“The constraint-theorist must take…
“The constraint-theorist must take these constraints as being more important than human wellbeing. After all, if they really just valued human wellbeing, they would be maximizers instead.”
This line of argument presupposes that you can spell out what “human well-being” is without ever mentioning (say) justice or respect for persons as a constitutive part of the account. (If you can’t, then saying that someone who just cares about human well-being should try to maximize it even if it means violating the side-constraints or not is rather like saying that someone who just cares about singing the Ode to Joy should sing it even if it means singing “and so say all of us” instead of “Tochter aus Elysium.”)
But why should you believe that? And why should you expect someone who is not already a consequentialist to accept the doctrine?
Anticopyright.