-directed labor”). But (3) is orthogonal to either (1) or (2) (it could in principle exist under either system) and (1) and (2) are in fact mutually exclusive. (1) has almost never existed in its pure form in human history; (2) and (3) have been very common, especially over the past 150-200 years. (I discuss the terminological issues in more length elsewhere, e.g. at http://radgeek.com/gt/2005/03/31/anarquistas_por.)

So it seems to me that I need to know what “capitalism” means, before I can have any idea of whether FDR saved it, destroyed it, left it untouched, or never even came upon it in the first place.

“The person simply deserves…

“The person simply deserves to be punished in the criminal legal system regardless of the effect on restraint and deterrence.”

Again, whether or not a person deserves X and whether or not we can legitimately give her X are two different questions. I have very little in the way of confident positive beliefs about what murderers do or don’t deserve, but I am quite sure that even if a murderer does deserve punishment we can’t rightfully inflict that on him or her against her or his will. (Again, because as a libertarian I condemn all forms of violence not in defense of self or others, and we’ve stipulated that the punishment in question serves no defensive purpose. If you intend to show that we can rightfully inflict punishment on someone who deserves it, against that person’s will, you’ll have to give reasons to think not only that they do deserve it, but also that the ordinary ban on aggressive violence is repealed in the case of convicted criminals.)

“What kind of restitution are we talking about for murder?”

I mean damages for wrongful death, payable to the victim’s estate (since the victim is dead). The sort of thing that you could today gain through a wrongful death suit (or perhaps more, since a system that exclusively depended on restitution might tends towards higher restitution than one in which restitution is thought of as something taken in addition to punishment).

“There are some crimes that are so heinous, that yes, it really wouldn’t bother me — that is, were I the master civil magistrate, I would vet such a punishment — but I’m not sure if the parent murder hypo that we are discussing is one of them.”

But you are sure that killing the murderer (provided that there’s no chance of error, etc. etc.) would be a fit punishment?

(As far as the 8th Amendment goes, well, let’s set that aside. The 8th Amendment can be changed or repealed if it serves the aims of justice to do so.)

Come on now, you…

Come on now, you can think of worse people for 1860-1880 than Robert E. Lee, can’t you? Lee was a slaver and a sleazebag, but he was as nothing compared to Nathan Bedford Forrest (perpetrator of the Ft. Pillow massacre and founding father of the Ku Klux Klan), or William Tecumseh Sherman (inventor of modern scorched-earth warfare in the 1860s, and genocidaire of the Plains and Southwest Indians in the 1870s-1880s), Alexander Stephens (Vice President of the Confederacy and author of the infamous “cornerstone speech”), etc.

Joseph McCarthy also seems like an overhyped choice for the 1940-1960, given the presence of General Curtis LeMay and Senator James Eastland (D-MS), who was as enthusiastic a leader in the hearings as McCarthy himself, and also personally helped to found the White Citizens Councils in the Mississippi Delta.

My perspective on this,…

My perspective on this, taking a step back, is “what good is it to carry around a conception of social justice?”

Well, the libertarian argument for holding libertarian principles of justice (i.e., justice as self-government, or justice as non-aggression) is usually that you should hold them because they are true. Questions of social good can only be sensibly answered after you’ve answered (tacitly or explicitly) the prior question of what would count as a good social outcome, and a theory of justice aims to supply part of the answer to that prior question.

Justice strieks me as a form of self-governance given the fact that every person is their own tyrant upon the world.

I don’t understand what “fact” you are pointing to here. Could you explain?

What tames the millions of tyrants who then walk the earth?

Judo. Or possibly guns.

In all seriousness, if you are asking how you stop people from violating each others’ rights in a libertarian society, that’s a question for constitutional theory. It’s an important question for libertarians to answer, but there isn’t any single libertarian answer to the question. Minarchists think that the government should take a primary role in stopping crime, along with private citizens acting individually and together for self-defense. Anarchists reject all forms of government on principle, and so favor individual and cooperative private self-defense. Some libertarians think that to build a sustainable libertarian society you need to engage in a process of education and moral agitation to get more people to accept libertarian or individualist ideas. Others think that you just need to give people the right tools and count on them to protect their own self-interest. Different libertarians favor different means of defense (unorganized armed populace, local militias, for-profit specialized defense agencies, martial arts, shifting resources towards security of home and property rather than stopping attacks in-progress or punishing after-the-fact, nonviolent passive resistance on an individual or coordinated level, etc. etc. etc.). A lot of us (myself included) tend to think that libertarians should leave a lot of this up to individual people and particular communities to decide, rather than insisting on a one-size-fits-all strategy, on the grounds that if you get out of people’s way, and let them talk with each other and make their own decisions, you’ll usually get a variety of interesting and innovative solutions to the problem that you wouldn’t get if you handed down a central plan from on high.

So what exactly is libertarianism offering the student of political life?

Boundary conditions on the acceptable means for carrying out political or social projects.

Habib: Maybe if Pro-Choicers…

Habib: Maybe if Pro-Choicers would PICK THEIR BATTLES we would be more sucessful. This was not a law that ended your reproductive rights.

In case you haven’t noticed, we were successful. Casey, for all the many problems with the decision, did strike down the law we were opposing.

As well it should have: whatever the law’s effects on “reproductive rights,” it was clearly a threat to women’s rights to act as autonomous human beings. As the plurality put it in Casey,

A husband has no enforceable right to require a wife to advise him before she exercises her personal choices. If a husband’s interest in the potential life of the child outweighs a wife’s liberty, the State could require a married woman to notify her husband before she uses a post-fertilization contraceptive. Perhaps next in line would be a statute requiring pregnant married women to notify their husbands before engaging in conduct causing risks to the fetus. After all, if the husband’s interest in the fetus’ safety is a sufficient predicate for state regulation, the State could reasonably conclude that pregnant wives should notify their husbands before drinking alcohol or smoking. Perhaps married women should notify their husbands before using contraceptives or before undergoing any type of surgery that may have complications affecting the husband’s interest in his wife’s reproductive organs. And if a husband’s interest justifies notice in any of these cases, one might reasonably argue that it justifies exactly what the Danforth Court held it did not justify — a requirement of the husband’s consent as well. A State may not give to a man the kind of dominion over his wife that parents exercise over their children.

Emphasis on important points of principle mine. (Actually, I don’t think that the State has the right to give mothers and fathers that kind of dominion over their children, either, but that’s a separate issue.)

jivin j: So judges should base their rulings on common-sense over the Constitution and legal precedent?

Tiffany might not be rising to take the bait, but hell, I’ll bite. Yes, judges should base their rulings on common-sense over the Constitution and legal precedent if it’s necessary to preserve principles of liberty, equality, and justice. The Constitution was not written in letters of fire or set in stone; it’s a changeable document composed by fallible, limited human beings like you and me, and has no claim to authority over anyone except insofar as it expresses, or conforms to, fundamental claims of liberty, justice, and equality, such as those set out in the Declaration of Independence.

Thus justices are fully in the right to make rulings based on the perceived “spirit” of Constitutional protections that don’t clearly draw from the ipsissima verba of the Constitution (e.g., Miranda, Griswold, Roe), and also right to make rulings that interpret unclear passages of the Constitution in the ways that best serve liberty, justice, and equality, rather than in the ways that best reflect legal precedent (e.g. Brown, overturning Plessy and the standing legal precedent of a half-century). Legal precedent not only has no authoritative standing on its own (not even as to Constitutional interpretation, let alone questions of right), but has in fact often been actively repugnant (Dredd Scott v. Sandford, Plessy v. Ferguson, Schenck v. U.S., Buck v. Bell, Korematsu v. U.S., Bowers v. Hardwick, etc.), and when it has been, it deserves the contempt of rational people, and Supreme Court justices, too.

So now what?

Ed: Now, being the…

Ed:

Now, being the defender of the free market that I am, I can’t conceive of any reason why Ford shouldn’t be able to make its own decisions on where it is best to advertise their products.

This seems to me to be special pleading.

The AFA is not claiming, as far as I can tell, that Ford should be legally prohibited from advertising in gay publications. What they are saying is that they intend to reinstate a consumer boycott of Ford by fundamentalist creeps if Ford doesn’t stop advertising in gay publications. You might think that’s a foolish thing to do (I certainly do), but the reasons that it is foolish don’t have anything to do with a debate over “the free market”, or with Ford “making its own decisions on where it is best to advertise their products” in any sense that matters from the perspective of free market principles.

Fundamentalist creeps have every right to try to get the results they want on the free market by refusing, or threatening to refuse, to buy from Ford as long as Ford advertises in magazines they find objectionable. Just as I have every right to refuse, or threaten to refuse, to buy from Ford if they kowtow to such idiotic demands, or if (say) they decided to start running ads in publications that really are morally repugnant, e.g., paedophile or white-power magazines. The fact that big corporations have to account for their business decisions to would-be consumers is not hampering the market; it’s part of the free market at work.

There are more than enough reasons to call the AFA’s demands foolish. Making specious appeals to free market principles, though, just reinforces the confusion — which all too many people, both libertarian and non-libertarian, already have — between “the free market” and “blind deference to big business.”